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ABSTRACT  OF  DISSERTATION 
CARE  WORKING  CONDITIONS:  
THE  ETHICS  AND  POLITICS  OF  SOCIAL  REPRODUCTIVE  LABOR  
FROM  ARISTOTLE  TO  MARXIST  FEMINISM 
The  spectre  of  an  inescapably  divided  working  class  has  haunted  every  generation  of 
marxist  theorists,  including  the  latest  wave  of  marxist  feminists  engaged  in  the  research 
programme  known  as  Social  Reproduction  Theory  (SRT).  In  this  dissertation,  I  will  explain 
how  Marx’s  clear  theoretical  debt  to  Aristotle  extends  into  the  marxist  feminist  analysis  of 
social  reproductive  labor  and  of  the  exploitation,  class  interests,  and  normative  demands 
which  condition  such  care  workers.  I  will  demonstrate  how  SRT  can  follow  Marx’s  own 
example  in  reading  Aristotle,  critically  yet  charitably,  in  order  to  resolve  three  problems. 
First,  Aristotle’s  original  concept  of  use  value  (built  upon  by  marxist  feminists)  can  help  to 
clarify  how  exploitation  is  mediated  through  hierarchical  sub-classes.  Second,  one  version 
of  neo-Aristotelian  virtue  ethics,  which  borrows  from  feminist  care  ethics,  can  offer  marxist 
feminism  a  ‘dialectical  ethic’:  as  contexts  change,  so  too  should  one’s  requisite  actions  and 
feelings  in  order  to  keep  a  balanced  character  exemplifying  liberatory  virtues  (e.g.  care  and 
justice)  rather  than  reactionary  vices  (e.g.  neglect  and  complicity).  Third,  Aristotle’s 
nuanced  concept  of  the  common  good  (despite  its  problematic  hierarchicalism)  can  inform 
marxist  feminism’s  liberatory  strategy,  which  involves  transforming  and  aligning  both  the 
external  goods  (e.g.  material  necessities)  and  internal  goods  (e.g.  virtuous  capabilities)  of 
each  subclass  in  a  patriarchal  racialized  class  system. 
KEYWORDS:  Feminism,  Marxism,  Aristotle,  Virtue  Ethics,  Exploitation,  Common  Good 
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The  text  you  are  reading  is  mine,  but  it  is  not  my  own;  it  was  bought  with  a  price. 
No,  not  bought—stolen:  a  product  of  exploitation,  oppression,  and  alienation.  It  represents 
hundreds  upon  hundreds  of  hours  of  unpaid  care  work  by  my  wife  Julianne,  who  (due  to 
our  nation’s  infrastructural  failures)  had  to  put  her  own  life  projects  on  hold  to  solo-parent 
and  homeschool  our  children  full  time,  in  order  to  allow  me  to  complete  the  research 
manifested  in  this  project.  It  represents  all  the  graduate  school  rejections,  college  loan 
denials,  high  school  expulsions,  and  underfunded  elementary  school  experiences  which 
conspired  to  keep  an  unknown  student  of  color  from  receiving  the  graduate  assistantship 
that  instead  allowed  me—a  middle  class  white  male—to  earn  a  higher  degree.  But  it  also 
represents  the  frankly  unliveable  wages  which  even  the  best  among  neoliberal  universities 
offer  to  ‘privileged’  graduate  student  workers  such  as  myself,  in  exchange  for  teaching  the 
same  number  of  classes  as  their  senior  colleagues  among  the  tenured  faculty  (not  including 
the  additional  moonlighting  jobs  which  only  slightly  offset  the  requisite  student  loans). 
These  are  social  problems  which  far  outstrip  the  agency  of  any  individual,  myself  included. 
And  yet,  to  varying  degrees,  we  are  all  complicit.  But  these  gradations  of  complicity 
indicate  the  lurking  presence  of  social  structures  which  sort  us  into  different  positionalities. 
While  social  interactions  need  not  be  zero-sum  dynamics,  hierarchy  produces  anergic 
(rather  than  synergic)  conditions.  When  the  needs  and  abilities  of  some  are  overvalued, 
they  become  privileges  and  powers  at  the  expense  of  the  marginalized  and  powerless.  This 
antagonism  even  manifests  fractally  within  segmented  subaltern  groups.  
The  specter  of  an  irreconcilably  divided  working  class  has  haunted  every 
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generation  of  marxist  theorists.  This  includes  the  latest  wave  of  marxist  feminists  engaged 
in  the  research  programme  known  as  Social  Reproduction  Theory  (SRT),  who  examine 
how  identity-based  hierarchies  (with  materialist  roots)  undermine  working  class  solidarity 
and  revolutionary  potential  by  partially  privileging  and  empowering  some  workers  at  the 
expense  of  others.  In  this  dissertation,  I  will  explain  how  Marx’s  clear  theoretical  debt  to 
Aristotle  extends  into  the  marxist  feminist  analysis  of  social  reproductive  labor  and  the 
exploitation,  class  interests,  and  normative  demands  which  condition  such  care  workers.  I 
will  demonstrate  how  SRT  can  follow  Marx’s  own  example  in  reading  Aristotle  critically 
yet  charitably  in  order  to  better  theorize:  (1)  how  exploitation  is  mediated  through 
hierarchical  sub-classes,  (2)  how  the  interpersonal  virtue  of  care  functions  as  an  exploitative 
vice  from  the  perspective  of  marxist  feminism’s  justice  ethics,  and  (3)  how  a  democratic 
common  good  might  be  constructed  to  resolve  the  conflicting  interests  of  productive  and 
reproductive  sub-classes  within  the  great  chain  of  exploitation  which  constitutes  a 
patriarchal  class  society,  whether  ancient  slavery  or  contemporary  capitalism. 
The  past  decade  of  late  capitalism  has  constituted  a  breaking  point  in  the  post-Cold 
War  neoliberal  consensus.  The  Great  Recession  of  2008  dispelled  the  bourgeois  myth  that 
class  status  is  an  insignificant  factor  of  social  injustice  compared  to  identitarian  oppressions 
on  the  basis  of  gender,  race,  sexuality,  ability,  etc.  The  2016  and  2020  U.S.  presidential 
elections  featured  a  self-declared  socialist  candidate,  who  drew  both  mass  coalitional 
support  and  also  criticism  for  being  yet  another  white  male  supposedly  peddling  white  male 
aggrievement  (itself  a  major  force  driving  Trump  to  an  electoral  victory).  
Yet  the  Trump  era  has  shown  clearly  that  the  working  class  is  not  (and  never  has 
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been)  a  predominantly  white  male  demographic,  but  is  instead  a  highly  gendered  and 
racialized  pool  of  exploitable—and  thus  organizable—labor.  Women,  especially  women  of 
color,  have  organized  a  wave  of  public  school  teachers’  strikes,  occupations  of  ICE 
detention  centers  filled  with  imprisoned  immigrant  laborers,  the  #MeToo  feminist 
movement  against  sexual  assault  (primarily  in  the  workplace),  and  Black  Lives  Matter 
protests,  marches,  and  uprisings.  The  latest  generation  of  marxist  feminists  have  viewed 
these  developments  not  as  disparate  advancements  for  women  and  non-binary  people,  but 
rather  as  different  fronts  in  a  class  war  against  patriarchal  capitalism.  And  increasingly,  they 
explain  this  system  with  the  conceptual  tools  of  Social  Reproduction  Theory  (SRT). 
Although  marxists  feminists  have  made  great  strides  in  theorizing  the  social 
reproductive  labor  which  preconditions  exploitable  wage  work,  several  significant 
contradictions  have  surfaced  within  social  reproduction  theory  (SRT)  which  I  will 
enumerate  below.  I  argue  that  SRT  might  resolve  these  tensions  by  engaging  with 
Aristotle’s  social  and  political  insights  not  in  spite  of  but  because  he  remains  perhaps  the 
foremost  theoritical  proponent  of  patriarchy  and  slavery.  Since  Aristotle  is  a  significant 
influence  upon  Karl  Marx  (and  by  extension  marxist  feminism),  SRT  has  the  opportunity  to 
consider  how  social  reproductive  care  work  functions  within  Aristotle’s  understanding  of 
his  own  patriarchal  class  society. 
Firstly,  I  argue  that  Aristotle’s  economic  concepts  of  use  value  and  exchange  value 
(especially  as  different  modes  of  surplus  value)  can  elucidate  the  nature  of  mediated 
exploitation  which  appears  to  characterize  the  relationship  between  an  indirectly  exploited 
social  reproductive  worker  and  directly  exploited  productive  worker.  The  idea  of  use  value 
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is  particularly  important  for  understanding  how  the  post-industrial  U.S.  has  shifted  to  a 
service  economy.  The  emotional  labor  and  care  work  which  has  often  characterized  home 
life  and  a  secondary  sector  of  the  labor  market  (consisting  of  disproportionately  Black, 
Latina,  and  Asian  women)  in  the  process  of  becoming  the  predominant  type  of  wage  work. 
While  this  type  of  labor  is  more  concrete  in  certain  ways,  insofar  as  service  work  directly 
provides  use  values,  it  is  abstract  in  others,  insofar  as  its  use  values  are  largely  consumed  by 
other  workers,  who  produce  surplus  exchange  values  to  be  extracted  by  the  ruling  class. 
Survival  and  subsistence  are  once  again  the  primary  life-functions  for  a  majority  of  citizens 
and  residents  in  the  ‘developed’  world.  This  deliberate  historical  regression  invites 
economic  insights  not  only  from  Marx’s  19th-century  capitalist  society  but  also  from 
Aristotle’s  patriarchal  slave  society  in  ancient  Greece.  In  the  first  chapter,  I  draw  an  analogy 
between  mediated  exploitation  in  the  ancient  world  (viz.  the  wife’s  positionality  between 
the  patriarch  and  the  slave)  and  in  contemporary  capitalism  (viz.  the  productive  laborer’s 
positionality  between  the  capitalist  bourgeoisie  and  the  growing  ranks  of  social 
reproductive  workers).  I  conclude  that  the  privileged  and  marginalized  layers  of  the 
working  class  are  both  exploited,  and  that  class-based  solidarity  is  possible  between  them. 
Secondly,  I  argue  that  Aristotle’s  ethical  concepts  of  virtue  and  vice  (in  dialogue 
with  some  feminist  care  ethicists  who  frame  care  as  a  virtue)  can  be  used  by  marxist 
feminists  to  articulate  a  ‘dialectical’personal  ethics  which  can  resolve  theoretical 
contradicitons  through  praxis  over  time.  Because  marxist  feminism  focuses  on 
macrostructural  injustices  which  can  be  rectified  only  through  collective  action,  it  leaves  the 
individual  moral  agent  without  a  substantive  moral  imperative  deeper  than  avoiding 
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microaggressions  on  the  one  hand  or  supporting  collective  struggles  against  macrostructural 
injustices  on  the  other.  While  these  conditions  are  necessary  for  embodying  marxist  feminist 
values,  they  are  insufficient.  The  former  prefigures  liberation  as  an  inherently  good  end  but 
only  at  an  interpersonal  level,  while  the  latter  configures  liberation  as  a  means  to  eventually 
construct  goodness  at  the  social  level.  The  connection  between  these  two  scales  is  the 
individual  moral  agent  (e.g.  a  radicalized  care  worker)  who  faces  both  concrete  relational 
commitments  and  abstract  social  duties.  Social  reproductive  labor  illustrates  this  tension: 
care  work  functions  as  a  benevolent  virtue  when  viewed  at  the  interpersonal  scale,  but  as 
an  exploitation-enabling  vice  when  viewed  at  the  socio-systemic  scale.  Although  marxist 
feminism  is  consequentialist  (valuing  ‘impact  over  intent’),  the  most  controllable  factor  in 
the  liberation  struggle  to  abolish  patriarchal  racialized  capitalism  is  each  political  subject’s 
character  motives.  Although  marxist  feminism  has  not  produced  a  properly  normative 
ethical  theory,  it  has  a  long  tradition  of  prescribing  character  growth  to  its  adherents.  For 
instance,  communist  organizer  Rosa  Luxemburg  exhorted  class-conscious  workers  to 
cultivate  self-discipline  and  ‘socialist  civic  virtues’.  Bolshevik  feminist  Alexandra  Kollontai 
called  upon  the  men  and  women  of  the  working  class  to  develop  egalitarian  relationships  to 
replace  the  hierarchical  relations  exemplified  in  traditional  marriages  and  families.  Black 
Panther  Shirley  Williams  drew  up  a  moral  code  of  revolutionary  discipline  for  the 
movement’s  children  (as  well  as  adults)  who  were  drawn  in  by  the  Party’s  famous  breakfast 
program.  And  the  Black  lesbian  socialists  of  the  Combahee  Workers  Collective  called  for 
different  but  (hopefully)  convergent  modes  of  self-criticism  and  self-discipline  for  radicals 
of  color  and  their  (often  chauvinistic)  white  fellow  travellers.  The  specific  nature  of 
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character-building  varies  according  to  the  moral  community’s  hierarchical  positionalities 
(along  the  axes  of  class,  race,  gender,  sexuality,  etc).  I  argue  that  marxist  feminists  must 
articulate  a  dialectical  ethic  which  can  account  for  such  undertheorized  norms.  I  conclude 
that  a  combination  of  neo-Aristotelian  virtue  ethics  and  the  feminist  ethic  of  care  can 
provide  marxist  feminists  with  a  theory  which  balances  between  the  particular  and 
universal,  the  relative  and  the  absolute,  motives  and  consequences,  and  egoism  and 
altruism.  
Thirdly,  I  will  argue  that  marxist  feminism  implicitly  endorses  Aristotle’s  political 
concept  of  the  common  good:  even  though  this  appears  to  function  ideologically  to  justify 
exploitation,  it  actually  functions  dialectically  as  the  shifting  horizon  of  shared  interests 
between  different  (sub)classes.  In  the  wake  of  the  2008  financial  crash  and  subsequent 
government  bailout  of  only  the  wealthy  ruling  class,  thousands  of  protesters  in  countless 
cities  chanted  “We  are  the  99%!”  This  rallying  cry  of  the  2011  Occupy  Wall  Street 
demonstrations  posited  a  common  economic  interest  among  nearly  all  sectors  of  the  nation 
(in  fact,  a  multitude  of  nations).  However,  after  this  mass  movement  was  crushed  by  the 
state,  leftists  reconsidered  its  coalitional  strategy.  Some  continued  using  this  rhetoric  and 
coalesced  around  the  social  democratic  campaigns  of  Bernie  Sanders.  However,  others 
criticized  this  movement  as  economistic  and  ‘class  reductionist,’  claiming  that  it  sacrificed 
the  particular  interests  of  oppressed  subalterns  to  the  ‘lowest  common  denominator’ 
interests  of  the  (white)  majority  of  the  populace.  Debates  raged  about  whether,  for  instance, 
‘Medicare  for  All’  or  ‘'Black  Reparations’  was  a  more  effective  strategy  for  rectifying 
economic  inequities  (which  vary  according  to  the  amount  of  wealth  historically  stolen  by 
xi
the  ruling  class).   After  two  cycles  of  such  disagreements,  social  reproduction  theorists 1
Cinzia  Arruzza,  Tithi  Bhattacharya,  and  Nancy  Fraser  published  a  book  called  “Feminism 
for  the  99%.”  Reflecting  on  their  own  political  praxis  in  organizing  the  International 
Women’s  Strike,  Arruzza,  Bhattacharya,  and  Fraser  speculated  what  would  take  to  create 
an  intersectional  movement  which  respects  particular  needs  of  the  special  oppressed  while 
acknowledging  the  need  for  mass  movements.  Their  nuanced  approach  toward  coalitions 
(in  light  of  class,  gender,  race,  and  sexuality)  entails  that  a  common  good  is  not  a  given; 
instead,  it  must  be  constructed.  I  argue  that,  in  order  to  account  philosophically  for  a 
strategy  of  solidarity  across  the  often  gendered  and  racialized  gap  between  productive  and 
social  reproductive  workers,  marxist  feminists  can  re-appropriate  the  Aristotelian  model  of 
the  common  good. 
1 Gray,  1. 
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CHAPTER  1.   MEDIATED  EXPLOITATION:  




1.1   Introduction 
In  this  chapter,  I  will  examine  how  any  class  society—that  is,  a  society  striated  by  a 
ruling  class  and  an  exploited  working  class—relies  on  the  creation  of  hierarchically 
organized  and  mutually  antagonistic  subclasses.  This  often  takes  the  form  of  a  division  of 
labor  between  production ,  which  is  the  human  generation  of  use  values  or  exchange 
values,  and  social  reproduction ,  which  is  the  regeneration  of  the  capacity  to  produce  value. 
Social  reproduction  is  both  a  specific  type  of  production  and  also  the  precondition  for  all 
types  of  production.  It  may  seem  odd  to  counterpose  a  genus  (production)  with  a  species 
(social  reproduction).  However,  this  distinction  is  meant  to  convey  the  difference  between 
that  labor  which  is  the  cause  of  human  labor  power  (i.e.  reproduction)  and  that  labor  which 
is  the  effect  of  actualized  human  labor  power  (i.e.  production).  According  to  marxist 
feminists,  this  division  of  labor  is  a  major  cause  not  only  of  gender  differentiation  and  the 
patriarchal  power  structuring  but  also  of  class  formation  and  the  opposition  of  economic 
interests.   1
Marxist  feminists  maintain  that  the  main  obstacle  to  solidarity  among  subclasses  (a 
phenomenon  referred  to  as  ‘dividing  the  working  class’)  is  not  the  identitarian  protests  of 
marginalized  subalterns,  who  are  often  super-exploited.   Rather,  it  is  the  temptation  for 2
1 Vogel,  170. 
2 While  the  term  “super-exploited”  lacks  rhetorical  sophistication,  it  is  a  technical  term  used  since 
the  1970s  by  marxist  feminists  such  as  Marlene  Dixon  and  anti-imperialist  such  as  Ruy  
Mauro  Marini. 
1 
those  workers  inhabiting  relatively  privileged  socio-economic  positionalities  to  identify 
with  their  exploiters  rather  than  with  their  fellow  workers.   3
These  subclass  functions  are  often  indexed  to  identity  markers,  such  as  race, 
nationality,  and  especially  gender,  which  produce  the  multiply-oppressed  subjects  studied 
by  intersectionality  theory.   However,  this  proliferation  of  compound  identities  (including 4
aspects  such  as  race,  sexuality,  ability,  nationality,  etc.)  has  revealed  a  new  theoretical 
problem.  If  these  aspects  cross-cut  one  another,  then  the  result  is  a  sparsely  populated 
absolute  subaltern  category  (e.g.  disabled,  undocumented,  working-class  lesbians  of  color), 
a  sparsely  populated  absolute  dominant  category  (e.g.  abled,  documented,  wealthy  cishet 
white  men),  with  a  massively  populated  intermediate  category  consisting  of  those 
oppressed  in  some  aspects  and  dominant  in  others.  In  theory,  if  enough  (hierarchalized) 
identity  aspects  and  subgroupings  are  introduced,  the  exponential  result  would  be  a  global 
population  entirely  atomized  according  to  micro-positionalities  and  totally  differentiated 
interests.  Such  individuals  would  have  no  material  or  ideological  basis  on  which  to 
strategically  organize  themselves  to  produce  systemic  change,  because  nearly  all  of  them 
would  benefit  in  at  least  some  way  from  the  status  quo.  Such  subdivisions  can  make 
solidarity—the  confluence  of  interests—nearly  impossible.  Tithi  Bhattacharya  presents  the 
apparent  problem  experienced  by  marxists  who  are  marginalized  by  gender  or  race: 
 
 
3 The  marxist  tradition  contains  an  ongoing  debate  about  the  status  of  privileged  members  of  the  
working  class.  The  more  pessimistic  view  contends  that  they  constitute  a  ‘labor  aristocracy’  who 
inescapably  share  interests  with  the  ruling  class  against  those  of  more  oppressed  workers  (E.O. 
Wright,  115;  Delphy,  15;  Barbalet,  133-34;  Sakai,  25). 
4 Collins,  28. 
2 
“[B]ecause  white  workers  in  the  Global  North  typically  earn  more  than 
workers  of  color,  there  can  never  be  common  grounds  of  struggle  uniting 
them,  as  the  very  real,  material,  empirically  documented  difference  between 
them  will  always  fuel  white  racism.  The  same  can  be  said  about  the  real 
material  differences  between  men  and  women.  What  is  interesting  about 
these  very  real  situations  is  that  to  try  to  challenge  them  within  the  context 
set  by  capitalism—or  capitalist  reality—would  have  two  consequences: 
either failure  (for  example,  as  in  the  numerous  historical  instances  where 
sexism  and/or  racism  overwhelm  or  choke  the  workers’  movement)  or  a 
political  strategy  that  seeks  to  overcome  such  differences  of  race/gender 
between  workers  by moral  appeals ,  asking  people  to  ‘do  the  right  thing’ 
even  if  it  is  not  in  their  immediate  interest  to  do  so.”  5
 
 
Yet  Bhattacharya  ultimately  rejects  this  pessimistic  dilemma  by  calling  for  workers  from  all 
different  strata  to  join  forces  in  solidarity  to  overcome  both  the  competitive  individualism  of 
the  labor  market  and  the  oppressive  hierarchization  of  social  identities.  As  she  writes, 
“Strategic  organizing  on  the  basis  of  such  a  vision  can  reintroduce  the  idea  that  an  injury  to 
[one]  is  actually  an  injury  to  all.”   However,  this  theoretical  basis  for  praxis  assumes  a 6
convergence  of  interests  which  is  not  yet  sufficiently  provided  by  the  branch  of  marxist 
feminism  known  as  Social  Reproduction  Theory  (SRT).  In  my  third  chapter,  I  will 
elaborate  on  the  requisite  conditions  for  such  solidarity.  In  this  chapter,  I  will  articulate  the 
socio-economic  obstacles  which  preclude  it. 
There  has  recently  been  a  critical  reappropriation  of  second-wave  marxist  feminist 
analyses  of  the  domestic  division  of  labor  and  the  unwaged  labor  which  preconditions 
wage  work.  This  has  involved  revisiting  the  1970s  ‘domestic  labor  debate’  between  the 
orthodox  dual  systems  theory  (DST)  and  the  heterodox  unitary  system  theory  (UST).   The 7
DST  school  insisted  that  feminine-coded  domestic  labor  reproduces  use  values  which  are 
5 Bhattacharya,  14-15,  emphasis  added. 
6 Bhattacharya,  89-90. 
7 Vogel,  152;  Weeks,  118. 
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extracted  directly  by  a  gendered  ruling  class  (viz.  men  as  husbands).  The  UST  school 
disagreed:  such  feminized  housework  does  produce  use  value  in  the  specific  form  of  labor 
power  (e.g.  the  capacity  of  a  husband  to  work  his  waged  job),  but  the  ultimate  form  of 
actualized  labor  power  is  extractable  exchange  value.  For  the  purposes  of  my  analysis,  it  is 
rather  irrelevant  whether  DST  or  UST  is  true,  because—unlike  many  of  the  theorists 
cited—I  am  not  trying  to  explain  the  emergence  of  gender  or  patriarchy.  Instead,  I  am 
trying  to  explain  mediated  exploitation  and  how  it  creates  and  hierarchically  structures 
subclasses,  often  on  the  basis  of  identity  factors  such  as  gender,  race,  or  ability.  What  is 
important  about  the  UST-DST  split  is  how  each  theory  safeguards  an  indispensable  value: 
DST  insists  on  intersectional  sensitivity  and  UST  insists  on  intra-class  solidarity.  
Marxist  feminists  have  used  the  theoretical  insights  of  SRT  to  explain  the  hidden 
gendered  (and  racialized  and  sexualized)  forms  of  exploitation  beneath  the  wage  labor 
market,  and  they  have  wielded  SRT  practically  to  strategize  liberation  through  direct 
actions  such  as  those  organized  by  the  Wages  for  Housework  movement  in  the  1970s  and 
the  International  Women’s  Strike  in  recent  years.  8
The  first  generation  of  SRT  resolved  the  problem  of  intra-working-class  solidarity 
by  positing  that  although  gender  relations  (like  other  identity-based  dynamics)  are  indeed 
sites  of  economic  value-extraction,  this  class  conflict  does  not  map  neatly  onto  the 
male-female  binary.  According  to  Silvia  Federici,  the  systemic  function  of  the  division  of 
labor  between  masculinized  production  and  feminized  social  reproduction  is  to 
8 Although  the  same  phenomena  of  domestic  labor  have  been  examined  by  other  subfields  (e.g.  
feminist  economics),  SRT’s  explanatory  model  is  distinctive  both  for  its  historical  materialist 
presuppositions  and  for  its  commitment  to  revolutionary praxis  (including  yet  exceeding  the 
policy  reforms  implied  by  more  liberal  research  programmes).  
4 
hierarchically  divide  the  working  class  to  keep  all  wages  low.  The  fact  that  marginalized 
and  privileged  laborers  usually  both  seek  higher  pay  implies  that  they  share  a  common 
interest  in  resisting  capital  and  therefore  potentially  have  mutual  solidarity.  9
However,  while  the  first  generation  of  SRT  dealt  primarily  with  the  nexus  of 
capitalism  and  patriarchy,  the  second  generation  has  compounded  that  intersection  by 
foregrounding  racism,  colonialism,  cisheteropatriarchy,  and  even  ageism.    The  second 10
generation  of  SRT  has  attempted  to  navigate  “the  rise  of  ‘identity  politics’  [and]  the 
decentering  of  class”  which  has  characterized  the  “postsocialist”  condition  of  leftist  theory 
and  praxis  in  the  neoliberal  era.   By  wielding  the  key  concept  of  social  reproduction, 11
recent  SRT  theorists  have  attempted  to  connect  the  political  demands  for  economic 
redistribution  and  social  recognition  (i.e.  civil  rights).  SRT  insists  that  historical  materialism 
exceeds  intersectionality  theory  in  its  ability  to  account  for  overlapping  oppressions—for 
instance,  the  positionality  of  a  female  care  worker  of  color.   However,  despite  its  major 12
sociological  contributions,  the  latest  wave  of  marxist  feminist  SRT  has  not  yet  adequately 
explained  the  dynamics  of  mediated  exploitation:  i.e.,  precisely  identifying  the  culpability 
for  the  extracted  surplus  value  at  each  node  of  the  economic  hierarchy.  13
9 Federici,  55,  73. 
10 Inspired  by  the  2013  revised  publication  of  Lise  Vogel’s  Marxism  and  the  Oppression  of  Women:  
Toward  a  Unitary  Theory  (1983),  a  recent  collection  edited  by  Tithi  Bhattacharya  called Social 
Reproduction  Theory:  Remapping  Classing,  Recentering  Oppression (2017)  illustrates  the  latest 
and  more  intersectional  wave  of  SRT.  In  it,  Susan  Ferguson  and  Serap  Saritas  Oran  focus  on  age, 
Alan  Sears  writes  about  queer  sexuality,  Bhattacharya  herself  examines  nationality,  and  David 
McNally  surveys  different  theories  of  intersectionality. 
11 Fraser  (1997),  2. 
12 McNally,  108-110;  Collins,  26. 
13 While  this  materialist  conception  of  socio-economic  culpability  may  appear  to  be  unduly  
structuralist  (and  thus  deterministic),  I  will  offer  a  complementary  account  of  subjective  agency  in 
Chapter  2.  Ultimately  I  follow  Naila  Kabeer  in  trying  to  navigate  a via  media  between  the 
individual-based  voluntarism  of  liberal  ethics  or  mainstream  economics  and  the  systemic 
determinism  of  structuralist  sociology  (Kabeer,  326-7). 
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This  lacuna  has  implications  for  the  theoretical  possibility  of  cross-subclass 
solidarity.  I  propose  that,  in  order  to  resolve  the  conceptual  problem  presented  by  working 
class  hierarchical  subdivisions,  marxist  feminists  follow  Karl  Marx’s  own  example  by 
reading  Aristotle’s  economic  texts.   In  Nicomachean  Ethics,  Aristotle  reflects  on  an 14
abstract  and  derivative  mode  of  value  distinct  from  consumptive  ‘use  value’,  a  concept 
which  becomes  known  as  ‘exchange  value.’  For  Marx’s  own  theorizing,  exchange  value 
becomes  an  integral  component  in  the  critique  of  capitalism,  because  capitalism  is  the  only 
classist  mode  of  production  geared  toward  producing  exchange  values  rather  than  use 
values.   SRT  marxist  feminists  have  disagreed  about  whether  social  reproductive  labor 15
directly  produces  exploitable  exchange  value,  or  whether  it  produces  those  use  values 
which  enable  others  to  produce  exploitable  exchange  values.  I  propose  that  Aristotle’s 
examination  of  a  different  mode  of  production—one  in  which  use  values  are  more 
visible—can  illuminate  the  contemporary  economic  relationship  between  productive  and 
social  reproductive  laborers.  I  argue  that  contrasting  the  Aristotelian  model  of  a  culturally 
embedded  economy  with  modern  capitalism’s  culturally  disembedded  economy  can  help 
SRT  better  understand  the  mechanism  by  which  a  division  of  labor  produces  a  division  of 
interests. 
14 Roll,  20.  George  McCarthy  writes:  “Marx  is  repulsed  by  the  despotic  and  authoritarian  structure  
of  this  ancient  economy  based  on  the  domination  of  women  and  slaves.  However,  Aristotle’s 
economic  theory  does  provide  the  foundation  stone  for  his  later  economics  in Capital ” 
(McCarthy,  11). 
15 The  type  of  exchange  value  that  Marx  is  most  interested  in  is  the  wage ,  the  supposedly  equal  
transaction  of  some  of  a  worker’s  labor  power  for  a  portion  of  a  capitalist’s  wealth  (Marx, Capital 
Vol.  I,  128).  While  wage  labor  existed  in  the  ancient  world,  it  was  peripheral  to  the  ubiquitous 
form  of  production:  slave  labor,  which  was  (obviously)  unwaged.  
6 
It  is  counter-intuitive  (to  say  the  least)  to  recommend  that  marxist  feminist  SRT 
looks  to  Aristotle’s  work  for  insights  into  the  nature  of  mediated  exploitation:  Aristotle  is 
one  of  history’s  most  infamous  ideological  apologists  for  patriarchy  and  slavery.   Yet  I 16
argue  that,  insofar  as  marxism  is  already  theoretically  indebted  to  Aristotle,  Aristotle’s 
analysis  of  the  ancient  hierarchical  oikos  can  serve  as  a  microcosmic  model  in  which  to 
track  how  mediated  exploitation  works  in  a  patriarchal  class  society.   In  Politics,  Aristotle 17
depicts  the  ancient  household  ( oikos )  as  a  gendered  class  structure,  which  marxist  feminists 
would  analyze  as  consisting  of  productive  and  social  reproductive  domestic  labor 
performed  by  slaves  and  wives. 
I  suggest  that  the  Aristotelian  role  of  housewife  should  continue  to  interest  marxist 
feminists  even  in  the  post-nuclear-family  paradigm  of  the  21st  century.  Even  though  the 
housewife  is  no  longer  the  most  relevant  exemplar  of  social  reproductive  labor,  historic 
variations  of  the  housewife  role  have  often  occupied  an  intermediate  positionality  on  the 
chain  of  extraction.  I  propose  that  the  ancient  oikos  provides  a  compelling  contrast  case  to 
first-generation  SRT’s  model  of  the  nuclear  housewife:  in  another  (older)  mode  of 
production,  social  reproduction  can  instead  be  performed  by  a  man  (e.g.  the  slave)  for  a 
woman  (e.g.  the  wife).  Precisely  because  the  socio-economic  positionality  of  the  ancient 
16 Coole,  19;  Okin,  74;  Saxonhouse,  63;  Elshtain,  41. 
17 Despite  his  obvious  critique  of  the  latter’s  hierarchicalism,  Marx  praises  “the  brilliancy  of  
Aristotle’s  genius”  (Marx, Grundrisse ,  541)  and  refers  to  him  as  “the  greatest  thinker  of  antiquity” 
(Marx, Capital  Vol.  I,  532).  Even  Marx’s  critique  is  blunted  by  historicism:  “If  a  giant  thinker  like 
Aristotle  erred  in  his  appreciation  of  slave  labour,  why  should  a  dwarf  economist  like  Bastiat  be 
right  in  his  appreciation  of  wage  labour?”  (Marx, Capital  Vol.  I,  175).  In  traversing  intellectual 
history,  it  is  not  my  intention  to  discover  and  defend  a  less  sexist  and  less  classist  Aristotle 
(although  there  are  scholars  who  have  pursued  such  a  hermeneutic  project).  Rather,  I  am  simply 
reading  Aristotle  both  as  the  most  representative  theorist  of  his  era’s  class  structure  and  as  the  first 
(proto)economist  to  articulate  the  two  modes  of  value  which  explain  the  socio-material 
conditions  of  the  polis  (composed  of  oikoi ). 
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housewife  differs  from  contemporary  female  workers,  it  can  illuminate  both  the  different 
possible  intersections  of  gender  and  class  and  the  constant  structure  of  mediated 
exploitation. 
In  the  Aristotelian  oikos ,  the  obvious  exploiter  is  the  patriarch,  whose  freedom  from 
the  burden  of  labor  is  reliant  on  the  exploitative  work  of  both  his  slaves  and  his  wife,  who 
manages  the  slaves.  I  will  employ  the  Aristotelian  (and  later  marxist)  concepts  of  use  value 
and  exchange  value  in  order  to  explain  how  the  managerial  wife’s  own  labor  power 
depends  upon  the  social  reproductive  labor  of  her  slaves.  As  a  domestic  worker,  the 
archetype  of  the  housewife  represents  mediated  exploitation—a  primary  obstacle  to  both 
working  class  solidarity  and  the  possibility  of  constructing  a  classless  common  good.  Yet  I 
will  demonstrate  that  even  the  privileged  subclass  of  housewives  in  antiquity,  which  is 
reliant  on  the  reproductive  labor  of  slaves,  is  not  itself  technically  part  of  the  exploitative 
ruling  class,  which  is  composed  entirely  of  patriarchs.  I  will  propose  that  this  conclusion 
has  significant  bearing  on  how  to  theorize  about  the  possibility  of  shared  interests  and 
solidarity  between  the  productive  and  reproductive  subclasses,  especially  when  they  are 
oppressed  according  to  gender  or  other  identity  aspects.  18
 
1.2   Marxist  Feminism 
Marxist  feminism  is  a  normative  project  dedicated  to  dismantling  both  class-based 
economic  exploitation  (i.e.  capitalism)  and  gender-based  socio-political  oppression  
18 Nancy  Fraser  points  out  that  calls  for  coalition-building  between  different  interest  groups  are  
hopeless  so  long  as  they  merely  advocate  “additive  combinations  among  already  formed 
constituencies”  rather  than  advocating  “novel  social  arrangements  that  could  transform  the 
identities  and  harmonize  the  interests  of  diverse,  currently  fragmented  constituencies”  (Fraser 
[1997],  4).  
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(i.e.  patriarchy).  Its  proponents  are  both  empowered  and  imperiled  by  being  situated  at  the 
intersection  of  two  political  traditions:  marxism  and  feminism.  Because  these  two  traditions 
often  have  divergent  understandings  of  concepts  such  as  gender  and  class,  they  also 
employ  different  definitions  of  evaluative  concepts  such  as  patriarchy  and  exploitation.  19
Following  the  practice  of  Communist  parties,  many  marxist  feminists  distinguish  between 
(special)  oppressions  and  exploitation.  In  this  framing,  oppression  refers  to  the 
socio-political,  intersubjective  conditions  of  an  individual  (regardless  of  class)  who  is 
mistreated  on  the  basis  of  their  identity  (along  the  lines  of  gender,  race,  sexuality,  ability, 
etc.).   The  special  oppression  which  marxist  feminists  have  focused  on  primarily  is 20
patriarchy.  This  is  a  term  shared  with  most  feminists  since  the  Second  Wave  that  identifies 
their  structural  nemesis:  the  nearly  universal  tendency  to  privilege  and  empower  men  and/or 
males  above  women  and/or  females.  Materialist  explanations  can  take  very  different  forms, 
insofar  as  they  disagree  on  whether  patriarchy  and  class  society  form  two  different  systems 
or  one  single  system.  21
Marxists  define  exploitation  as  the  objective,  material  condition  of  a  working-class 
(i.e.  property-less)  individual  whose  labor  produces  surplus  value  which  is  appropriated  by 
a  ruling-class  property  owner.  For  Marxists,  capitalism  is  simply  the  latest  form  of 
exploitative  class  society,  which  has  become  a  nearly  global  tendency  to  distribute  the 
means  of  production  as  private  property,  to  organize  production  through  markets  (both  of 
19 This  is  because—as  both  traditions  emphasize—observation  is  theory-laden,  and  ‘factual’  
descriptions  often  presuppose  evaluations.  
20 This  distinction  is  a  later  development  in  marxism,  as  Marx  and  Engels  use  the  two  terms  
interchangeably  to  describe  and  explain  class  structures  (Marx  and  Engels, Manifesto  of  the 
Communist  Party ,  474). 
21 Delphy,  75;  Mies  (1998),  7-8;  Manning,  7-8.  Delphy  is  a  dual-systems  theorist,  while  Mies  and  
Manning  are  unitary-system  theorists. 
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workers  competing  for  jobs  and  employers  competing  for  customers),  and  to  organize 
consumption  largely  as  the  (re)investment  of  profit  (i.e.  the  surplus  beyond  subsistence). 
While  all  other  modes  of  production  function  to  produce  a  surplus  of  use  values  (e.g. 
stockpiles  of  grain),  capitalism  functions  to  produce  a  surplus  of  exchange  values  (e.g. 
stock  market  gains  on  the  price  of  grain).   22
Marxist  feminists  have  taken  up  these  key  economic  concepts  in  order  to  explain 
the  same  phenomena  that  interests  liberal  feminists—gender,  sexism,  and  patriarchy.  By 
framing  these  in  historical  materialist  terms,  marxist  feminists  have  argued  that  economic 
conditions  have  influenced  and  even  determined  women’s  social  positionalities  throughout 
history.   These  materialist  explanations—and  their  respective  liberatory  strategies—can 23
differ  widely,  depending  on  whether  they  conceptualize  patriarchy  and  class  society  as  two 
different  systems  or  as  one  single  system.   Since  the  New  Left  era  of  the  1970s,  dual 24
systems  theory  (DST)  and  unitary  systems  theory  (UST)  have  grappled  with  how  the 
gendered  division  of  labor  maintains  the  antagonism  between  the  interests  of  masculinized 
productive  workers  and  feminized  reproductive  workers. 
 
1.3   Dual  Systems  Theory  and  Unitary  System  Theory 
SRT  began  as  a  unitary  system  theory  explaining  the  homogeneity  of  class 
exploitation  and  sexist  patriarchy  (as  opposed  to  dual  systems  theory  which  conceptualizes 
22 These  other  modes  of  production  include  not  only  slavery  and  feudalism  but  also  ‘primitive’  
communism  and  modern  state  socialism.  I  elaborate  upon  the  crucial  distinction  between  use 
value  and  exchange  value  below. 
23 Arruzza,  12;  Bhattacharya,  5. 
24 As  Shulamith  Firestone  reiterates,  “Before  we  can  act  to  change  a  situation...  we  must  know  how  it  
has  arisen  and  evolved”  (Firestone,  2). 
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them  as  separate  social  structures).  UST  offers  an  explanation  of  how  mediated  exploitation 
organizes  class  interests  in  a  merely  contingent  way,  which  makes  a  cross-positionality 
coalition  possible.  However,  this  is  challenged  by  DST’s  compelling  explanation  of  how 
interlocking  oppressions  function  in  an  exploitative  class  system.  For  DST,  patriarchy  is  a 
separate  social  structure  from  capitalism.  Although  patriarchy  and  capitalism  reinforce  each 
other,  they  are  distinct—and  this  distinction  is  not  simply  between  a  superstructural 
epiphenomenon  (patriarchy)  and  a  material  base  (capitalism),  but  also  between  two  distinct 
types  of  economic  infrastructures.  In  the  DST  model,  patriarchy  is  its  own  separate  mode  of 
production  (viz.  unpaid  domestic  labor),  operating  in  parallel  to  capitalism.   For  DST 25
theorist  Christine  Delphy,  the  key  structure  for  womanhood  is  wifehood,  which  she  defines 
as  a  socio-economic  class  that  is  distinct  from  and  exploitatively  subordinate  to 
husbandhood.   As  Juliet  Mitchell  argues,  these  two  socio-economic  structures  are 26
distinguished  conceptually  and  functionally,  if  not  materially:  the  woman’s  condition  of 
being  exploited  and  oppressed  (perhaps  by  the  same  man)  constitutes  a  “complex—not  a 
simple—unity.”   27
Among  DST’s  most  convincing  premises  is  the  fact  that  patriarchy  historically 
precedes  capitalism,  which  suggests  that  their  relationship  is  not  a  necessary  correlation  (let 
alone  identity).    The  dual  systems  approach  takes  its  cue  from  Marx’s  intellectual  partner 28
25 Delphy,  73;  Hartmann,  3.  According  to  Gibson-Graham,  “Noncapitalism  is  found  in  the  
household,  the  place  of  woman,  related  to  capitalism  through  service  and  complementarity...  it 
appears  as  a  pre-capitalist  mode  of  production…  [and]  it  appears  as  socialism”  (Gibson-Graham, 
7). 
26 Delphy,  72.  
27 Juliet  Mitchell  identifies  the  four  overdetermining  structures  of  this  complex  unity  as:  
“Production,  Reproduction,  Sex,  and  Socialisation  of  Children”  (Mitchell,  26).  
28 Arruzza,  11. 
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Friedrich  Engels,  who  applied  the  methodology  of  historical  materialism  to  the  existence  of 
patriarchy  in  The  Origin  of  the  Family,  Private  Property,  and  the  State .   Engels  explains 29
how  class  property  relations  and  the  gendered  division  of  labor  are  historical  privations  of 
an  earlier  matriarchal  collectivism.   For  DST  adherents,  even  though  modern  women’s 30
domestic  labor  reproduces  the  entire  class  structure  (i.e.  capitalism),  its  chief  beneficiaries 
are  not  distant  capitalists  but  rather  the  local  men  of  the  house.  DST  proponent  Heidi 
Hartmann  warns  that  any  ‘marriage’  between  marxism  and  feminism  will  ultimately 
suppress  women’s  liberation  in  favor  of  economic  revolution,  because  women’s 
exploitation  (i.e.  patriarchal  oppression  as  an  economic  dynamic)  is  actually  in  men’s 
interests.   31
However,  another  current  of  theorists  have  upheld  marxist  feminism  not  only  as  a 
viable  theory  but  as  a  praxis  which  can  construct  working-class  solidarity  across  gender 
lines.  Social  Reproduction  Theory  developed  primarily  within  UST,  which  holds  that 
patriarchy  and  capitalism  are  simply  two  aspects  of  the  selfsame  social  system,  which 
oppresses  and  exploits  women  and  gender  non-conforming  individuals.   For  UST, 32
patriarchy  is  not  itself  a  distinct  gendered  mode  of  production  as  with  DST  (let  alone  a 
self-reproducing  ideological  system,  as  asserted  by  certain  liberal  feminisms).  The  corollary 
claim  is  that  not  all  men  are  exploiters  and  not  all  women  are  exploited.   UST  insists  that 33
(in  Hartmann’s  critical  description),  in  spite  of  “the  appearance  that  women  are  working  for 
29 Bezanson  and  Luxton,  26-27.  
30 Engels,  The  Origin  of  the  Family,  Private  Property,  and  the  State ,  739.  
31 Hartmann,  5.  She  famously  warns  that  for  marxist  feminists,  “marxism  and  feminism  are  one,  and  
that  one  is  marxism”  (Hartmann,  2).  
32 Mies  (1988),  37-38. 
33 Arruzza,  9. 
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men  privately  in  the  home,”  it  is  actually  the  case  that  “women  work  for  capital”  instead  of 
for  their  male  partners.   UST  theorists  MariaRosa  Dalla  Costa  and  Selma  James  describe 34
the  home  as  “a  colony  governed  by  indirect  rule”  of  capital,  and  that  the  housewife  “is  the 
slave  of  a  waged  slave.”   This  view  implies  that  patriarchy  is  indeed  a  system  of 35
exploitation,  but  one  which  is  internally  essential  for  a  class  society’s  dominant  mode  of 
production  (e.g.  capitalism).   36
Some  unitary  systems  theorists  helped  to  form  the  first  generation  of  SRT,  which 
offered  its  own  explanation  of  mediated  exploitation.  In  the  1970s,  the  international  Wages 
for  Housework  campaign  (launched  by  marxist  feminists  such  as  Dalla  Costa,  James,  and 
Silvia  Federici)  attempted  to  demand  payment  for  this  unremunerated  reproductive  labor. 
Yet  this  demand  was  made  not  of  their  husbands  and  male  partners  (as  DST  might  suggest), 
but  rather  of  the  capitalist  state  (which  Marx  and  Engels  call  the  executive  committee  of  the 
ruling  class).   Echoing  Frantz  Fanon,  Dalla  Costa  and  James  warn  that  the  exploited  will 37
fight  each  other  if  they  do  not  fight  their  mutual  exploiter.   Because  it  permitted 38
inter-gender  solidarity  among  male  and  female  workers,  WFH  was  described  as  the  “most 
controversial”  development  of  the  women’s  liberation  movement.   39
Moreover,  WFH  activists  in  the  first  generation  of  SRT  were  criticized  for  a  type  of 
white  feminism  which  does  not  address  the  experiences  and  interests  of  many 
multiply-oppressed  people  (e.g.  working  class  women  of  color).  By  contrast,  second 
34 Hartmann,  6.  
35 Dalla  Costa  and  James,  56,  58.  
36 Arruzza,  7.  
37 Federici,  9,  12;  Marx  and  Engels,  Manifesto  of  the  Communist  Party ,  475. 
38 Dalla  Costa  and  James,  57. 
39 Federici,  54.  Yet  even  Heidi  Hartmann  (a  DST  proponent)  applauded  the  WFH  campaign  for  
raising  leftist  consciousness  about  the  significance  of  domestic  labor  (Hartmann,  7-8). 
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generation  SRT  examines  the  degree  to  which  identitarian  oppression  and  economic 
exploitation  can  be  explained  through  the  thematic  of  social  reproduction  (and  especially 
social  reproductive  labor).  This  was  seen  in  practice  in  March  2018  in  the  International 
Women’s  Strike.  This  action  (organized  by  SRT  theorists  Tithi  Bhattacharya,  Cinzia 
Arruzza,  Nancy  Fraser,  and  others)  was  a  deliberate  radicalization  of  the  liberal  feminist 
tendencies  of  the  earlier  Women’s  March,  which  had  been  criticized  for  ignoring  the 
classed,  raced,  and  queered  aspects  of  women’s  oppression.   Because  recent  SRT 40
proponents  attempt  to  provide  a  more  intersectional  analysis  than  their  Second  Wave 
feminist  foremothers,  they  may  appear  to  endorse  DST  rather  than  UST.  However,  by 
wielding  historical  materialism’s  dialectical  understanding  of  oppressive  systems  as  being 
internally  contradictory  rather  than  externally  conflictual,  recent  contributions  to  SRT  avoid 
the  additive  atomism  of  intersectionality  theories  such  as  DST.   41
However,  despite  its  improvements,  recent  SRT  still  shares  DST’s  main  theoretical 
weakness:  the  fragmentation  problem.  Arruzza  recognizes  this,  insisting  that  “diversity 
must  become  our  weapon,  rather  than  an  obstacle  or  something  that  divides  us.”  42
Movements  such  as  the  International  Women’s  Strike  demonstrate  the  possibility  of 
building  a  multicultural  united  front  against  capitalism.  However,  because  these  aspects  of 
oppression   (e.g.  gender  identity,  race,  sexuality,  ability,  nationality,  etc.)  are  explained  by 
SRT  at  least  in  part  by  their  economic  roles  in  social  reproduction,  there  is  an  exponential 
proliferation  of  possible  positionalities  within  the  great  chain  of  extraction.  The  multiple 
variations  within  this  “complex  unity”  deconstruct  the  binary  distinction  between  the  ‘labor 
40 Bhattacharya,  19;  Arruzza  (2017),  192,  195. 
41 Arruzza  (2017),  195-196;  McNally,  99. 
42 Arruzza  (2017),  196. 
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aristocratic’  privileged  workers  and  the  multiply-oppressed  super-exploited  workers.   Yet 43
this  analytical  complication  makes  solidarity  less,  not  more,  possible:  the  model  now 
contains  countless  minute  differentials  between  the  more  exploited  (and  thus  less 
exploitative)  and  the  less  exploited  (and  thus  more  exploitative). 
In  the  remainder  of  this  chapter,  I  will  argue  that  Aristotle’s  proto-economic  insights 
can  help  SRT  to  reframe  the  value  of  social  reproductive  labor  in  order  to  determine  the 
degree  of  complicity  borne  by  a  labor  aristocracy  (whatever  its  class  boundaries  may  be).  I 
will  examine  how  the  mode  of  exploitation—effectuated  through  the  division  of 
labor—hierarchically  divides  workers’  interests  according  to  how  they  consume  in  relation 
to  what  they  (re)produce. 
 
1.4   Social  Reproduction 
While  19th  century  orthodox  marxism  focused  on  manual  labor  and  commodity 
production  and  20th  century  Western  marxism  focused  on  desire  and  consumption, 
contemporary  marxist  feminists  focus  on  the  social  reproduction  of  value-producing  human 
labor  power  itself.  Social  reproduction  is  the  most  interesting  type  of  production  to  marxist 
feminists,  because  it  is  classed  and  gendered  (and  often  also  racialized,  sexualized,  and 
‘able-ized’).  Marxist  feminists  redefine  Marx’s  philosophical  anthropology  by  rendering 
human  beings  not  primarily  as  the  productive  laboring  animal,  but  the  reproductive  laboring 
animal.  
43 McNally,  110.  This  dialectical  type  of  systems  thinking  (which  is  obvious  in  Marx’s  more  
Hegelian  texts)  gives  the  lie  to  critiques  by  anti-marxists  such  as  Gibson-Graham,  who  insists  that 
capitalism  is  not  hegemonic  but  rather  “at  loose  ends  with  itself”  (Gibson-Graham,  ix). 
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Although  the  concept  of  social  reproduction  is  broader  than  that  of  domestic  labor , 
it  often  takes  the  form  of  unpaid  care  work  which  is  often  performed  by  a  woman  in  her 
family’s  home.   However,  as  Lise  Vogel  emphasizes,  the  essential  attribute  of  social 44
reproduction  is  the  replenishment  of  labor  power .  Labor  power,  in  turn,  is  the  “capacity  for 
useful  labor”  which  is  “consumed”  via  the  process  of  production.   Social  reproduction 45
(using  a  broad  definition)  can  take  three  forms:  the  daily  replenishment  of  an  individual’s 
ability  to  work,  the  intergenerational  replenishment  of  the  workforce  en  masse,  and  the 
wholistic  perpetuation  of  the  mode  of  production  of  the  entire  society.   Federici  narrows 46
the  concept  to  social  reproductive  labor:  the  set  of  tasks  (typically  performed  in  a  familial 
home)  which  are  necessary  to  sustain  a  productive  laborer  to  return  to  their  paid  job.  Such 
social  reproductive  labor  was  typically  the  role  of  a  housewife  who  cooked,  cleaned,  and 
performed  affective  labor  for  her  wage-working  husband,  and  gestated,  birthed,  and  cared 
for  her  children—the  next  generation  of  laborers.   47
Increasingly,  however,  these  tasks  have  been  deterritorialized  and  reterritorialized 
within  the  waged  labor  market.   Today,  a  woman’s  social  reproductive  labor  often 48
involves  caring  for  additional  productive  wage  workers:  her  elderly  but  still  employed 
parent,  her  working  adult  child  who  still  lives  with  her,  and  especially  for  herself.   This  last 49
44 Bezanson  and  Luxton,  32;  Arruzza,  21.  Laslett  and  Brenner  provide  a  standard  (though  limited  
and  contestable)  definition  of  social  reproduction:  “the  activities  and  attitudes,  behaviors  and 
emotions,  responsibilities  and  relationships  directly  involved  in  the  maintenance  of  life  on  a 
daily  basis,  and  intergenerationally…  includ[ing]  various  kinds  of  work—mental,  manual,  and 
emotional”  (Laslett  and  Brenner,  382-83). 
45 Marx,  Capital  Vol.  I,  283;  Vogel,  138. 
46 Hartmann,  6;  Vogel,  27,  158-69;  Federici,  5;  Bhattacharya,  6. 
47 Federici,  49.  However,  the  nuclear  family  as  a  unit  of  reproduction  was  never  very  stable:  
capitalism  has  historically  maintained  women  as  a  reserve  army  of  labor  who  are  sometimes 
forced  to  work  outside  the  home  as  well  as  inside  it  (Dalla  Costa  and  James,  54). 
48 Federici,  49. 
49 The  ‘self-care’  which  this  involves  is  not  leisurely  personal  indulgence,  but  rather  the  unpaid  
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responsibility  is  due  to  the  neoliberal  expectation  that  working  class  women  should  work  a 
‘double  shift’:  the  unwaged  second  shift  of  domestic  labor  is  the  necessary  preparation  for 
the  next  day’s  first  shift  at  a  waged  job.   50
Social  reproductive  labor  is  one  type  of  social  reproduction,  which  is  in  turn  one 
type  of  production.  However,  at  the  micro-level  at  which  workers  live  their  lives, 
production  and  reproduction  often  take  on  opposed  yet  complementary  roles—even  though 
the  latter  is  technically  one  specific  form  of  the  former.  In  SRT’s  framing,  social 
reproduction  and  commodity  production  are  merely  two  phases  of  a  single,  cyclical 
process.   It  is  the  very  continuity  of  these  aspects  which  makes  it  difficult  for  the  marxist 51
analysis  of  exploitation  to  track  surplus  value  upwards  through  the  economic  hierarchy.  
Federici  argues  that  the  traditional  domestic  division  of  labor  between  productive 
and  reproductive  labor  is  a  bourgeois  strategy  to  divide  and  conquer  the  working  class 
along  gender  lines.   Despite  the  interdependence  of  producers  and  reproducers,  capital 52
deviously  divides  such  laborers  between  the  ‘productive’  and  the  ‘non-productive,’  pitting 
the  latter  against  the  former  as  dependents  who  must  earn  their  keep  indirectly  off  the 
market.   Even  though  the  capitalist  economy’s  entire  labor  force  is  (re)created  by  social 53
reproductive  labor  (often  in  the  form  of  unwaged  housework),  it  often  goes  uncompensated 
off-the-clock  disciplines  which  are de  facto  job  requirements  of  every  worker,  in  order  to  prepare 
them  to  work.  A  worker’s  sleep  regimen,  personal  hygiene  routine,  meal  plans,  and  commute  all 
revolve  around  their  job  and  must  be  tended  to  as  if  they  were  officially  parts  of  it  (James,  21). 
50 This  has  been  the  case  for  Black  women  for  much  longer,  dating  back  to  the  U.S.’s   slavery  era  
(Davis,  238).  Likewise,  as  Maria  Mies  writes,  the  integration  of  Indian  women  lace  workers  “into  a 
world  system  of  capital  accumulation  has  not  and  will  not  transform  them  [fully]  into  free  wage 
labourers.  It  is  precisely  this  fact—their  not  being  free  wage-labourers,  but  housewives—which 
makes  capital  accumulation  possible  in  this  sector”  (Mies  [1981],  500). 
51 Bhattacharya,  3. 
52 Federici,  8.  
53 Federici,  36.  
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because  it  is  seen  as  not  producing  value.   Capital  keeps  its  labor  costs  low  by  relying  on 54
such  unwaged  labor  as  a  precondition  for  the  labor  which  is  officially  recognized  in  the 
formal  waged  economy.  This  illusion  can  be  sustained  only  because  the  exchange  values 
circulating  in  the  market  are  ultimately  dependent  upon  use  values  which  are  (re)produced 
and  consumed  elsewhere—often  at  home.  
 
1.5   Use  Value  and  Exchange  Value 
Marxist  feminists  insist  that  the  standard  description  of  value  production  (shared  by 
many  bourgeois  and  marxist  economics)  is  superficially  misleading,  and  they  challenge  the 
claim  that  a  productive  worker  produces  his  own  means  of  subsistence  by  himself.  Instead, 
they  argue,  the  productivity  of  such  an  exploited  worker  is  often  offloaded  onto  other 
(unseen)  workers  who  support  him  by  performing  social  reproductive  labor,  which 
produces  surplus  value  in  the  form  of  either  use  value  or  exchange  value. 
These  concepts  of  use  value  and  exchange  value  are  so  foundational  to  the  marxist 
theory  of  exploitation  that  Marx  begins  his  very  first  chapter  of  Capital  Volume  I  with  a 
section  concerning  these  two  “factors  of  the  commodity.”   Yet  the  genealogy  of  this 55
conceptual  pair  long  predates  Marx,  extending  back  through  the  bourgeois  classical 
economists  (e.g.  Adam  Smith  and  David  Ricardo)  beyond  Scholasticism  (e.g.  St.  Thomas 
Aquinas)  all  the  way  back  to  Aristotle,  who  first  articulated  the  distinction  between  value  in 
54 Dalla  Costa  and  James,  43.  Within  SRT  there  has  been  a  further  debate  about  whether  or  not  social  
reproductive  labor  produces  exchange  value  in  addition  to  producing  use  value.  Benston  and 
Vogel  posit  that  the  product  of  social  reproductive  labor  is  simply  use  value,  while  Dalla  Costa, 
James,  and  Federici  insist  that  it  is  exchange  value  (Hopkins,  131). 
55 Marx,  Capital  Vol.  I,  125. 
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use  and  value  in  exchange.   According  to  Marx,  ‘use  value’  is  an  attribute  of  some  good 56
or  service  which  “satisfies  human  needs,”  either  “directly  as  a  means  of  subsistence,  i.e.  an 
object  of  consumption,  or  indirectly  as  a  means  of  production.”   Use  value  is  the 57
qualitative  property  of  a  good  or  service  which  is  directly  consumed  to  fulfill  some  need  or 
want.  By  contrast,  ‘exchange  value’  is  the  additional  quantitative  property  of  such  a  good 
or  service  which  renders  it  capable  of  being  equally  traded  for  another  commodity  or 
commodities.   Because  exchange  value  operates  indirectly  as  a  means  rather  than  directly 58
as  an  end,  it  represents  the  distribution  of  goods  rather  than  presenting  a  good  for 
consumption. 
Marxism  accepts  the  common  view  that  use  values  are  produced  by  material 
conditions  and  by  human  labor  which  can  transform  such  natural  resources.   However, 59
marxism  takes  a  more  counter-intuitive  stance  on  exchange  values  by  claiming  that  they 
can  be  produced  by  only  one  cause:  human  labor.   While  every  product  has  a  use  value, 60
not  every  product  also  has  an  exchange  value:  thus,  only  certain  types  of  consumable 
goods  or  services  are  commodities.   And  among  these  types  of  exchange-valued 61
commodities,  marxists  are  especially  interested  in  one  particular  type:  the  only  one  with  the 
56 Haney,  47. 
57 Marx,  Capital  Vol.  I,  125. 
58 Marx,  Capital  Vol.  I,  138.  Marx  writes  that  “use-values…  are  only  commodities  because  they  
have  a  dual  nature,  because  they  are  at  the  same  time  objects  of  utility  and  bearers  of  [exchange]  
value”  (Marx,  Capital  Vol.  I,  138). 
59 Marx,  Capital  Vol.  I,  133-34. 
60 Marx  notes  that  the  bourgeois  capitalist  (a  member  of  a  distinct  type  of  ruling  class)  seeks  “to  
produce  not  only  a  use-value,  but  a  commodity;  not  only  use-value,  but  value;  and  not  just  value, 
but  also  surplus-value”  (Marx,  Capital  Vol.  I,  293). 
61 Marx,  Grundrisse ,  267-268;  Benston,  14;  Mandel,  10-11. 
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capacity  to  create  a  surplus  of  exchange  value  in  excess  of  the  sum  of  its  inputs.  This 
commodity  is  human  labor  power.  62
In  any  economic  system,  a  worker  consumes  (i.e.  uses  or  exhausts)  their  own  labor 
power  to  produce  a  surplus  value  above  and  beyond  their  own  means  of  subsistence :  the 
necessary  conditions  for  living  to  work  another  day.   In  a  class  society  (such  as  patriarchal 63
slavery,  feudalism,  capitalism,  and  even  state  socialism),  some  property  owner  claims  the 
right  to  extract  this  surplus  from  the  worker:  that  is,  to  exploit  their  productivity.  Under 
capitalism,  surplus  value  takes  the  form  of  exchange  value:  the  commodities  are  produced 
precisely  to  be  sold  for  profits  (part  of  which  are  reinvested  as  capital),  rather  than  to  be 
used  or  even  exchanged  merely  at  cost.  But  in  pre-  or  non-capitalist  societies,  human  labor 
power  typically  has  only  use  value,  not  exchange  value.  Like  other  types  of  exchange, 
labor  markets  often  still  exist  in  such  economies  (e.g.  ancient  Athens),  but  they  do  not 
constitute  the  dominant  relation  of  production  as  under  capitalism.  
Aristotle  lays  out  the  idea  of  exchange  value  in  a  discussion  on  distributive  justice: 
“[A]ll  things  that  are  exchanged  must  be  somehow  commensurable…  All  goods  must 
therefore  be  measured  by  some  one  thing.”   This  concept  is  abstracted  from  the  more 64
intuitive  notion  of  use  value  which  he  describes  in  a  discussion  of  external  goods:  “all 
things  useful  are  useful  for  a  purpose,  and  where  there  is  too  much  of  them  they  must  either 
do  harm,  or  at  any  rate  be  of  no  use.”   Paradoxically,  Aristotle  has  been  regarded  as  the 65
father  of  two  conflicting  theories  of  exchange  value:  the  labor  theory  (that  commodity 
62 Labor  power  is  the  potential  to  transform  material  things  into  new  use  values,  while  labor  is  the  
actualization  of  such  a  capacity  (Marx,  Capital  Vol.  I,  283). 
63 Marx,  Capital  Vol.  I,  284,  325. 
64 Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics  1133a19-26;  Haney,  47. 
65 Aristotle,  Politics  VII.i  1323b7-9;  Haney,  47;  Gordon,  11. 
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prices  are  determined  by  the  amount  of  labor  necessary  to  produce  them)  and  the  utility 
theory  (that  commodity  prices  are  determined  by  consumer  demand  on  the  market).   While 66
Marx  (as  the  paradigmatic  labor  theorist)  adopts  the  former  theory,  he  argues  that  the 
ubiquity  of  slave  labor  in  antiquity  blinded  Aristotle  to  the  fact  that  exchange  value  is 
ultimately  determined  not  by  consumer  demand  but  by  socially  necessary  labor.   67
  For  both  Aristotle  and  marxist  feminism,  the  economic  concept  of  “value”  must 
ultimately—however  indirectly—refer  to  use  value.   Unlike  the  modern  capitalist 68
economic  system,  the  ancient  Athenian  economy  described  and  prescribed  by  Aristotle  was 
powered  by  the  production,  distribution,  and  consumption  of  concrete  use  values  rather 
than  abstract  exchange  values.   Accordingly,  Aristotle’s  economic  thought  subordinates 69
exchange  value  to  use  value:  the  former  is  valuable  only  as  a  means  to  justly  re-distribute 
the  latter  to  a  consumer.   While  such  normative  approaches  to  economic  issues  were 70
hegemonic  for  millenia,  the  rise  of  capitalism  and  the  value-neutral  rhetoric  of  bourgeois 
political  economy  have  suppressed  the  axiological  depth  of  market  phenomena. 
However,  the  marxist  tradition  (echoing  Aristotle)  has  insisted  that  primary 
economic  functions  possess  not  only  descriptive  but  also  normative  aspects.   Exploitation 
corrupts  every  phase  of  the  economic  cycle:  production,  consumption,  and  distribution  (of 
66 Gordon,  115. 
67 Marx,  Capital  Vol.  I,  151-2. 
68 This  means  that  exchange  value  is  derivative:  the  financial  attempt  to  reify  it  inevitably  results  in  
speculative  bubbles  and  crashes. 
69 Gallagher,  9-11. 
70 Aristotle  denounces  all  interest-bearing  investment  as  usury,  which  ‘unnaturally’  treats  money  as  
the  end  of  an  exchange  rather  than  as  the  means  of  exchange  (Aristotle, Politics ,  I.x  1258b2-7; 
Marx, Capital  Vol.  I,  267).  This  is  one  instance  of  a  more  general  Aristotelian  principle:  “Of 
everything  which  we  possess  there  are  two  uses:  both  belong  to  the  thing  as  such,  but  not  in  the 
same  manner,  for  one  is  the  proper,  and  the  other  the  improper  use  of  it”  (Aristotle, Politics  I.ix 
1257a8-10).  
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which  exchange  is  a  type).  Aristotle  could  not  foresee  the  way  that  capitalism  would 
reprogram  the  logic  of  production  according  to  the  marketplace  language  of  exchange 
value.  However,  it  would  be  wrong  to  conclude  that  Aristotle’s  work  therefore  lacks  any 
insight  into  the  structural  constants  of  how  value  functions  within  a  class  society.  Indeed, 
Aristotle  can  be  read  as  articulating  an  exploitative  mode  of  production—patriarchal 
slavery—which  produces  a  surplus  consisting  primarily  of  use  values  rather  than  of 
exchange  values.  Because  marxist  feminism  (via  Marx)  employs  these  concepts  in  its 
critique  of  patriarchal  capitalism,  it  will  be  helpful  to  understand  how  use  value  and 
exchange  value  function  concretely  in  Aristotle’s  classist,  patriarchal  lifeworld. 
 
1.6   Home  Economics  in  the  Ancient  Oikos 
Under  late  capitalism,  the  term  “economics”  tends  to  signify  unlimited  (and,  for 
Aristotle,  unethical)  profiteering  through  trading  commodities  which  have  abstract 
exchange  values.   While  ancient  Greek  society  certainly  had  markets,  the  dominant  mode 71
of  production  was  not  governed  by  labor  market  exchanges  but  rather  by  patriarchal 
slavery.   Accordingly,  the  term  “economics”  is  etymologically  derived  from  oikonomia , 72
the  ancient  Greek  term  for  “household  management.”   73
Oikonomia  concerns  the  acquisition,  production,  and  stewardship  of  goods  and 
services  with  concrete  use  values  within  a  hierarchical  household,  or  oikos .   In  ancient 74
71 McCarthy,  11;  Haney,  45-6.  For  the  sake  of  grammatical  consistency,  I  will  use  the  present  tense  
throughout  this  chapter  when  referring  not  only  to  Aristotle’s  writings  but  also  to  the  social 
realities  of  his  ancient  Greek  culture.  
72 Marx,  Capital  Vol.  I,  172;  Finley  (1970),  24-25. 
73 This  is  Jowett’s  translation  of  oikonomikos,  which  might  also  be  translated  as  “household  rule”  
(Aristotle,  Politics  I.ix  1257b19-22). 
74 Aristotle,  Politics  I.ix  1257b19-22,  I.viii  1256b28-31;  Marx,  Capital  Vol.  I  253-54ff;  Polanyi,  
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Athenian  society,  production  and  distribution  were  so  deeply  embedded  in  another  social 
institution—the  patriarchal  family—that  their  domain  could  not  be  properly  called  an 
“economy”  (in  the  modern  disembedded  sense  of  a  reified,  independent  social  institution 
called  “the  market”).  Instead,  economic  functions  were  almost  entirely  embedded  within 
this  other  domain:  the  oikos .  Because  such  economies  were  functionally  undifferentiated 
from  family  life,  some  recent  social  theorists  hold  that  Aristotle  and  his  peers  do  not  think  to 
conceptualize  or  explain  it  independently  (at  least  not  in  any  way  which  is  significant  by 
modern  standards).   This  interpretation  provides  additional  historical  support  for  SRT, 75
which  contends  that  even  the  disembedded  economy  constituting  late-stage  capitalism 
cannot  divorce  reproduction  from  production. 
In  inviting  marxist  feminists  to  revisit  the  ancient  oikos ,  my  intention  is  not  to 
re-center  the  household  as  an  economic  unit  of  analysis;  instead,  I  seek  to  analyze  it  as  a 
microcosmic  class  economy  which  conditions  (sub)class  interests  according  to  a  particular 
mode  of  production  and  a  particular  mode  of  value-distribution.  The  ancient  oikos  displays 
all  the  socio-economic  components  of  gendered  class  formation,  sub-class  antagonism,  and 
mediated  exploitation  required  for  the  application  of  SRT.  (Moreover,  because  this 
oikonomic  slave  society  has  a  class  of  social  reproductive  laborers  who  are  not  necessarily 
gendered  feminine,  this  case  can  demonstrate  how  patriarchy  is  not  necessarily  coextensive 
with  social  reproduction). 
68-69;  Booth,  6.  Aristotle  writes,  “The  family  is  the  association  established  by  nature  for  the 
supply  of  men’s  everyday  wants”  (Aristotle,  Politics ,  1252b13-14). 
75 These  include  Karl  Marx,  Hannah  Arendt,  M.I.  Finley,  Joseph  Schumpeter,  and  Karl  Polanyi  
(Booth,  6-7). 
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As  Aristotle  explains  in  Book  I  of  Politics ,  the  archetypal  Athenian  oikos  is  a 
hierarchical  household  whose  members  include  a  husband,  father,  and  master  (or 
‘patriarch’,  for  simplicity’s  sake),  his  wife,  his  slaves,  and  his  children.   Atop  the  chain  of 76
command,  this  free  male  patriarch  serves  multiple  social  roles—as  citizen,  as  husband,  as 
slave-master,  and  as  father.   His  wife  (whom  Engels  calls  the  “chief  housemaid”)  serves  as 77
the  second-in-command  over  their  slaves,  who  perform  the  majority  of  productive  and 
reproductive  work.   78
As  an  empirical  theorist,  Aristotle  develops  his  account  of  slavery  (as  of  all  other 
phenomena)  based  on  his  observations  of  the  world  as  he  finds  it,  which  in  ancient  Athens 
is  permeated  with  unfree  labor.   His  society  prospers  on  the  backs  of  slaves,  many  of 79
whom  serve  craftsmen  or  the  city-state,  but  some  of  whom  serve  private  households.  80
Because  the  ancient  oikos  is  a  unit  of  production,  and  most  of  its  constituent  laborers  are 
slaves,  their  work  is  undoubtedly  productive  of  surplus  use  value.  However,  slaves  also 
perform  social  reproductive  labor  in  order  to  replenish  not  only  their  own  labor  power,  but 
also  that  of  the  wife  in  her  productive  function  as  household  manager.  81
76 Aristotle  writes  that  “the  first  and  fewest  possible  parts  of  a  family  are  master  and  slave,  husband  
and  wife,  father  and  children”  (Aristotle, Politics  I.iii  1253b5-6).  It  should  be  noted  that  although 
slaves  and  even  wives  were  often  purchased  by  the  patriarch,  the  exchange  value  of  this  initial 
‘investment’  pales  in  comparison  to  the  surplus  value  extracted  from  their  labor.  
77 Aristotle,  Politics  I.iii  1253b1-11. 
78 Engels,  The  Origin  of  the  Family,  Private  Property,  and  the  State ,  738.  When  Aristotle  writes  of  
women  in  the oikos ,  he  is  referring  primarily  to  the  free  (i.e.  not  enslaved)  wife  of  the  patriarch, 
because  “nature  has  distinguished  between  the  female  and  the  slave”  (Aristotle, Politics  I.ii 
1252b1).  Of  course,  this  ‘free  woman  has  multiple  social  roles:  she  is  often  also  a  mother,  sister, 
and  daughter.  However,  it  is  her  role  as  housewife  which  is  most  economically  significant. 
Accordingly,  I  will  refer  to  her  socio-economic  positionality  as  ‘wife.’ 
79 Schofield,  11;  Millett,  193.  
80 Ambler,  391-3.  Aristotle  would  be  the  first  to  remark  that  the  ideal  types  in  his  economic  theory  
are  not  necessarily  accurate  descriptions  of  historical  Athenian  society,  since  there  are  always 
exceptions  to  the  rule  of  nature  ( Politics  I.xii  1259b2-3,  I.vi  1255b2-3).  
81 Other  marxists  may  take  issue  with  this  characterization  of  managers  as  producers  of  value.  I  
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In  Aristotle’s  philosophical  anthropology,  the  free  wife—unlike  the  slave—has  not 
only  the  capacity  to  be  ruled,  but  also  to  rule  (at  least  to  some  degree).  Although  she  is 
exploited  and  oppressed  by  her  patriarchal  husband,  she  is  nonetheless  the  superior  of  her 
slaves.  For  Aristotle,  it  is  the  wife’s  capacity  for  practical  reason  (shared  by  all  rulers) 
which  allows  her  to  organize  her  subordinates,  because  she  understands  how  to 
wholistically  coordinate  all  the  ‘moving  parts’  into  a  functional  system.   Despite  also 82
possessing  such  intellectual  capacity,  the  patriarch  himself  does  not  engage  in  such  rational 
central  planning:  instead,  he  authorizes  his  wife  to  oversee  household  activities  and 
production  in  his  stead.   The  wife  is  functionally  in  charge  of  the  household  much  of  the 83
time  while  her  husband  is  gone  engaging  in  public  affairs.  While  Aristotle  depicts  the 
patriarch  as  the  household’s  provider,  this  is  only  in  a  formal  sense:  his  “provision”  amounts 
to  private  property  rights  (secured  via  trade  or  conquest)  over  resources  which  generate 
surplus  use  value  through  the  production  process  performed  by  his  household’s  workers.   84
Hannah  Arendt  depicts  the  ancient  Athenian  aristocracy  as  scorning  labor  as  it 
represents  necessity,  which  is  the  antithesis  of  freedom.   Even  physical  proximity  to 85
respond  that  insofar  as  managerial  oversight  is  a  necessary  function  of  the  production  process,  it 
contributes  to  the  stock  of  created  value.  This  fact  can  be  seen  more  easily  if  the  oppressive 
conditions  of  domination  are  removed:  in  a  worker-owned  cooperative,  management  does  not 
disappear—instead,  the  workers  must  manage  themselves. 
82 Aristotle,  Politics  I.xiii  1260b12-14;  Millett,  187. 
83 Aristotle  claims  that  free  men  have  rationality  with  authority,  while  free  women  have  rationality  
but  lack  authority  (Aristotle, Politics  I.xiii  1260a9-14).  While  this  last  property  is  ambiguous,  it  is 
clear  that,  as  household  manager,  the  wife  exercises  power  derived  from  the  patriarch  (Stauffer, 
937;  Saxonhouse,  74).  
84 Aristotle,  Politics  I.viii  1256a10-11.  Although  it  is  anachronistic  to  redescribe  the  Aristotelian  
oikos  with  marxist  terminology  (or  even  the  language  of  bourgeois  economics),  I  believe  that  it  is 
conceptually  warranted  because  of  Aristotle’s  intellectual  impact  on  such  discourse  in  the  first 
place. 
85 Arendt,  12,  81.  Finley  notes  that  while  all  citizens  were  free  (i.e.  not  slaves),  not  all  freemen  were  
citizens.  For  example,  certain  male  laborers  were  considered  free,  yet  not  citizens  (Finley  [1982], 
122).  Additionally,  although  no  women  were  citizens,  some  women  were  understood  to  be 
free—namely,  the  wives  of  property-owning  citizens  (F.A.  Wright,  212). 
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necessitarian  labor  is  seen  as  tainting  the  patriarch’s  liberty;  therefore  it  is  regarded  as 
unnatural  for  masters  to  be  relationally  close  to  their  slaves.   Accordingly  Aristotle  argues 86
that  a  managerial  wife  should  mediate  between  her  husband  and  the  slave  to  avoid 
contaminating  the  former’s  ability  to  freely  leave  the  oikos  to  participate  in  the  public  life  of 
the  polis .   87
For  Aristotle,  leisure  is  a  necessary  but  insufficient  condition  for  eudaimonia :  the 
good  life  of  human  flourishing.   Technically  speaking,  anyone  who  is  not  enslaved— 88
craftsman,  merchant,  even  housewife—is  free;  yet  only  the  ruling  class  of  citizen  patriarchs 
are  empowered  to  enjoy  their  freedom  leisurely .   Unlike  the  modern  conception  of  leisure 89
(which  associates  free  time  ‘off  the  clock’  with  one’s  private  life  at  home),  leisure  in  the 
ancient  world  is  expressly  a  function  which  can  only  be  fulfilled  outside  of  the  home.  90
Aristotle  writes  that  the  teleological  good  life  of  a  privileged  minority  (viz.  free  male 
citizens)  involves  contemplating  scientific  and  philosophical  truths  ( theoria )  or  applying 
practical  wisdom  ( phronesis )  in  deliberation  about  political  decisions.   But  the  patriarch’s 91
leisurely  freedom  is  only  made  possible  by  the  exploitation  of  the  other  household 
86 Millett,  206-7. 
87 While  Aristotle’s  prescriptions  for  the  relational  proximity  between  master  and  slave  are  
occasionally  inconsistent,  he  repeatedly  counsels  every  patriarch  to  deputize  his  wife  to  rule  in 
his  stead,  whether  the  patriarch  is  present  or  not  (Aristotle,  Politics  I.xii  1259b2-8,  I.xiii  1260a40- 
1260b8,  II.v  1264b2,  III.iv  1277a5-7,   III.iv  1277b24-26;  Millett,  204).  
88 Aristotle,  Politics  VII.xv  1334a18-36;  Booth,  27. 
89 Booth,  33. 
90 Owens,  716.  Throughout  his  corpus,  Aristotle  vacillates  in  his  view  of  eudaimonia  (available  
only  to  the  patriarch):  while  he  explicitly  privileges  intellectual  contemplation  ( theoria )  as  the 
telos  of  the  fully  human  life,  his  virtue  ethics  implies  the  contrary  position  that  eudaimonia 
involves  of  a  certain  type  of  action  ( praxis )—namely,  exercising  the  virtue  of  practical  wisdom 
( phronesis )  (Adkins,  311-312). 
91 Aristotle  writes,  “[T]hose  who  are  in  a  position  which  places  them  above  toil  have  stewards  who  
attend  to  their  households  while  they  occupy  themselves  with  philosophy  or  with  politics”  
(Aristotle,  Politics  I.vii  1255b34-36). 
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members.   For  these  wives  and  slaves  (and  all  other  non-citizen  persons),  the  telos  of  life  is 92
to  excellently  perform  the  social  roles  of  production  or  social  reproduction,  in  order  to 
provide  for  the  patriarch’s  basic  needs  (shelter,  clothing,  food,  water,  and  above  all  free 
time )  so  that  he  can  enjoy  such  leisure  and  the  consumption  of  use  values  which  it 
necessitates. 
 
1.7   Modes  of  Consumption 
In  our  modern  capitalist  system,  the  economic  term  “consumption”  does  not 
necessarily  refer  to  the  tangible  use  of  goods  and  services,  but  merely  to  the  commodified 
demand  for  them  on  a  market.  And  the  fact-value  distinction  presupposed  by  liberal 
ideology  removes  nearly  all  normative  conditions  from  consumer  desire  and  market 
demand.  However,  Aristotle  (similarly  to  marxist  feminists)  rejects  the  value-neutrality  of 
consumption,  particularly  when  considering  wealth.   The  clearest  criterion  for  discerning 93
what  constitutes  vicious  excess  as  opposed  to  virtuous  moderation  in  the  ownership  of 
wealth  is  whether  and  how  it  is  used.   Aristotle’s  teleological  emphasis  on  the  normative 94
dimension  of  use  values  can  illuminate  the  (sub)division  of  labor  and  the  constitution  of 
subclasses  within  the  oikos .  Unlike  bourgeois  economics,  Aristotle’s  proto-economic 
account  of  (re)production  and  consumption  is  inherently  normative  (however  classist  and 
sexist  those  norms  may  be).    Therefore,  I  propose  that  it  can  offer  conceptual  clarification 95
92 Booth,  31. 
93 Aristotle  writes  that  “the  things  that  have  a  use  may  be  used  either  well  or  badly;  and  riches  is  a  
useful  thing”  ( Nicomachean  Ethics  IV.i  1120a4-5). 
94 Aristotle  frames  distributive  surplus—which  possibilizes  either  useless  hoarding  or  excessive  
consumption—according  to  an  ethical  schema  in  which  virtue  is  a  mean  between  extremes 
(Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics  IV.i  1119b25-26). 
95 Because  Aristotle  borrows  his  values  uncritically  from  the  hegemonic  ideology  of  his  patriarchal  
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to  the  marxist  feminist  SRT  project  which  faces  the  problem  of  mediated  exploitation  and 
the  division  of  interests. 
In  the  ancient  ‘oikonomic’  system,  consumption  has  a  much  more  concrete 
meaning,  because  most  production  is  intended  not  for  profitable  sale  but  rather  for 
immediate  use  in  fulfilling  some  need  or  want.  Yet  the  consumption  of  a  use  value  can  look 
vastly  different  depending  on  the  class  positionalities  of  the  consumers,  each  of  whom  are 
teleologically  differentiated  from  the  others.  Although  the  patriarch,  the  wife,  and  the  slave 
may  all  consume  the  same  oikos -produced  goods  or  services  (e.g.  a  meal),  there  are  three 
different  latent  use  values  which  are  called  forth  by  the  different  needs  of  each  person.  The 
patriarch  consumes  these  products  in  the  mode  of  leisurely  freedom.  By  contrast,  the  slave 
and  the  wife  consume  them  in  the  mode  of  necessitarian  labor,  in  order  to  provide  their  own 
distinct  services  to  the  household.  
For  a  historical  materialist  theory  such  as  marxist  feminism,  it  may  seem  as  though 
the  motives  or  goals  of  economic  agents  are  irrelevant  factors  in  determining  whether  or  not 
they  exploit  other  agents.  After  all,  for  vulgar  marxism,  all  that  matters  are  socio-material 
conditions,  not  psychological  ones.   However,  even  in  marxism,  the  evaluation  of  labor  as 96
exploitative  presupposes  that  one  is  forced  to  produce  surplus  value  (whether  as  use  value 
or  as  exchange  value)  which  does  not  benefit  one’s  self.  At  least  part  of  this  surplus  is 
and  slavery-based  society,  it  is  impossible  for  him  to  imagine  marxist  feminism’s  ideal  social 
order  in  which  necessary  labor  is  both  minimized  and  equitably  distributed.  This  is  most  clearly 
demonstrated  in  his  dismissal  of  the  prospect  of  a  fully  automated  classless  economy  as  utopian: 
“if  every  instrument  could  accomplish  its  own  work…  the  shuttle  would  weave  and  the  plectrum 
touch  the  lyre,  [and]  chief  workmen  would  not  want  servants,  nor  masters  slaves”  (Aristotle, 
Politics  I.iv  1253b34-1254a3). 
96 There  are  often  class  traitors  on  both  sides  of  a  class  war  whose  subjective  commitments  
contradict  their  own  objective  interests.  For  example,  Engels  was  a  factory  owner  who  used  his 
wealth  to  fund  the  revolutionary  socialist  movement. 
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extracted  by  the  ruling  class  in  order  to  provide  for  their  (and  their  managers’)  necessary 
means  of  subsistence.  The  teleological  purpose  of  the  worker’s  labor  is  to  help  eliminate  the 
need  for  the  ruling  class  to  labor.  This  means  that  the  worker’s  telos  is  really  an 
instrumental  and  subordinate  purpose — a  means  to  another’s  end.  For  Aristotle  as  well  as  
for  marxist  feminists,  the  ultimate  purpose  of  necessary  labor  must  ultimately  be  freedom 
(or  liberation),  conceived  as  a  substantive  notion  of  flourishing.  So  the  real  question  is:  who 
exactly  enjoys  the  freedom  made  possible  by  the  worker’s  necessary  labors? 
In  the  Aristotelian  economic  model,  the  aristocratic  wife  enjoys  certain  rights  and 
freedoms  (like  her  husband  and  unlike  her  slave).  However,  these  largely  take  the  form  of 
her  privileged  duty  to  oppressively  oversee  the  slave.  She  is  similarly  confined  to  this 
private  worksite,  deliberately  walled  off  from  public  life  because,  Aristotle  insists,  her 
capacity  to  reason  is  “without  authority”  ( akuron )  and  she  herself  must  also  be  supervised.  97
Unlike  her  enslaved  subordinates,  she  is  ‘free’...  but  only  insofar  as  she  is  not  herself 
enslaved.   She  is  not  socially  enabled  to  autonomously  live  the  good  life  ( eudaimonia ).  98 99
Instead,  her  privileges  are  wasted.  Rather  than  consuming  use-values  produced  by  the  slave 
to  enable  her  own  freedom,  she  consumes  them  merely  to  enable  her  own  exploitation.  She 
in  turn  labors  to  ensure  that  the  entire  oikos  fulfills  its  purpose,  which  is  to  enable  the 
patriarch—liberated  from  the  realm  of  necessity—to  live  a  public  life  of  freely  developing 
97 Aristotle,  Politics  I.xiii  1260a10-14.  One  interpretation  takes  this  notion  of  akuron  to  be  an  
internal  psychological  weakness.  However,  another  takes  it  to  be  an  external  social  constraint, 
which  is  not  only  in  line  with  reality  but  also  with  Aristotle’s  account  of  the  wife’s  ability  to 
rationally  coordinate  household  activities  (Levy,  415) 
98 Karbowski,  326. 
99 Aristotle  defines  eudaimonia  as  consisting  of  “complete  excellence”  (Aristotle,  Nicomachean  
Ethics  I.xiii  1102a5-6).  Unfortunately,  as  Inglis  argues,  Aristotle  limits  the  wife  to  possessing  only 
an  “approximation  of  paradigmatic  virtue”  (Inglis,  186).  Therefore,  she  is  also  prevented  (in 
theory  or  in  practice)  from  access  to  the  good  life. 
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his  own  potential.   For  the  wife  (as  for  the  slave),  the  final  cause  ( telos )  of  her  household 100
role—her  life’s  meaning—is  reduced  to  effectively  producing  household  use  values, 
thereby  reproducing  her  society’s  mode  of  production.  Although  Aristotle  describes  these 
economic  conditions  as  ethically  ideal  and  socially  harmonious,  this  depiction  takes  on  very 
dark  tones  when  viewed  instead  through  marxist  theory.  Under  exploitative  and  thus 
alienating  working  conditions,  such  workers  atrophy  in  body  and  mind,  and  their  creative 
potential  fails  to  “develop  freely.”   101
Extracted  surplus  value—whether  it  is  the  direct  service  of  slaves  and  wives  or  the 
profits  indirectly  stolen  from  wage  workers—is  potential  use  value.  And  this  potential  is  not 
only  denied  to  super-exploited  social  reproductive  laborers;  it  is  also  denied  to  aristocratic 
productive  workers.  Accordingly,  while  a  privileged  worker  necessarily  acts  as  an  efficient 
cause  in  value  extraction,  she  does  not  ultimately  share  in  its  final  cause.  Neither  the  wife 
nor  the  slave  are  recognized  as  having  the  teleological  potential  for  the  good  life  of 
liberation  beyond  necessity.  Thus,  it  is  possible  that  the  real  interests  of  the  labor  aristocracy 
may  align  with  those  of  the  super-exploited  rather  than  with  the  ruling  class. 
 
1.8   Conclusion 
In  this  chapter,  I  have  engaged  Social  Reproduction  Theory  in  a  dialogue  with  a 
problematic  but  important  influence  from  economic  history:  Aristotle.  I  have  presented  his 
articulation  of  the  key  concepts  of  use  value  and  exchange  value  and  his  theory  of  the  class 
structure  and  economic  function  of  the  hierarchical  oikos .  I  have  argued  that  Aristotle’s 
100 Aristotle,  Politics  VII.xv  1334a36-39. 
101 Marx,  Economic  and  Philosophic  Manuscripts  of  1844 ,  74. 
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insights  constitute  a  simplified  model  of  the  complexly  unified  system  of  sexism  and 
classism  theorized  by  marxist  feminist  social  reproduction  theory.  
I  have  also  noted  how  the  most  recent  works  of  SRT  bridges  the  gap  between  two 
earlier  schools  of  marxist  feminism.  The  first,  Dual  Systems  Theory,  stresses  how  the 
gendered  (and  raced)  division  of  labor  is  caused  by  independent  yet  intersecting  vectors  of 
oppression  and  exploitation  which  call  for  distinct  liberation  struggles  to  avoid  sexist  class 
reductionism.  The  second  school,  Unitary  Systems  Theory,  stresses  how  this  situation  is 
caused  by  an  overarching  pattern  of  class-based  exploitation  which  is  always-already 
internally  subdivided  according  to  a  division  of  labor  which  reproduces  special 
oppressions,  and  calls  for  a  coalitional  class-first  strategy.  However,  even  though  21st 
century  SRT  has  drawn  from  both  schools  to  develop  a  socio-economic  model  which 
foregrounds  feminism,  anti-racism,  and  other  progressive  movements  in  terms  of  the 
classed  division  of  labor,  this  materialist  approach  to  intersectionality  entails  the  conceptual 
impossibility  of  solidarity  across  varying  strata  of  the  working  class.  Even  though  SRT 
proponents  disprove  this  fragmentation  problem  in  their  rhetoric  and  their  political  praxis , 
their  theory  itself  appears  unequipped  to  address  the  mediated  exploitation  of  a  putative 
labor  aristocracy  (whatever  its  gendered  or  racialized  characteristics). 
In  order  to  better  understand  the  structural  constants  of  exploitation  (particularly  the 
causal  culpability  of  an  intermediary  worker  in  a  chain  of  value  extraction),  I  considered  the 
function  of  the  privileged  strata  of  the  working  class—the  managerial  housewives—in  the 
ancient  mode  of  production:  patriarchal  slavery.  Although,  for  obvious  reasons,  marxist 
feminist  SRT  focuses  on  contemporary  capitalism  (as  did  Marx  himself  in  his  magnum 
31 
opus  Capital ),  its  research  programme  is  robust  enough  to  critique  exploitation  in  every 
mode  of  production,  globally  and  historically.  I  have  demonstrated  that  SRT  can  be  applied 
to  the  ancient  socio-economic  system  in  order  to  understand  who  is—and  who  is 
not—responsible  for  the  extraction  of  surplus  value. 
The  example  of  Aristotle’s  ‘oikonomic’  wife  demonstrates  that  it  is  possible  for  a 
privileged  worker  (among  the  ‘labor  aristocracy’)  to  depend  on  another  worker’s  unpaid 
social  reproductive  labor  without  intermediately  exploiting  them  (in  the  technical  sense). 
Even  though  the  wife  oppressively  dominates  her  slave,  strictly  speaking  it  is  the  ruling 
class  patriarch  who  indirectly  exploits  the  subordinate  social  reproductive  worker  as  well  as 
the  intermediate  labor  aristocrat.  This  nuance  is  significant  because  it  possibilizes  solidarity 
between  the  reproductive  lower  working  class  with  the  productive  upper  working  class.  By 
recognizing  their  joint  opposition  to  the  ruling  class,  these  different  socio-economic  tiers 
can  share  radical  aspirations  to  systemically  transform  the  exploitative  structures  which 



















CHAPTER  2.   THE  DIALECTICAL  VIRTUES  (AND  VICES) 




2.1   Introduction  
In  this  chapter,  I  will  consider  the  contradictory  dimensions  of  interpersonal  ethics 
and  social  ethics.  I  will  propose  that  marxist  feminism  requires  a  dialectical  ethics  which 
connects  short-term  and  micro-scale  interpersonal  norms  with  long-term  and  macro-scale 
social  imperatives.  I  will  take  up  the  analysis  of  care  work  by  social  reproduction  theory 
(SRT)  in  order  to  show  how  its  ethically  ambiguous  nature  exemplifies  a  more  general 
problem  for  marxist  feminism  in  reconciling  interpersonal  and  social  normativities.  
As  a  type  of  marxist  feminism,  SRT  provides  a  clear  social  ethic  (condemning  systemic 
exploitation,  particularly  of  the  most  vulnerable  workers).  Yet  its  theorists  (like  marxists 
generally)  require  a  clearer  articulation  of  normative  ethical  theory  at  the  (inter)personal 
scale.   Of  course,  marxist  feminist  Simone  de  Beauvoir  penned  the  philosophical  classic 102
The  Ethics  of  Ambiguity  at  the  height  of  French  existentialism.   However,  her  meta-ethical 103
insights  into  relativism  and  existentialism  do  not  readily  translate  into  the  discourse  of 
normative  ethics,  which  remains  an  open  question  for  marxist  feminism.  An  adequate 
personal  ethics  for  social  reproduction  theory  and  praxis  must  be  dialectical  in  nature, 
addressing  the  tension  between  these  values  of  immediate  interpersonal  care  and  those  of 
strategic  social  justice  (oriented  toward  a  “communist  horizon”).   104
102 This  parallels  Lise  Vogel’s  insistence  that  feminists  who  have  demonstrated  excellence  in  their  
political  praxis  still  require  the  deeper  theoretical  grounding  which  marxism  provides  (Vogel,  32). 
103 de  Beauvoir  (1948),  10. 
104 Dean  (2012),  2. 
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I  argue  that  deontological  and  contractualist  theories  are  insufficient  for  this  role  of 
dialectical  ethics  because  their  reliance  on  rights  and  universalizability  are  too  static  and 
individualistic  for  marxist  feminism’s  historical  materialist  methodology.  Utilitarian  theories 
are  also  insufficient  because  they  can  justify  the  sacrifice  of  the  interests  of  vulnerable 
minorities  (e.g.  working-class  women  of  color)  for  the  interests  of  privileged  majorities  (e.g. 
the  white  male  labor  aristocracy).  This  leaves  marxist  feminists  with  two  possible  normative 
ethical  theories:  feminist  care  ethics  and  virtue  ethics  (Aristotelian  or  otherwise).  I  will 
ultimately  argue  that  virtue  ethics—specifically,  a  neo-Aristotelian  virtue  ethic  revised  by 
feminist  care  ethics—is  the  best  candidate  for  a  marxist  feminist  dialectical  ethic.  I  will 
ultimately  demonstrate  this  by  applying  it  to  the  moral  imperatives  which  would  be  faced 
by  a  care  worker  who  has  been  radicalized  by  marxist  feminism. 
 
2.2   Dialectical  Ethics:  Between  (Inter)Personal  Ethics  and  Social  Ethics 
Marxist  feminism  is  the  theory  and  praxis  which,  according  to  the  Black  communist 
revolutionary  Claudia  Jones,  holds  that  “the  inequality  of  women  is  inherently  connected 
with  the  exploitation  of  the  working  class.”    However,  its  normative  discourse  typically 105
105 Jones,  4.  This  intersectional  approach  is  often  positioned  as  a  new  development  in  feminism’s  
third  wave,  following  the  struggle  for  rights  of  “formal  equality”  in  the  first  wave  and  the  struggle 
for  material  rights  (concerning  labor  and  sexuality)  in  the  second  wave  (Vogel,  3).  However,  there 
were  already  marxist  feminists  in  the  early  20th  century  fighting  these  struggles  in  the  2nd  and 
3rd  Communist  Internationals,  but  they  tend  to  be  written  out  of  the  ‘feminist  waves’  narrative. 
This  call  to  redistribute  social  reproduction  is  hardly  new—it  is  the  same  demand  made  over  a 
century  ago  by  marxist  feminists  Clara  Zetkin,  Alexandra  Kollontai,  and  Rosa  Luxemburg  in  the 
communist  Second  International  (Smith,  1).  Unfortunately,  this  tradition  has  been  ignored  by 
even  the  most  socialist  of  major  FCE  theorists,  Joan  Tronto  ([1993],  176).  
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gets  framed  as  political  and  not  as  ethical.   It  remains  to  be  seen  what  marxist  feminists 106
want  in  a  strictly  moral  theory.   107
The  branch  of  moral  philosophy  concerned  with  issuing  imperatives  (based  on  a 
criterion  for  right  and  wrong  in  reference  to  the  good  and  the  bad)  is  known  as  normative 
ethics .   Its  injunctions  are  often  addressed  to  a  single  individual  moral  agent.  This 108
subfield,  known  as  personal  ethics  (or  individual  ethics ),  is  difficult  to  reconcile  its 
counterpart  social  ethics .   Social  ethical  theories  (such  as  marxist  feminism)  are  often 109
classified  disciplinarily  within  sociology  rather  than  moral  philosophy,  because  the 
methodological  individualism  of  much  ethical  discourse  presupposes  a  degree  of  personal 
agency  which  marxism’s  structural  analysis  is  reticent  to  acknowledge.   Although  modern 110
liberalism  has  attempted  to  institute  a  rigid  divide  between  the  individual  and  interpersonal 
level  of  ethics  and  the  social  level  of  politics,  other  political  theorists—from  Aristotle  to 
Marx—have  viewed  them  as  shading  into  each  other.   111
While  marxist  feminism  clearly  has  a  social  ethic,  its  corollary  personal  ethic  is 
much  less  clear.   Marxist  feminists  implicitly  uphold  the  values  of  liberation,  autonomy, 112
equality,  and  equity,  and  they  condemn  oppression,  exploitation,  domination,  and 
106 Dalla  Costa  and  James,  47-8. 
107 This  echoes  Annette  Baier’s  famous  essay  “What  Do  Women  Want  in  a  Moral  Theory?”  She  
insists  that  a  sufficiently  feminist  ethics  must  incorporate  yet  exceed  the  contributions  of  prior 
male  theorists  (Baier,  266).  I  hope  to  expand  this  question  to  account  for  class. 
108 Following  Hegel,  de  Beauvoir  claims  that  normative  ethics  exists  only  as  long  as  is  differs  from  
ought;  the  entire  goal  of  ethics  is  to  close  this  gap  and  therefore  dissolve  normative  potentiality 
into  one’s  actual  state  of  being  (de  Beauvoir  [1948],  10-11). 
109 Armstrong,  119-20.  
110 Marx,  Theses  on  Feuerbach ,  144. 
111 Tronto  [1993],  6-7;  Fraser  and  Honneth,  4;  Fraser,  33;  Groff,  314. 
112 Recent  feminist  ethicits  have  been  deliberately  connecting  the  gap  between  personal  and  social  
ethics;  however,  this  continues  to  remain  an  open  question  for  specifically  marxist  feminists  
(Dillon,  378). 
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alienation.   Accordingly,  they  demand  the  historical  transformation  of  the  social  structures 113
of  production,  reproduction,  socialisation,  and  sexuality.   This  communist  horizon  must 114
necessarily  involve  women’s  liberation,  yet  its  details  cannot  be  determined  in  advance 
without  impeding  the  process  with  static  ideals.   Nonetheless,  a  marxist  feminist  personal 115
ethic  must  orient  its  norms  to  this  ultimate  yet  unclear  end.  In  so  doing,  it  must  also  resolve 
several  additional  philosophical  contradictions.  
First,  a  dialectical  ethic  must  be  objectivist  enough  to  ground  a  universal  call  to 
social  liberation,  yet  relativist  enough  to  account  for  different  moral  situations  involving 
individuals  and  groups  of  varying  positionalities  (according  to  class,  race,  gender,  sexuality, 
etc.).   Second,  it  must  avoid  the  fatalism  of  social  determinism  without  succumbing  to  a 116
metaphysical  libertarianism  which  is  individualistic  and  voluntaristic—in  a  word, 
bourgeois .   Third,  its  liberatory  strategy  must  avoid  the  idealist  expectation  that  moral 117
agents  (i.e.  political  subjects)  can  be  consistently  motivated  by  rational  principles  rather 
than  embodied  affects,  even  as  its  particular  version  of  consequentialism  must  seek  to 
produce  a  more  logical  social  order  where  fear-based  heteronomy  is  transformed  into  a 
naturally  communistic  impulse.   Fourthly,  it  must  neither  demand  endlessly  self-sacrificial 118
altruism  from  its  subaltern  moral  agents,  nor  permit  the  selfish  egoism  of  crude  anarchism. 
A  marxist  feminist  ethic  must  resolve  these  contradictions  in  historical  materialist  terms. 
113 Its  primary  opponents  are  imperialists,  capitalists,  fascists,  and  patriarchal  reactionaries,  whose  
ideologies  have  often  been  internalized  by  working  class  men  (Jones,  4-5). 
114 Mitchell,  43.  
115 de  Beauvoir  (1948),  153;  Mitchell,  54. 
116 Leon  Trotsky  writes  that  “elementary  moral  precepts  exist...  but  the  extent  of  their  action  is  
extremely  limited  and  unstable.  Norms  ‘obligatory  upon  all’  become  the  less  forceful  the  sharper 
the  character  assumed  by  the  class  struggle”  (Trotsky,  165). 
117 Marx,  The  Eighteenth  Brumaire  of  Louis  Bonaparte ,  595. 
118 Engels,  Anti-Dühring ,  726. 
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Such  a  methodology  is  known  as  dialectics :  the  dynamic  by  which  unstable  structures 
work  out  their  internal  contradictions  over  time.   In  order  to  judge  which  normative 119
theory  is  most  suitable  as  a  dialectic  ethic,  I  will  compare  how  each  applies  to  the  particular 
case  study  of  social  reproductive  care  work. 
 
2.3   Case  Study:  Social  Reproductive  Care  Work 
In  order  to  determine  the  normative  ethical  theory  that  is  most  coherent  with  the 
marxist  feminist  project,  it  will  be  helpful  to  identify  a  particular  subject  as  a  moral  agent. 
The  moral  agent  with  whom  marxist  feminists  concern  themselves  must  also  be  a  politically 
revolutionary  subject .   There  are  many  candidates  for  the  revolutionary  subject  beyond 120
“working  class”  (which  has  often  strangely  been  coded  as  cisheteronormative,  white,  and 
male):  women,  racial  subalterns,  queers,  etc.   One  of  the  most  promising  figures  is  the 121
social  reproductive  care  worker ,  whose  ‘super-exploitative’  socio-economic  role  is  laden 
with  intersecting  identitarian  oppressions.   Following  social  reproduction  theory,  I  will 122
take  as  my  case  study  a  working  class  woman  (i.e.  someone  who  faces  both  structural 
oppression  and  structural  exploitation)  who  performs  care  work.  Perhaps  this  moral  agent  is 
also  disabled,  queer,  and  a  woman  of  color,  though  for  simplicity’s  sake  what  is 
conceptually  significant  is  her  economic  role  as  a  social  reproductive  care  worker.  123
119 McNally,  103-4;  Bhattacharya,  4. 
120 Sargent,  xxi;  Federici,  7. 
121 Bhattacharya,  68.  Following  in  the  footsteps  of  Black  marxist  feminists  like  Lucy  Parsons,  
Claudia  Jones,  and  Angela  Davis,  the  Combahee  River  Collective  has  called  for  a  revolutionary 
socialist  movement  which  is  “particularly  committed  to  working  on  those  struggles  in  which  race, 
sex,  and  class  are  simultaneous  factors  in  oppression”  (Combahee  River  Collective,  26). 
122 Federici,  7.  According  to  Tronto,  “In  most  societies,  care  work  is  distributed  by  gender,  by  caste  
and  class,  and  often,  by  race  and  ethnicity  as  well.”  (Tronto  [1993],  x).  
123 McNally,  109. 
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Care  work  is  the  paradigmatic  type  of  social  reproductive  labor  and  thus  a  useful 
point  of  comparison  for  marxist  feminists  considering  different  normative  ethical  
theories.   It  can  be  defined  as  physical  or  emotional  labor  which  provides  direct  service  to 124
others  in  order  to  decrease  their  pain  or  increase  their  pleasure,  or  to  supplement  their 
disability  or  increase  their  capacity.  Social  reproductive  labor—the  often  unremunerated 
replenishment  of  labor  power—is  the  paradigm  case  of  care  work  for  marxist  feminist 
inquiry.   125
Because  the  subject  of  marxist  feminism  is  the  working  class  woman,  the  primary 
(though  not  only)  social  context  of  her  oppression  and  exploitation  throughout  much  of 
global  history  is  in  the  domestic  sphere:  this  often  extends  beyond  her  own  housework  to 
performing  domestic  labor  for  another.   However,  even  though  these  nearly  universal 126
patterns  have  produced  a  gendered  (and  often  racialized)  class  in-itself ,  it  remains  to  be  seen 
whether  this  demographic  can  become  a  gendered  racialized  class  for-itself .   Marxist 127
feminists  have  hoped  that  feminized  care  workers  can  move  from  passively  experiencing 
oppression  in  isolation  and  exploitation  to  actively  and  collectively  working  against 
patriarchal  capitalism  as  revolutionary  subjects.   It  is  clear  that  each  social  reproductive 128
laborer  (hereafter  “care  worker”)  is  a  moral  patient  who  experiences  the  immoral  actions 
124 Dalla  Costa  and  James,  54. 
125 Fraser,  23.  Combining  class  struggle  with  the  women’s  liberation  movement,  SRT  was  developed  
in  the  1970s  and  1980s  by  marxist  feminists  such  as  Silvia  Federici,  Mariarosa  Dalla  Costa,  Selma 
James,  Christine  Delphy,  and  Lise  Vogel.  It  has  undergone  a  recent  resurgence  by  theorists  and 
activists  such  as  Nancy  Fraser,  Susan  Ferguson,  Tithi  Bhattacharya,  Cinzia  Arruzza,  and  Kathi 
Weeks.  SRT  examines  service  institutions  whose  end  product  is  the  labor  power  of  workers 
themselves,  for  example:  hospitals,  schools,  restaurants,  and  especially  families. 
126 de  Beauvoir  (1952),  113-14. 
127 Dalla  Costa  and  James,  58.  This  is  a  refinement  of  Marx’s  original  formulation  of  class  
consciousness,  which  mostly  ignores  the  gendered  and  racialized  contours  of  the  working  class 
(Marx,  The  Poverty  of  Philosophy ,  218). 
128 Federici,  60. 
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by  others  within  the  oppressive  and  exploitative  conditions  of  a  patriarchal  class  structure; 
the  manifold  wrongs  against  her  are  obvious.  However,  such  a  care  worker  is  also  a  moral 
agent .   The  particular  form  of  moral  agency  which  is  most  relevant  to  marxist  feminists  is 129
the  revolutionary  potential  of  a  subject  who  becomes  ethically  bound  to  a  particular 
political  project.  Marxist  theorist  Louis  Althusser  refers  to  the  process  whereby  such  an 
individual  is  ‘subjectified’  as  interpellation .  130
The  first  obstacle  keeping  a  care  worker  from  becoming  a  revolutionary  subject  is 
ideological  false  consciousness:  she  has  already  been  interpellated  as  an  acquiescent  subject 
by  the  patriarchal  capitalist  system.  Marxist  theory  suggests  that  many  workers  wrongly 
identify  their  interests  with  those  of  their  exploiters.   Such  a  care  worker  may  be  working 131
against  her  will,  and  suppressing  her  own  self-interested  values  and  feelings.  And  even 
when  the  care  worker  does  not  suffer  subjectively  from  ideological  false  consciousness,  her 
acquiescence  to  abusive  working  conditions  can  help  to  reinforce  oppressive  social 
patterns.  A  marxist  feminist  moral  theory  must  reckon  with  these  problematic  dynamics, 
especially  in  light  of  the  fact  that  many  women  are  already  interpellated  as  care  workers. 
Such  a  dialectical  ethic  must  be  able  to  sift  through  their  existing  attitudes  and  skills 
(cultivated  through  their  care  work),  affirming  those  tendencies  which  are  liberatory  while 
129 Dalla  Costa  and  James,  56,  59. 
130 Althusser  explains  that  “ideology  ‘acts’  or  ‘functions’  in  such  a  way  as  to  ‘recruit’  subjects  among  
individuals  (it  recruits  them  all)  or  ‘transform’  individuals  into  subjects  (it  transforms  them  all) 
through  the  very  precise  operation  that  we  call  interpellation  or  hailing…  ‘Hey,  you  there!’” 
(Althusser,  190). 
131 Marx  and  Engels,  The  German  Ideology ,  154.  This  phenomenon  is  not  necessarily  irrational,  but  a  
rational  calculation  of  which  alliance  (along  the  axis  of  class,  race,  or  gender)  has  the  highest 
probability  of  serving  one’s  own  interests  (Ferguson  and  Folbre,  333).  The  danger  of  an 
agency-erasing  paternalistic  critique  can  be  mitigated  by  temporalizing  conflicting  interests:  one 
may  be  aware  of  their  long-term  interests  even  as  they  pursue  compromised  short-term  interests. 
Accordingly,  marxist  feminist  strategy  must  mediate  between  short-  and  long-term  goals  (Federici, 
55). 
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rejecting  those  which  are  reactionary.  Unfortunately,  the  two  primary  normative 
theories—deontology  and  utilitarianism—are  unable  to  interpellate  moral  agents  into 
liberatory  struggle  as  political  subjects,  because  these  theoretical  lenses  are  themselves  at 
least  partially  veiled  by  false  consciousness. 
 
2.4   Deontology  and  Utilitarianism 
Several  normative  theories  immediately  reveal  themselves  to  be  untenable  for 
marxist  feminism:  those  which  feminist  care  ethics  refers  to  as  justice  ethics .  Contractualist 
approaches  (such  as  Kantian  and  Rawlsian  deontological  theories)  are  too  formalist  and 
universalist  to  adequately  interpellate  the  individuals  situated  within  the  social  systems  of 
patriarchy  and  capitalism  as  political  subjects.   Even  though  marxist  feminists  may  use  the 132
language  of  “women’s  rights”  or  “worker’s  rights”,  the  deontological  framework  of  rights 
and  correlative  duties  has  traditionally  been  associated  primarily  with  property  rights,  which 
have  been  systematically  denied  to  women,  BIPOC,  and  the  working  class  for  millenia  in 
the  West.   Whatever  normative  rights  and  duties  may  eventually  obtain  in  a  ‘kingdom  of 133
ends’,  they  are  at  best  utopian  abstractions  (and  at  worst  ideological  mystifications)  if  one 
does  not  historicize  their  injunctions  to  the  current  moment’s  social  conditions.  134
As  a  historical  materialist  theory,  marxist  feminism  must  therefore  embrace  some 
form  of  consequentialist  ethics  in  order  to  make  such  ‘rights’  substantively  available  to  all 
132 However,  Blackledge  admits  that   “to  the  extent  that  Marxists  articulate  ethical  critiques  of  
capitalism  they  tend  to  revert  to  one  or  other  form  of  modern  bourgeois  morality:  typically  either 
consequentialism  or  deontology.”  (Blackledge,  41).  
133 Bhattacharya,  69.  As  Carole  Pateman  and  Charles  Mills  point  out,  the  idea  of  a  ‘voluntary  
contract’  within  a  racist  patriarchal  class  system  is  a  farce,  because  power  dynamics  skew  the 
voluntariness  of  the  parties’  consent  to  the  terms  of  agreement  (Pateman  and  Mills,  2,  7). 
134 Brenkert,  428. 
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subalterns.   The  most  popular  version  of  consequentialism  is  utilitarianism,  but  marxist 135
feminists  also  face  several  problems  with  this  model  of  the  right  and  the  good.  The 
qualitative  objection  of  utilitarianism  is  that  the  desires  of  individuals  of  different  classes  or 
identity  groups  should  not  be  weighted  equally;  there  should  be  a  preference  for  the  needs 
of  the  oppressed.   The  quantitative  objection  is  that  utilitarian  theories  are  too  majoritarian 136
to  adequately  protect  the  rights  of  minorities  (in  the  literal  sense  of  a  quantitative  subset 
constituting  less  than  50%  of  the  whole  population).  Even  though  the  workers  in  a  class 
society  compose  the  vast  majority  of  people,  approximately  half  of  them  are  women  or 
non-binary  workers.  This  fraction  drops  further  into  minority  status  upon  specifying 
‘working  class  women  of  color.’  It  clearly  seems  wrong  to  sacrifice  subaltern  interests  for 
the  greater  good  (i.e.  the  interests  of  males,  white  people,  and  the  ruling  class),  yet 
utilitarianism  would  seem  to  demand  exactly  that.  137
Having  ruled  out  deontology,  contractualism,  and  utilitarianism,  marxist  feminist 
dialectical  ethics  must  look  for  its  normative  roots  in  either—or  both—of  the  remaining 
approaches:  feminist  care  ethics  or  virtue  ethics.  Because  SRT  is  a  feminist  project 
concerned  with  care  workers,  its  theorists  might  be  expected  to  adopt  some  version  of 
feminist  care  ethics  (FCE).  
 
135 Communists  facing  difficult  conditions  have  not  only  erred  on  the  side  of  sacrificing  means  to  
ends  (Blackledge,  41),  but  also  sacrificing  ends  to  means  and  making  a  virtue  of  necessity  (de 
Beauvoir  [1948],  125).  Marxist  feminist  ethics  must  follow  her  injunction  to  strike  “a  balance 
between  the  goal  and  its  means”  (de  Beauvoir   [1948],  148). 
136 Brenkert,  433. 
137 Arruzza,  Bhattacharya,  &  Fraser,  13. 
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2.5   Feminist  Care  Ethics 
In  the  1980s,  several  moral  philosophers  developed  a  new  normative  ethical  theory 
known  as  a  feminist  ethic  of  care ,  which  they  distinguished  from  what  they  term  masculine 
ethics  of  justice .   Feminist  care  ethics  aimed  to  resolve  major  problems  in  both  utilitarian 138
and  deontological  paradigms.   This  novel  normative  theory’s  key  value  of  care  is  often  in 139
tension  with  the  value  of  justice.   According  to  this  schematic,  marxist  feminism  is  a 140
(social)  justice  ethic  and  therefore  lacks  robust  interpersonal  norms.  This  theoretical 
deficiency  can  perhaps  be  rectified  by  valorizing  care.  However,  while  feminist  care  ethics 
must  inform  marxist  feminist  SRT,  it  cannot  alone  serve  as  an  adequate  personal  ethic.  In 
order  to  determine  which  normative  theory  is  most  dialectically  appropriate  for  marxist 
feminism,  I  will  examine  the  feminized  and  racialized  role  of  the  care  worker ,  who  figures 
prominently  in  both  social  reproduction  theory  (SRT)  and  feminist  care  ethics  (FCE).   In 141
doing  so,  I  will  close  the  gap  in  the  literature  separating  these  closely  related  yet 
disciplinarily  independent  fields. 
138 FCE  was  initially  sketched  out  by  Carol  Gilligan  in  a  critique  of  unduly  androcentric  accounts  of  
moral  development  (which  culminated  in  Kantian  rationalist  absolutism),  which  focus  on  the 
independent  self  and  its  work—not  on  its  relationships  (Gilligan,  151,  160).  Similarly,  Nel 
Noddings  writes  that  whereas  women’s  feminized  experience  often  results  in  a  concrete  emotional 
moral  approach,  men’s  masculine  experiences  tends  to  lead  to  rationally  abstract  moral  approach 
(Noddings,  8). 
139 Noddings  explicitly  contrasts  her  FCE  with  the  contractualist  school  (Noddings,  4). 
140 Held,  15.  In  FCE’s  schema,  any  moral  context  can  be  framed  through  either  the  masculinized  
value  of  justice  (i.e.  universal  obligation)  or  the  feminized  value  of  care  (i.e.  particularized  love), 
neither  of  which  should  be  absolutized  over  the  other  (Gilligan,  167;  Noddings,  xiv,  11,  18; 
Benhabib,  180;  Baier,  266,  271,  273).  
141 Just  as  SRT  has  been  used  to  reinterpret  marxism’s  materialist  analysis  along  gender  and  racial  
lines,  Maurice  Hamington  proposes  that  FCE’s  attunement  to  the  common  situation  of 
embodiment  can  discern  universal  norms  while  acknowledging  identitarian  differences 
(Hamington,  80). 
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Care,  as  defined  by  FCE  theorist  Joan  Tronto,  is  the  “on-going  responsibility  and 
commitment”  for  some  other  subject  (or,  more  broadly,  object).   FCE  values  relationships 142
not  merely  as  instrumentally  good  means,  but  also  as  inherently  good  ends.   The 143
philosophical  anthropology  undergirding  FCE  assumes  both  that  human  beings 
instinctively  engage  in  “natural  caring”  and  also  that  “ethical  caring”  must  be  prescribed 
under  conditions  in  which  natural  care  is  insufficient  (or  even  impossible).  144
Unfortunately,  the  imperative  to  care  has  often  been  imposed  upon  women 
externally  by  patriarchal  social  structures,  rather  than  internally  according  to  their  own 
conscientious  judgments.  Sarah  Ruddick  argues  that  even  though  caring  practices  were 
conditioned  by  millenia  of  women’s  oppression,  they  nonetheless  contain  valuable  elements 
and  can  be  repurposed  by  feminists.   Joan  Tronto  is  less  sure,  warning  FCE  not  to  make  a 145
virtue  of  feminized  caring  because  of  its  oppressive  historical  conditioning.   I  will 146
examine  these  complex  contributions  in  turn,  noting  both  their  attractive  and  problematic 
elements  for  marxist  feminists. 
First,  FCE  seeks  to  position  itself  between  moral  objectivism  and  relativism.  It 
views  care  both  as  manifesting  in  unique  ways  in  different  relational  and  social  contexts, 
yet  it  also  posits  care  as  a  universal  phenomenon  across  human  societies.   Marxist 147
feminist  strategy  requires  tactical  flexibility,  and  this  is  no  more  apparent  than  in  an 
organizer’s  treatment  of  individuals  from  differently-privileged  social  positionalities.  148
142 Tronto  (1989),  173. 
143 Held,  17;  Noddings,  5.  
144 Noddings,  xv.  Ethical  caring  is  thus  only  auxiliary  to  natural  caring. 
145 Ruddick,  359.  Herbert  Marcuse  makes  a  very  similar  argument  (Marcuse,  283). 
146 Tronto  (1989),  185. 
147 Held,  3,  20. 
148 Arruzza,  196. 
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However,  even  if  care  is  descriptively  a  universal  value  (found  in  all  societies),  care  which 
does  not  extend  beyond  the  particularity  of  its  proximate  relations  can  justify  xenophobic 
attitudes  toward  more  distant  others.   For  instance,  marxist  feminists  might  lapse  from 149
their  internationalist  commitments  into  ‘social  imperialism,’  caring  for  subalterns 
domestically  in  the  imperial  core  while  ignoring  those  in  the  colonial  periphery.  Thus,  while 
care  may  be  a  value  among  other  values  (such  as  justice),  it  should  not  be  elevated  above 
them.   150
Second,  FCE  attempts  to  avoid  the  extremes  of  both  determinism  and  libertarianism 
by  highlighting  both  the  agency  of  care  workers  and  their  social  constraints  and 
compulsions.  FCE  valorizes  actions  which  are  performed  (voluntarily  or  involuntarily)  by 
oppressed  moral  agents,  and  which  are  wrongly  recognized  only  as  a  natural  ‘given.’  151
However,  FCE’s  affirmation  of  the  historically  feminized  (and  thus  denigrated)  practice  of 
care  has  prompted  accusations  that  it  reinforces  patriarchal  gender  norms  and  consigning 
women  to  subjugational  roles.   Critics  claim  that  FCE  mislabels  relational  care  work  as  a 152
labor  of  love,  thereby  making  a  virtue  of  necessity.   By  assuming  that  care  workers  have 153
149 Tronto  (1989),  183.  In  fact,  the  classical  definition  of  corruption,  dating  back  to  Aristotle,  is  the  
privileging  of  private  interests  (relational  as  well  as  individual)  over  public  interests. 
150 Positioning  care  over  and  against  justice  degrades  the  value  of  the  latter  and  undermines  
resistance  to  oppression  (Sander-Staudt,  27-8). 
151 Annette  Baier  criticizes  masculine  moral  theory  for  omitting  duties  to  care  for  the  young  and  to  
perpetuate  morality  intergenerationally.  Such  androcentric  liberal  theories  tend  to  amoralize 
feminized  care  practices  and  take  for  granted  conditions  such  as  being  raised  by  a  loving 
parent—which  assume  not  merely  parental  duty  but  the  parental  virtue  of  loving  care  (Baier, 
267-8). 
152 Held,  12;  Ruddick,  346;  Groenhout,  173.  Groenhout  expands  this  point:  “traits  identified  as  
‘feminine’  are  common  to  many  people  who  are  raised  under  oppressive  circumstances,  and  are 
perhaps  better  understood  as  survival  mechanisms  than  virtues”  (Groenhout,  185).  
153 Kittay  attributes  this  to  oppressive  background  conditions  such  as  poverty  which  “undermine  the  
possibility  of  love’s  labor”  (Kittay,  174). 
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more  agency  and  autonomy  than  may  be  the  case,  FCE  risks  fixing  the  care  worker  more 
firmly  in  the  grasp  of  social  determinism  which  marxist  feminists  are  trying  to  pry  open. 
Third,  FCE  strives  to  attend  to  moral  motives  (particularly  acting  out  of  a  feeling  of 
care)  as  much  as  to  consequences  (particularly  the  ends  of  mutually  caring  relationships).  154
Although  FCE  values  natural  caring  (i.e.  that  which  proceeds  from  instincts  and  affects),  it 
also  prescribes  caring  in  contexts  where  an  insufficient  emotional  motive  cannot  effectively 
provide  for  the  needs  of  moral  patients.  By  respecting  the  moral  significance  of  emotional 
affects,  FCE  challenges  the  masculine  rationalism  of  both  deontology  (which  absolutizes 
reason)  and  utilitarianism  (which  instrumentalizes  it).  Even  though  care  ethicists  tend  to 
focus  on  actions  over  psychological  states,  the  moral  ideal  is  healthy  relationships  of  mutual 
care  and  affection.  The  stereotypically  altruistic  connotations  of  care  also  may  ideologically 
legitimize  the  economic  extraction  of  the  surplus  value  produced  by  the  care  worker.  155
Even  if  she  subjectively  enjoys  her  role  in  the  caring  relation,  it  may  be  objectively 
exploitative.   The  motivation  of  the  care  worker  (whether  love  or  duty)  is  not  the  only 156
relevant  moral  factor:  the  consequences  of  one’s  care  practices  may  combine  with  those  of 
others  to  constitute  detrimental  social  patterns.   157
Fourth,  FCE  attempts  to  deconstruct  the  false  dichotomy  between  egoism  and 
altruism.   Moreover,  in  focusing  on  interpersonal  relationships,  FCE  seeks  to  evade  the 158
individual-versus-society  dilemma  which  utilitarianism  and  deontology  have  been  fighting 
154 Held,  20. 
155 Held,  16;  McLaren,  105. 
156 Ruddick,  354;  Baier,  269-70. 
157 Benhabib  questions  the  moral  significance  of  an  individual  “‘woman’s  voice’  independent...  of  
race  and  class  differences,  and  abstracted  from  social  and  historical  context”  (Benhabib,  191). 
158 For  Held,  caring  relations  are  “neither  egoistic  nor  altruistic”  (Held,  12). 
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since  the  19th  century.  By  valuing  care  over  individual  rights,  FCE  challenges  the  egoistic 
values  motivating  capitalist  exchange  (“the  paradigmatic  relationship  of  modern  society”). 
  However,  although  FCE  has  widened  its  focus  to  include  the  moral  role  of  the  cared-for 159
as  well  as  that  of  the  carer,  the  theory  still  tends  toward  a  self-denying  heteronomy.  160
Feminist  care  ethics  tends  to  be  normatively  altruistic,  to  the  point  of  being  criticized  for 
valorizing  self-sacrifice  (especially  that  of  female  care  workers)  for  the  interests  of  cared-for 
others.   While  marxist  feminists  acknowledge  the  importance  of  self-sacrifice  in  a 161
liberation  struggle,  altruism  is  a  limited  principle  for  radical  organizing.  162
All  of  these  problems  make  FCE  unsuitable  for  a  marxist  feminist  ethic,  along  with 
the  other  major  ethical  theories  of  deontology  and  utilitarianism.  This  leaves  virtue  ethics  as 
the  final  probable  contender  for  a  dialectical  personal  ethic  which  can  complement  the 
social  ethic  embodied  by  marxist  feminist  politics. 
 
2.6   Neo-Aristotelian  Virtue  Ethics 
I  will  argue  that  immediate  interpersonal  demands  and  long-term  social  demands  are 
connected  both  in  Aristotle’s  Nicomachean  Ethics  and  in  the  works  of  some  recent  feminist 
care  ethicists  who  frame  (interpersonal)  care  as  a  virtue  alongside  (social)  justice.   Over 163
159 Tronto  (1989),  178.   FCE  emphasizes  the  substantive  value  of  equity  (a  “recognition  of  
differences  in  need”)  over  the  formal  values  of  liberty  or  equality  (Gilligan,  164). 
160 Tronto  (1989),  180.  Noddings  describes  care  as  “a  move  away  from  self”  (Noddings,  16). 
161 McLaren,  107.  Tronto  cautions  other  care  ethicists  to  avoid  romantically  idealizing  selflessness  
in  caregivers  (Tronto  [1989],  178). 
162 This  is  not  only  because  of  the  finitude  of  self-sacrifice,  but  also  because  micro-ethical  
(inter)personal  care  does  not  scale  up  to  macro-ethical  social  justice  (Tronto  [1989],  182).  While 
Nel  Noddings  gestures  toward  systemic  thinking  (calling  her  society  to  “transform...the 
conditions  that  make  caring  difficult  or  impossible”),  she  is  primarily  interested  in  interpersonal 
actions  rather  than  social  praxis  (Noddings,  xxii). 
163 Sander-Staudt,  21. 
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the  past  several  decades,  the  oldest  tradition  of  normative  ethics  has  undergone  an 
intellectual  renaissance,  spearheaded  by  the  theory  known  as  neo-Aristotelian  virtue  ethics 
(NAVE).   Although  such  theorists  are  committed  to  the  general  structure  of  Aristotle’s 164
moral  thought  and  regularly  cite  and  comment  upon  their  intellectual  godfather,  their 
hermeneutic  project  has  reconstructed  a  rather  idiosyncratic  Aristotle.  This  neo-Aristotelian 
approach  has  at  times  detached  the  concept  of  character  excellence  from  its  original  context 
in  fixed  social  roles,  which  may  seem  immutable  from  the  perspective  of  Aristotle’s  other 
works  (such  as  Politics ).   Virtue  ethics  is  rooted  in  the  Aristotle’s  ancient  culture  of 165
patriarchy  and  slavery,  yet  20th-  and  21st-century  NAVE  has  rightly  rejected  Aristotle’s 
denigration  of  women  and  slaves,  recontextualized  his  normative  theory,  and  revised  his 
catalog  of  virtues  to  address  the  lifeworld(s)  of  contemporary  society.  166
As  NAVE  theorist  Rosalind  Hursthouse  correctly  predicted,  this  development  has 
increasingly  merged  virtue  ethics  with  other  normative  theories,  including  feminist  care 
ethics.   Several  neo-Aristotelian  virtue  ethicists  have  borrowed  the  value  of  care  from 167
FCE  and  designated  it  as  a  virtue  alongside  justice,  prudence,  self-control,  courage,  etc.   I 168
164 Hursthouse  (1999b),  2;  Nussbaum,  xxiv.  Although  there  are  of  course  many  varieties  of  virtue  
ethics  (some  of  which  have  very  diverse  intellectual  lineages,  including  Confucianism),  Halwani 
insists  that  Aristotle  offers  the  only  plausible  version  of  virtue  ethics  (Halwani,  14).  Philippa  Foot 
similarly  argues  that  Aristotle’s  version  is  the  most  systematic  (Foot,  1).  In  Benhabib’s  definition, 
“‘neo-Aristotelianism’  refers  to  a  hermeneutical  philosophical  ethics,  taking  as  its  starting  point 
the  Aristotelian  understanding  of phronesis,” i.e.  the  cardinal  virtue  of practical  reason 
(Benhabib,  25).  
165 Aristotle’s  traditional  virtue  ethics  focused  on  patriarchal  virtues  and  ignored  or  denigrated  
female  virtues,  such  as  care  (Dillon,  381). 
166 McLaren,  113;  Sander-Staudt,  21-22;  Halwani,  17-18;  Snow  (2015),  51;  Hursthouse  (1999b),  2,  8;  
Dillon,  381.  Groff  writes  that  Marx  himself  has  an  implicit  but  underdeveloped  ethical  theory  
which  is  “recognizably  Aristotelian”  (Groff,  325). 
167 Hursthouse  (1999b),  5;  Snow  (2018),  321. 
168 Slote,  127;  Sander-Staudt,  24-5.  Although  Aristotle  does  not  explicitly  discuss  the  value  of  care,  
he  dedicates  the  Books  VIII  and  IX  of Nicomachean  Ethics  to  explaining  the  concept  of 
‘friendship.’  He  treats  this  term  so  broadly  and  multifariously  that  FCE  could  translate  it  simply  as 
‘caring  relationship,’  albeit  one  with  problematic  features  (Halwani,  7;  Groenhout,  193). 
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propose  that  such  a  neo-Aristotelian  virtue  ethics  is  well-positioned  for  marxist  feminism’s 
dialectical  thinking. 
The  core  of  any  normative  theory  is  not  its  practical  application  but  its  posited 
source  of  moral  obligation.  The  key  issue  for  virtue  ethics  is  ultimately  not  about  how  one 
should  act  (let  alone  how  one  should  feel)—it  is  ultimately  about  why  one  should  become  a 
certain  type  of  person.   Rather  than  focusing  on  rules  or  actions,  virtue  ethics  attends 169
primarily  to  character  states:  habitual  dispositions  toward  acting  and  feeling  in  certain  ways 
rather  than  others.   These  character  states  of  virtue  or  vice  are  not  necessarily  fixed,  but 170
can  change  over  time.  Through  ‘self-work’  on  one’s  character,  the  accidental  nature  of 
virtuous  but  out-of-character  actions  can  become  an  essential  aspect  of  one’s  ‘second 
nature.’   Through  practice,  bad  habits  can  become  good  habits,  and  unhealthy  and 171
destructive  irrational  desires  can  become  healthy,  constructive,  and  more  rational.  172
Accordingly,  virtue  ethics  stresses  personal  moral  development  more  than  perhaps  any 
other  normative  theory.   173
Accordingly,  Neo-Aristotelian  virtue  ethics  has  a  clear  definition  of  the  good  for 
human  beings:  it  is  a  complete  life  of  virtuous  activity.   Virtue  ethics  is  fundamentally 174
concerned  with  the  moral  agent’s  soul,  which  is  not  separable  from  the  body  but  rather  its 
animating  principle.   The  moral  agent’s  soul  is  always  characterized  by  virtue,  vice,  or 175
169 Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics ,  II.i  1103b12-21;  Anscombe,  1275;  Groff,  334.   
170 Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics ,  II.v-vi  1106a11-15;  Hursthouse  (1999a),  105;  Kosman,  105. 
171 Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics ,  II.iv  1105a18-20;  Politics ,  VII.i  1323b30-31,  Snow  (2018),  334;  
Burnyeat,  78. 
172 Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics ,  II.i  1103b7-21;  Burnyeat,  86,  88. 
173 Burnyeat,  70. 
174 Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics,  I.vii  1098a16-18.  Whereas  utilitarianism  and  deontology  concern  
themselves  with  particular  moments  of  principled  action,  virtue  ethics  concerns  itself  with  the 
entirety  of  one’s  life  (Russell,  2). 
175 In  this  interpretation  (contra  that  of  Hardie),  Aristotle  and  his  NAVE  successors  are  value  monists,  
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both.   The  excellent  character  habits  called  the  virtues  are  taken  to  be  both  instrumentally 176
and  intrinsically  valuable:  they  are  simultaneously  causal  means  to  and  partially  constitutive 
ends  of  the  good  life.   Aristotle  refers  to  this  condition  of  flourishing  amid  both  internal 177
and  external  goods  as  eudaimonia .   178
Of  course,  the  exact  list  of  virtues  is  disputable,  as  it  is  unclear  which  character 
states  should  count  as  virtues  and  which  should  count  as  vices.   What  is  relatively 179
consistent  across  the  different  tables  of  virtues,  however,  is  the  structure  of  what  constitutes 
a  virtue:  it  is  a  mean  between  opposing  vices  (destructive  character  habits)  which  manifest 
either  as  a  defect  (too  little  of  a  given  action  or  passion  in  a  given  context)  or  an  excess  (too 
much  of  either).   Therefore,  correcting  one’s  habits  requires  both  knowing  whether  one  is 180
predisposed  toward  too  little  or  too  much  of  a  particular  passion,  and  consciously  willing 
against  one’s  ‘natural’  impulses.   As  Aristotle  counsels,  “We  must  drag  ourselves  away  to 181
the  contrary  extreme”  and  thereby  “get  into  the  intermediate  state.”   Some  NAVE 182
who  posits  a  single  value  (or  “supremely  desired  activity,”  in  Ackrill’s  formulation)  as  the 
ultimate  end  of  human  life  (Ackrill,  58).  
176 Aristotle  characterizes  virtues  and  vices  not  as  first-order  psychological  faculties  for  passion  or  
action,  but  rather  as  second-order  states  of  those  psychological  capacities  (Aristotle, 
Nicomachean  Ethics  II.v  1106a11-13). 
177 MacIntyre  (1981),  149;  Snow  (2018),  321;  Broadie,  344.  In  the  ‘ergon  argument’,  Aristotle  
considers  what  the  distinctive  capacities  of  the  human  being  must  be  (Aristotle, Nicomachean 
Ethics ,  I.vii  1097b22-1098a19;  Ackrill,  69-70).  One  interpretation  has  him  positing  a 
combination  of  thought  and  action—practical  rationality—as  the  uniquely  and  essentially 
human  function,  as  opposed  to  those  of  gods  or  animals  (Nussbaum,  xxvii;  Ackrill,  70; 
Groenhout,  179).  
178 Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics ,  I.xii  1102a1-4;  Ackrill,  64.  The  Greek  term  ‘ eudaimonia’  has  
often  been  translated  as  ‘happiness.’  This  choice  has  been  criticized  for  conveying  a  shallow 
external  end  rather  than  a  deeper  internal  end  (Kraut  [1979],  169;  Ackrill,  67;  ).  
179 MacIntyre  (1981),  162.  Even  Aristotle’s  clearest  presentation  of  his  table  of  virtues  and  
corresponding  vices  is  not  exhaustive  ( Nicomachean  Ethics ,  II.vii  1107a28-1108b10.  
180 Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics ,  II.vi  1107a2-5.  Of  course,  the  same  character  state  can  change  its  
nature  as  a  virtue  or  as  a  vice  as  conditions  change  (Foot,  14,  16;  Murdoch,  113).  
181 Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics ,  II.ix  1109a24-1109b4;  MacIntyre  (1981),  190. 
182 Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics ,  II.ix  1109b4-5;  Foot,  8,  11;  Hursthouse  (1999b),  107. 
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theorists  have  described  the  relationship  between  virtue  ethics  and  feminist  care  ethics  in 
precisely  this  way,  proposing  that  a  collaboration  would  be  mutually  corrective  and 
beneficial.  183
First,  NAVE  has  the  potential  to  rectify  the  threat  of  subjectivism  in  FCE.   For 184
instance,  a  virtuous  care  worker  is  not  always  actually  engaged  in  care  work  (whether 
active  praxis  or  emotional  pathos ),  but  she  has  cultivated  the  virtuous  character  state  ( hexis ) 
with  the  constant  desire  to  potentially  provide  the  right  type  of  care,  to  the  right  person,  in 
the  right  context,  to  the  right  degree.   Because  care  work  has  been  demanded  of  women 185
for  millenia,  patriarchal  class  societies  habituate  women  in  developing  this  disposition.  186
While  in  the  abstract  such  an  altruistic  character  trait  may  be  laudable,  the  oppressive 
conditions  of  working-class  women  entail  that  this  comes  at  the  expense  of  their 
opportunities  to  realize  their  undeveloped  potential—to  cultivate  other  virtues.  NAVE  is 
able  to  both  relativize  the  criterion  for  excellent  feeling  and  action  to  the  oppressive 
constraints  of  the  care  worker’s  specific  positionality,  yet  also  to  recognize  the  virtues 
which  she  has  been  forced  to  develop  as  objective  and  universalizable  virtues  which  should 
also  be  expected  from  vicious  oppressors.   NAVE  thus  balances  elements  of  relativism 187
and  with  those  of  absolutism. 
Second,  NAVE  has  a  greater  potential  than  FCE  to  counter  the  socially 
deterministic  force  of  fixed  internal  and  external  conditions  with  the  possibility  of 
183 McLaren,  15;  Groenhout,  172. 
184 Ethical  naturalists  such  as  Aristotle,  Hursthouse,  and  Foot  treat  the  virtues  as  objectively  good  
even  as  they  are  relatively  indexed  to  the  specific  nature  of  the  moral  agent  and  other  conditions.  
185 Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics,  II.vi  1106b16-24;  Hursthouse  (1999b),  92.  
186 Slote,  36;  Dillon,  386.  
187 Davis,  11. 
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cultivating  freedom.  Even  though  the  virtuous  agent’s  actions  are  not  absolutely 
determined,  neither  are  they  nor  absolutely  free.  Her  will  ( prohairesis )  is  always  under 
compulsion—not  only  by  external  conditions,  but  also  by  the  state  ( hexis )  of  her  
character.   Yet  because  her  present  character  is  conditioned  by  her  past  actions,  it  is  also 188
possible  for  her  to  willfully  transform  her  own  hexis  by  acting  according  to  her  reason 
( logos )  until  her  emotions  ( pathē )  align  with  her  rational  judgments.   Virtue  ethics 189
characterizes  the  transformation  of  vice  into  virtue  not  only  as  moral  development  of  one’s 
will,  but  moral  development  of  one’s  emotions  and  one’s  intellect.   Moral  development, 190
for  Aristotle,  involves  growing  from  a  psychological  state  in  which  experiencing  the  right 
passion  and  performing  the  right  action  are  unlikely  (if  not  impossible)  to  occur,  to  a  state  in 
which  their  occurence  becomes  probable  (or  even  necessary).   Such  a  moral  agent  moves 191
from  ‘incontinent;  vice,  to  ‘continent’  vice,  to  virtue.   For  example,  a  care  worker  should 192
train  herself  both  to  enjoy  and  to  ‘work  on’  a  difficult  caring  relationship  if  she  knows  it 
will  increase  her  ability  to  thrive.  Conversely,  she  should  train  herself  to  despise  and  to  ‘go 
on  strike’  from  a  difficult  caring  relationship  (literally  or  figuratively)  if  she  knows  it  will 
oppressively  constrain  her.  By  attending  to  the  dynamics  of  both  external  and  internal 
conditions,  NAVE  situates  its  philosophical  anthropology  between  social  determinism  and 
libertarianism.  
188 Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics,  III.v  1114a32-1114b3.  
189 Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics,  VI.ii  1139a22-25;  Politics  VII.xiv  1333a17-19. 
190 Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics  III.v  1114a19-22;  III.x  1118a24-26;  Murdoch,  115;  Sherman,  236. 
191 Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics  II.iv  1105b5-11;  II.ix  1109a20-1109b6.  Of  course,  one’s  character  
transformation  can  also  be  regressive.  Character  habituation  is  inherently  dynamic,  whether  in  the 
direction  of  growth  or  of  atrophy  (MacIntyre  [1981],  189). 
192 Burnyeat,  86. 
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Third,  in  theorizing  both  the  motivating  source  and  the  consequential  end  of  ethical 
action,  NAVE  attends  (perhaps  more  than  other  normative  theories)  to  the  complex 
relationship  between  intellect,  affect,  and  will.   While  virtue  ethics  (like  other  normative 193
theories)  judges  a  moral  agent’s  behavior  as  right  or  wrong,  this  first-order  evaluation  of  her 
actions  is  superseded  by  its  second-order  evaluation  about  her  character  hexis  (which  has 
been  conditioned  by  her  past  actions  and  also  determines  her  future  actions).  Her  hexis 
should  be  both  rationally  principled  (insofar  as  she  is  intellectually  attuned  to  ends  and  their 
means)  and  emotionally  affected  (insofar  as  she  is  embodied  in  a  material  form  subject  to 
passions  and  desires).   Because  of  its  temporal  sensibility,  virtue  ethics  appears  to  be 194
consequentialist:  one’s  repeated  actions  have  the  consequence  of  making  one’s  character 
state  either  virtuous  or  vicious.  Yet  it  also  appears  to  be  deontological  (or  perhaps  simply 
‘motivist’),  since  one’s  character  state  is  also  the  motive  for  virtuous  or  vicious  actions.  195
For  instance,  a  moral  agent  who  performs  exploitive  care  work  (whether  waged  service 
labor  or  social  reproductive  labor)  does  so  for  one  of  two  reasons:  either  she  find  the  forced 
labor  of  love  intrinsically  desirable  (due  to  ideological  conditions),  or  she  fears  the  threat  of 
losing  her  job  (i.e.  her  means  of  subsistence).  Yet  in  consequentialist  terms,  the  artifice  of 
her  paid  affective  labor  is  not  actually  vicious:  in  fact  it  may  well  be  virtuous,  insofar  as  it 
exhibits  no  more  (and  no  less)  emotional  labor  than  necessary  to  achieve  her  ends  given 
193 Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics  VI.ii  1139a17-1139b5. 
194 Aristotle  writes  that  “the  irrational  passions  are  thought  not  less  human  than  reason  is”  
( Nicomachean  Ethics  III.i  1111b1-2). 
195 MacIntyre  (1981),  149.  
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such  relational  coercion.   NAVE  offers  a  way  to  value  motives  and  consequences 196
simultaneously.  
Fourth,  virtue  ethics  appears  to  be  egoistic,  insofar  as  it  privileges  caring  for  the 
individual  moral  agent’s  own  soul  and  whether  or  not  she  receives  what  she  needs  to 
flourish  (physically  and  psychologically).   However,  unlike  in  crude  egoism,  the  object  of 197
the  moral  agent’s  desire  is  not  pleasure  simpliciter ,  but  rather  self-transformation  (which 
produces  higher  pleasures).   Virtue  ethics  is  thus  poised  between  the  opposing  vices  of 198
apathetic  egoism  (i.e.  excessive  self-interest)  and  hyper-altruistic  self-negation  (i.e.  deficient 
self-interest).   For  NAVE,  the  higher  self  of  enlightened  self-interest  is  a  relational  and 199
social  self.   The  virtuous  care  worker  is  neither  asymmetrically  codependent  with  others 200
nor  autonomously  isolated  from  them,  but  rather  she  is  inclined  to  both  provide  and  expect 
the  contextually  appropriate  type  and  amount  of  care  for  a  given  situation.   NAVE  can 201
offer  a  slight  corrective  to  FCE’s  problematic  altruism  in  the  form  of  elevated  egoism. 
196   In  fact,  this  merely  continent  (rather  than  virtuous)  care  is  actually  a  necessary  means  to  a  greater  
care-filled  end:  the  virtuous  care  worker  undoubtedly  has  other  relationships  outside  of  work, 
possibly  including  dependents  who  call  forth  her  care  on  a  more  consensual  and  affectionate 
basis.  In  Aristotelian  terms,  this  involves  maintaining  merely  a  friendship  (i.e.  relationship)  of 
utility  rather  than  a  friendship  of  pleasure  or  virtue  (Aristotle, Nicomachean  Ethics  VIII.iii 
1156a6-1156b24;  MacIntyre  [1981]),  158).  
197 Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics ,  VII.xiii  1153b17-18;  Halwani,  13. 
198 Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics  X.vi  1176b25-32.  Aristotle  writes,  “Therefore  the  good  man  
should  be  a  lover  of  self  (for  he  will  both  himself  profit  by  doing  noble  acts,  and  will  benefit  his 
fellows),  but  the  wicked  man  should  not;  for  he  will  hurt  both  himself  and  his  neighbours, 
following  as  he  does  evil  passions”  ( Nicomachean  Ethics  IX.viii  1169a12-15). 
199 Nussbaum,  xviii,  xxx;  Mann,  204.  Philippa  Foot  treats  virtue  ethics  as  elevated  egoism,  Bernard  
Williams  treats  it  as  a  form  of  altruism,  and  Rosalind  Hursthouse  describes  it  as  a  combination  of 
the  two  (Hursthouse  [1999b],  169).  I  agree  with  Hursthouse,  whose  view  entails  (I  propose)  that 
NAVE  should  adopt  care  as  a  virtue. 
200 Cooper,  296.  Because  care  ethics  treats  relationships  as  ontologically  basic,  some  of  its  
Proponents  have  accused  NAVE  of  being  inescapably  individualistic  in  its  philosophical 
anthropology  (Sander-Staudt,  26).  However,  Aristotle  views  moral  agents  as essentially  relational 
and  social  beings  (Aristotle, Nicomachean  Ethics ,  I.iii  1253a26-30,  McLaren,  110).  Yet  even  if 
NAVE’s  ontology  is  insufficiently  relational,  Halwani  argues  that  NAVE  need  only  accommodate 
FCE’s  ethical  commitments,  not  its  ontological  ones  (Halwani,  40). 
201 McLaren,  114. 
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In  each  of  these  philosophical  tensions,  neo-Aristotelian  virtue  ethics  assists  feminist 
care  ethics  in  balancing  important  but  opposed  principles.  In  the  next  section,  I  will  show 
how  marxist  feminist  theory  can  weld  the  virtue  of  justice  to  the  value  of  care.  Such  a 
nuanced  ethic  will  aid  the  marxist  feminist  project  of  (re)creating  social  structures  which 
make  just  care  more  possible  and  unust  care  less  necessary.   202
 
2.7   A  Marxist  Feminist  ‘Virtue  Ethic  of  Care’ 
It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  renaissance  of  virtue  ethics  and  the  birth  of  feminist 
care  ethics  occurred  simultaneously.   It  is  even  more  significant  that  these  developments 203
began  in  the  1980s—the  last  decade  of  the  Communist  threat  to  the  capitalist  order,  and  the 
first  full  decade  of  global  neoliberalism.  NAVE  and  FCE  can  be  seen  as  different  ways  of 
resisting  the  Reaganite-Thatcherite  individualism  which  has  permeated  what  Nancy  Fraser 
calls  the  “‘postsocialist’”  condition.   I  argue  that  the  overlapping  discourse  of  a 204
neo-Aristotelian  virtue  ethic  of  care  (VEC),  as  posited  by  McLaren,  Halwani,  Groenhout, 
and  Mann,  can  prove  beneficial  to  recently  resurgent  marxist  feminism  as  manifested  by  the 
most  recent  wave  of  social  reproduction  theory,  particularly  Bhattacharya,  Fraser,  and 
Arruzza.  
As  the  moral  exemplar  of  marxist  feminism,  a  radicalized  care  worker  requires  a 
whole  spectrum  of  virtues  to  flourish  in  her  political  role,  some  of  which  flow  from  her 
202 In  McLaren’s  understanding,  virtue  ethics  approaches  “both  care  and  justice  as  social  capacities”  
which  require  institutional  support  (112). 
203 Held,  24.  
204 Fraser  and  Honneth,  94.  The  NAVE  wave  inaugurated  by  Alasdair  MacIntyre  was  perhaps  a  
belated  response  to  (or  even  recapitulation  of)  G.E.M.  Anscombe’s  idiosyncratic  virtue  ethical 
treatise  several  decades  prior. 
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work  life.   The  most  ready-to-hand  virtue  for  a  care  worker  would  obviously  be  care , 205
which  marxist  feminists  can  recognize  not  only  as  a  skill  required  for  an  exploitative  service 
job,  but  also  as  a  pro-social  character  trait  which  readies  one  to  serve  others  in  the  struggle 
for  liberation.   If  care  work  is  a  practice  consisting  of  beneficial  actions,  then  care  itself  is 206
a  virtue  (the  balanced  condition  of  one’s  psychological  potential  to  act  beneficially).  207
Anyone  can  engage  in  the  act  of  care  work,  but  not  everyone  develops  the  virtuous 
disposition  to  meet  another’s  needs  (even  at  one’s  own  expense).   If  care  is  a  virtue,  then 208
it  is  not  only  a  means  to  the  good  life,  but  also  an  essential  part  of  what  Aristotle  calls 
eudaimonia  and  what  marxists  feminists  call  liberation  or  communism.   209
In  order  to  provide  others  with  what  they  need  and  deserve,  the  care  worker  must 
neither  meet  too  few  of  their  essential  needs  (i.e.  the  vice  of  neglect),  nor  meet  too  many  of 
their  extraneous  desires  (i.e.  the  vice  of  overexertion).   Yet  because  she  is  interpellated  as 210
a  marxist  feminist,  she  recognizes  that  this  balance  is  impossible  to  meet  under  the 
constraints  of  patriarchal  racialized  capitalism.  Accordingly,  her  virtue  of  care  also  requires 
that  she  develop  the  complementary  virtue  of  justice.   Other  radical  virtues  include 211
205 Virtue  ethicists  often  portray  the  virtues  as  being  mutually  necessary  (Aristotle,  Nicomachean  
Ethics ,  VI.xiii  1144b32-33;  Murdoch,  111-12;  Groenhout,  183).  
206 Mann,  201;  Groenhout,  190.  Just  as  there  is  no  political  strategy  which  guarantees  liberation,  the  
virtues  are  only  the  most  likely  means  of  achieving  the  good  life  (which  includes  external  goods). 
There  are  no  vices  with  a  greatest  probability  of  reliably  providing  the  conditions  of  flourishing 
(Hursthouse,  [1999],  176).  
207 Groenhout,  190;  Noddings,  9.  
208 Sander-Staudt,  30;  Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics  II.iv  1105a18-23.  Noddings  describes  care  as  “a  
state  of  readiness”  in  which  a  moral  agent  ‘availabilizes’  herself  to  and  for  others  (Noddings,  17, 
19).  Ruddick  describes  care  as  a  virtue  which  is  the  actualization  of  the  capacity  of  attention,  the 
development  of  which  “is  a  discipline  that  requires  effort  and  self-training”  (Ruddick,  357).  
209 MacIntyre  (1981),  148;  Halwani,  4,  Kollontai,  230.  Cooper  reads  Aristotle  as  treating  friendship  
in  the  same  multivalent  manner,  both  as  a  means  and  as  an  end  (Cooper,  294). 
210 Schofield,  315-16. 
211 Rachels  and  Rachels,  158;  Tronto  (1993),  168);  Noddings,  6;  Sander-Staudt,  37.  Held  insists  that  
“an  adequate,  comprehensive  moral  theory  will  have  to  include  the  insights  of  both  the  ethics  of 
care  and  the  ethics  of  justice…  rather  than  that  either  of  these  can  be  incorporated  into  the  other” 
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practical  wisdom  (e.g.  discerning  when  social  conditions  are  or  are  not  ripe  for  direct 
action),  courage  (e.g.  confronting  the  bosses  or  the  riot  police),  and  self-control  (e.g. 
refusing  to  cross  picket  lines  for  personal  benefit).   All  these  virtues,  but  especially  care 212
and  justice,  require  a  careful  balance  to  avoid  conflicting  with  one  another.   Only  through 213
a  virtue  ethic  of  care  can  marxist  feminists  dialectically  reconcile  relativism  with  absolutism, 
libertarianism  with  determinism,  motivism  with  consequentialism,  and  egoism  with 
altruism.  
First,  marxist  feminists  would  benefit  from  VEC’s  dialectical  resolution  to  the 
tension  between  absolute  universality  and  relativistic  particularity.   Although  virtue  ethics 214
is  described  with  the  language  of  balance  and  moderation,  the  virtuous  mean  between 
extremes  is  always  contextually  relative  to  particular  subjective  and  objective  conditions.  215
These  determine  which  feelings  and  actions  count  as  virtuous  and  which  count  as  vicious; 
under  different  or  changing  conditions,  a  virtuous  behavior  can  become  vicious,  and  vice 
versa.   A  historically-conscious  attunement  to  concrete  conditions  is  vital  for  a  radicalized 216
care  worker  in  discerning  the  helpful  and  harmful  tendencies  which  her  working  conditions 
(Held,  16).  Groenhout  accordingly  views  FCE  and  NAVE  as  capable  of  correcting  one  another’s 
deficiencies  (Groenhout,  173,  187).  
212 Kathi  Weeks  also  treats  hope  as  a  political  virtue,  similar  to  how  medieval  Christian  scholars  
framed  hope  as  a  theological  virtue  by  extending  Aristotle’s  moral  schema  (195).  
213 Snow  [2015],  57.  Jean-Paul  Sartre  (the  life  partner  of  Simone  de  Beauvoir)  famously  offers  an  
example  of  this  contradiction.  In  WWII,  a  student  of  his  had  faced  the  choice  of  staying  home  to 
care  for  his  ailing  mother  or  of  leaving  her  to  join  an  anti-fascist  milita.  Sartre  describes  this 
dilemma  as  opposing  “two  kinds  of  morality:  a  morality  motivated  by  sympathy  and  individual 
devotion,  and  another  morality  with  a  broader  scope,  but  less  likely  to  be  fruitful”  (Sartre,  31).  
214 Groenhout,  186. 
215 Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics  II.vi  1106b19-23. 
216 Aristotle, Nicomachean  Ethics  III.vii  1115b24-1116a7;  MacIntyre  (1981),  154.  Unlike  modern  
utilitarian  and  deontological  ethicists,  neo-Aristotelians  insists  that  only  the phronimos —one 
with  the  virtue  of  practical  reason—  can  decide  what  counts  as  a  right  (or  wrong)  action  in  a 
particular  context  (Broadie,  352-3).  The  individual  conditions  of  each  moral  agent  determines 
which  practices  they  should  take  up  to  correct  for  the  specific  vices  (some  more  destructive  than 
others)  which  tend  to  accompany  their  social  positionality  (Snow  [2018],  324).  
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have  instilled  in  her.  A  radicalized  care  worker  would  be  committed  to  overturning  modern 
patriarchy  and  capitalism,  and  she  would  valorize  her  character  traits  as  virtues  only  insofar 
as  they  make  liberation  more  possible.   A  virtue  ethic  of  care  would  ensure  that  she  and 217
her  subaltern  peers  are  not  alone  in  being  called  to  a  liberation  struggle.  The  obligatory 
force  of  VEC  must  impose  on  a  rich  white  male  as  much  as  on  a  working  class  woman  of 
color,  even  if  the  latter  is  much  more  likely  to  be  interpellated  as  a  liberatory  agent  than  the 
former.   218
Second,  VEC  resolves  the  marxist  feminist  tension  between  libertarianism  and 
determinism.  On  this  theory,  a  radicalized  care  worker’s  character  state  is  neither  absolutely 
determined  by  their  social  positionality  (within  the  system  of  patriarchal  racialized 
capitalism)  nor  absolutely  free  (to  act  justly  or  caringly  in  any  situation).  The  good  life  also 
requires  certain  external  and  internal  goods  which  involve  some  degree  of  moral  luck.  219
However,  this  situation  is  precisely  what  the  marxist  feminist  project  is  set  up  to  transform. 
The  structural  impacts  of  capitalism,  patriarchy,  and  white  supremacy  make  it  impossible 
for  many  people  to  live  well—not  only  the  oppressed  who  are  denied  external  goods,  but 
also  their  oppressors  who  fail  to  develop  internal  goods.   Yet  marxists  insist  that  the 220
217 According  to  Dillon,  a  feminist  ethic  of  character  would  simply  redefine  virtue  as  any  liberatory  
character  trait  and  vice  as  any  submissive  characteristic  (Dillon,  384).  
218 This  is  not  to  deny  the  moral  significance  of  the  virtues  for  those  not  interpellated  by  leftist  
political  commitments—merely  to  argue  that  they  are  indispensable  to  (and  evidence  for)  the 
latter.  Although  I  have  focused  on  the  moral  agency  of  a  very  specific  character  (a  female  care 
worker  who  has  gained  a  leftist  political  consciousness),  this  exemplar  represents  a  universal 
moral  situation  which  applies  to  everyone  with  the  capacity  for  care  and  justice.  
219 Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics  I.viii  1099a32-1099b8;  VII.xiii  1153b16-18;  Nussbaum,  xiii.  
Given  the  historical a  priori  which  habituates  both  social  conditions  and  the  moral  agent’s  own 
character  development,  it  is  often  the  case  that  the  right  action  is  not  always  available  to  freely 
make  (and  perhaps  that  the  right  emotions  are  not  always  available  to  feel)  (Kosman,  113). 
Moreover,  social  conditions  can  make  it  unlikely  if  not  impossible  to  develop  the  fully  human 
virtues  and  thus  to  achieve eudaimonia (Aristotle, Nicomachean  Ethics  VII.viii  1150b29-1151a8; 
MacIntyre  [2011],  15-16). 
220 MacIntyre  (2011),  13-14;  Mann,  212.  As  Dillon  points  out,  the  privileges  of  being  an  oppressor  
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historical  forces  which  produce  seemingly  deterministic  systems  also  dialectically  produce 
the  possibility  of  their  demise:  oppression  and  exploitation  eventually  drive  some  subalterns 
to  resist  so  forcefully  that  they  liberate  not  only  themselves  but  also  the  material  and 
ideological  structures  which  reproduce  social  hierarchies.   221
History  shows  that  an  exploited  care  worker  can  attain  gender,  race,  and  class 
consciousness;  such  a  transformation  will  motivate  her  to  act  according  to  the  liberatory 
demands  of  social  justice  as  well  as  the  demands  of  relational  care.  For  instance,  Alexandra 
Kollontai  was  radicalized  by  reading  Marx  while  mothering  a  newborn;  Claudia  Jones 
became  a  Communist  after  working  in  a  segregated  laundromat,  and  Selma  James 
developed  her  marxist  feminist  views  while  performing  domestic  labor  as  a  housewife.  222
Such  frustrating  working  conditions  can  accelerate  a  care  worker’s  realization  of  both  the 
structural  impediments  to  genuine  care  and  the  imperative  to  join  with  others  in  bending  the 
arc  of  history  toward  justice.  A  marxist  feminist  VEC  recognizes  that  any  such  movement 
which  is  committed  to  overcoming  deterministic  social  structures  will  be  not  able  to  liberate 
itself  through  virtuous  actions  without  cultivating  durable  virtuous  character.  
Third,  a  dialectical  VEC  seeks  a  balance  between  the  motives  and  the  intended 
consequences  of  a  moral  agent’s  actions.   Motivist  changes  in  desired  ends  and 223
consequentialist  changes  in  strategic  means  affect  one  another.  As  Paul  Blackledge  argues, 
can  at  most  secure  external  goods,  and  not  a  virtuous  balance  of  internal  goods  (Dillon,  391). 
221 Marx  and  Engels,  Manifesto  of  the  Communist  Party ,  483.  Working  class  radicals  strive  to  abolish  
class  as  well  as  capitalism;  Black  liberationists  strive  to  abolish  race  as  well  as  white  supremacy, 
and  feminists  strive  to  abolish  gender  as  well  as  patriarchy 
222 James,  13.  Even  the  occasional  white  male  capitalist  like  Friedrich  Engels  has  been  radicalized  by  
observing  and  learning  to  detest  the  oppression  and  exploitation  of  others  (Brown  and  Fee, 
1248-49). 
223 de  Beauvoir  (1948),  146,  148.  
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socialist  practices  have  followed  the  trajectory  of  “Marx’s  implicit  Aristotelianism,  by 
which  the  goods  internal  to  working  class  struggles  are  both  the  means  and  ends  of  virtuous 
activity.”   As  a  political  project  which  favors  the  action  noun  liberation  in  designating  its 224
means  and  its  ends,  it  seems  that  marxist  feminism  requires  a  consequentialist  ethic.  225
Paradoxically,  however,  it  must  also  be  deontologically  motivist:  even  though  marxist 
feminists  are  willing  when  necessary  to  force  their  values  upon  reactionaries—whether  by 
reform  or  revolt—the  ultimate  end  (and  optimal  means)  of  their  struggle  is  a  change  of 
“hearts  and  minds.”   It  is  possible  to  retrain  one’s  character  motivations  as  the  desire  to 226
liberate  and  the  proper  fear  of  complicitly  acquiescing  to  injustice.   A  social  movement 227
engaged  in  a  liberation  struggle  must  rely  on  an  emotionally  committed  yet  rationally 
principled  rank-and-file.  Accordingly,  the  marxist  feminist  tradition  demonstrates  how  VEC 
can  value  both  the  motives  and  the  consequences  of  individual  and  social  acts  as  different 
phases  of  a  causal  cycle. 
Fourth,  a  dialectical  VEC  can  help  marxist  feminism  to  avoid  falsely  dichotomizing 
altruism  and  egoism.  On  the  one  hand,  any  socialist  ethic  must  valorize  feelings  and  actions 
which  subordinate  self-interest  to  the  common  good:  no  one  should  thrive  at  the  expense  of 
others  (especially  those  oppressed  by  race,  gender,  class,  etc).   Yet  on  the  other  hand,  a 228
marxist  feminist  ethic  should  not  reinforce  sexist  and  racist  demands  of  obligatory  altruism, 
especially  for  a  care  worker  who  is  habituated  into  putting  other’s  needs  ahead  of  her 
224 Blackledge,  43. 
225 Combahee  River  Collective,  23. 
226 Kollontai,  230-31.  
227 James,  75. 
228 Kollontai,  230,  256. 
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own.   If  the  care  worker  develops  too  much  of  an  attachment  to  an  oppressive  or 229
alienating  caring  role,  she  may  stray  into  the  vice  of  deficient  self-love  (or  “self-care”  in 
modern  parlance).   This  has  been  demonstrated  by  recent  strikes,  when  teachers,  nurses, 230
and  other  essential  service  workers  have  been  chastised  for  withholding  their  labor  because 
such  direct  action  supposedly  violates  the  rights  of  their  charges  (patients,  students,  and 
customers).   Of  course,  striking  is  a  form  of  collective  self-advocacy,  but  when  such  care 231
workers  refuse  to  perform  their  economic  roles,  it  is  often  as  altruistic  as  it  is  egoistic.  Poor 
care-working  conditions  lead  to  poor  care,  so  by  standing  up  for  their  own  interests, 
striking  care  workers  also  stand  up  for  the  interests  of  the  cared-for  people  whom  they 
serve.   It  is  certainly  possible  a  care  worker  could  perform  the  virtuous  act  of  striking 232
without  being  motivated  by  virtue  (e.g.  care  or  justice).   It  is  also  possible  that  she  could 233
find  herself  in  struggle  together  with  fellow  travellers  (who  may  have  reactionary  vices)  to 
secure  life’s  necessities.   In  fact,  labor  organizing  proceeds  on  precisely  the  assumption 234
that  less  virtuous  comrades  are  necessary  to  building  the  rank-and-file,  even  as  the  best 
unions  refuse  to  tolerate  explicitly  chauvinistic  behavior.   This  rather  Aristotelian  strategy 235
of  shared  struggle  will  help  workers’  character  motives  to  improve  as  they  habitually 
practice  just  and  caring  actions  (alongside  comrades  such  as  the  exemplary  radicalized  care 
229 James,  75;  Mann,  204;  Noddings,  xvii. 
230 Groenhout,  194.  Even  Aristotle  does  not  treat  self-love  and  love  of  another  as  zero-sum,  because  
they  are  ideally  identical:  for  virtuous  people,  “friend  is  another  self”  ( Nicomachean  Ethics  IX.iv  
1166a27-32;  Biss,  125;  Cooper,  280). 
231 McAlevey,  136-37. 
232 McAlevey,  30. 
233 Aristotle  writes  that  “some  men  are  called  good  in  respect  of  a  state,  others  in  respect  of  an  
Activity”  ( Nicomachean  Ethics  VIII.v  1157b5-6). 
234 Aristotle,  Politics  I.ii  1253a3-4,  Nicomachean  Ethics  VII.iv  1157a16-19,  VIII.ix  1160a9-11.  In  
Aristotelian  terms,  such  a  person  would  be  considered  a  temporary  ‘friend  of  utility’  rather  than  a  
long-lasting  ‘friend  of  virtue’  (Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics  VIII.iv  1157a12-19;  Biss,  126) 
235 McAlevey,  31. 
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worker).   Accordingly,  a  marxist  feminist  VEC  would  follow  Aristotle  in  distinguishing 236
between  base  egoism  and  elevated  egoism,  and  in  showing  how  moral  growth  can 
transform  the  reactionism  of  the  former  into  the  comradeliness  of  the  latter.   As  one 237
develops  a  more  virtuous  motive  of  solidarity,  one’s  classist,  racist,  and  sexist  feelings  and 
actions  (which  often  correlate  with  selfishness  under  capitalism)  at  least  begin  to  dissolve. 
Aristotle  writes  that  “in  loving  a  friend,  [people]  love  what  is  good  for  themselves.”   A 238
virtue  ethic  of  care  would  be  able  to  offer  marxist  feminists  a  dialectical  ethic  in  which 
altruism  and  egoism  need  not  ultimately  be  opposed. 
 
2.8   Conclusion 
My  analysis  has  taken  as  a  moral  exemplar  the  figure  of  a  radicalized  care 
worker—a  feminized  social  reproductive  laborer  who  has  joined  the  liberation  struggle 
against  racialized  patriarchal  capitalism.  My  methodology  treats  her  not  simply  as  a  moral 
patient  violated  by  injustices,  nor  even  as  a  politically  revolutionary  subject,  but  as  a  moral 
agent.  Rather  than  applying  a  normative  theory  to  her  context  in  order  to  determine  her 
moral  obligations,  I  have  instead  taken  for  granted  her  moral  imperatives  imposed  by  the 
liberation  struggle  in  order  to  reverse-engineer  a  dialectically  appropriate  personal  ethic.  I 
have  concluded  that  the  optimal  corollary  to  marxist  feminist  social  ethics  is  some  form  of 
virtue  ethics.  I  have  proposed  in  particular  a  neo-Aristotelian  virtue  ethic  which  treats  care 
as  a  cardinal  virtue.  However,  the  unequal  distribution  of  care  has  limited  the  virtues  of 
oppressor  and  oppressed  (albeit  in  very  different  ways).  An  equitable  redistribution  of  the 
236 Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics  II.i  1103a3-1103b4;  (Kraut  [1999],  101);  Jimenez,  4. 
237 Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics  VIII.iv-v  1157a12-1158a2. 
238 Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics  VIII.v  1157b32;  Kahn,  39;  McAlevey,  207. 
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gendered  and  racialized  social  reproductive  labor  would  compel  socio-economically 
privileged  moral  agents  (particularly  white  men)  to  overcome  their  vicious  deficiency  to 
care  for  others,  and  would  also  allow  oppressed  and  exploited  moral  agents  (particularly 
working  class  women  of  color)  to  relinquish  their  excessively  caring  habits.  Such 
redistribution  of  care  work  is  not  only  teleologically  desirable  as  a  condition  of  communist 
eudaimonia —it  is  also  prefiguratively  necessary  as  an  immanent  condition  of  marxist 
feminist  liberatory  strategy.  All  marxist  feminist  moral  agents  (both  in  the  oppressive 
present  and  in  the  liberated  age  to  come)  should  cultivate  the  virtue  of  justice  and  the  virtue 
of  care…  and  the  virtue  of  practical  wisdom  which  alone  can  determine  the  context-specific 















CHAPTER  3.   WORKING  TOWARD  A  COMMON  GOOD: 
ALIENATION,  AUTONOMY,  AND  SOLIDARITY  
 
3.1   Introduction 
In  my  third  chapter,  I  will  present  a  political  argument  that  fuses  together  the 
economic  and  ethical  cases  I  laid  out  in  my  first  two  chapters.  As  I  showed,  social 
reproductive  and  productive  workers  both  have  conflicting  concrete  interests  (especially  on 
the  basis  of  gender  and  race),  but  they  share  an  abstract  interest  in  opposing  the  ruling  class 
whose  power  impedes  the  development  of  just  and  caring  conditions  (socially  as  well  as 
personally).  This  ambivalence  demonstrates  the  need  for  a  more  robust  concept  of  the 
common  good :  the  moral  confluence  of  interests  between  self  and  others.   I  argue  that 239
even  though  modern  capitalist  society  is  divided  by  class  structures  (that  are  hierarchically 
intersected  by  gender  and  race),  it  need  not  be  impossible  for  different  classes,  races,  or 
genders  to  share  a  common  good.   Accordingly,  even  though  marxist  feminism  is  a 240
conflict  theory  positing  the  necessity  of  competing  interests,  its  dialectical  goal  is  a  social 
condition  of  voluntary  cooperation  and  mutual  aid.   However,  the  possibility  of  such  a 241
common  good  is  contingent  upon  the  abolition  of  class  structures  and  the  gender  and  racial 
hierarchies  that  they  condition.  
239 Aristotle,  Politics  III.vi  1278b36.  In  defining  political  action  between  citizens  with  varying  
interests,  Arendt  points  out  the  linguistic  fact  that  “interest”  is  literally  “ inter-est ”—something 
“which  lies  between  people  and  therefore  can  relate  and  bind  them  together”  (Arendt,  182). 
240 Dalla  Costa  and  James,  49.  Claudia  Jones  writes  that  “the  fight  the  fight  for  the  full,  economic,  
political  and  social  equality  of  the  Negro  woman  is  in  the  vital  self-interest  of  white  workers,  in  
the  vital  interest  of  the  fight  to  realize  equality  for  all  women”  (Jones,  3). 
241 Marxist  feminism  is  both  a  conflict  theory  (that  assumes  that  in  class  societies,  different  classes  
have  distinct  and  often  competing  interests)  and  a  dialectical  theory  insisting  that  the  point  of 
class  struggle  (like  gender  liberation)  is  not  simply  to  invert  the  hierarchical  positionalities,  but 
to  ultimately  abolish  them. 
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Marxist  feminists  describe  such  a  utopian  state  of  affairs  as  communism ,  the  ethos 
of  which  is  articulated  most  clearly  by  Karl  Marx:  from  each  according  to  their  ability,  to 
each  according  to  their  need .   Such  a  “cooperative  society  based  on  common  ownership 242
of  the  means  of  production”  (to  use  Marx’s  terms)   would  not  only  heal  alienation  and 243
exploitation,  but  also  the  material  base  of  patriarchy  and  white  supremacy.   I  propose  that 244
this  communist  principle  is  a  particular  vision  of  the  common  good .  This  concept,  first 
extensively  theorized  by  Aristotle,  can  be  defined  as  the  social  condition  in  which  the 
interests  (i.e.  needs  and  abilities)  of  all  are  served.  By  contrast,  the  condition  of  only  the 
interests  of  some  being  served  is  corruption.  This  conceptual  dyad  serves  as  Aristotle’s 
principle  of  institutional  legitimacy,  gauging  whether  a  given  social  structure  is  just  or 
unjust.  It  seems  to  me  that  the  marxist  feminist  project  relies  on  precisely  this  schema, 
implicitly  if  not  explicitly.  
Of  course,  Aristotle  undeniably  constructs  justifications  of  patriarchy  and 
exploitation,  the  bêtes  noires  of  marxist  feminism.  Yet  Aristotle’s  hierarchical  assertions  are 
actually  misapplications  of  his  own  first  principles:  he  invalidly  draws  chauvinistic 
implications  from  his  hylomorphic  philosophical  anthropology  and  his  functionalist  social 
and  political  theories.  I  propose  that  Aristotle’s  common  good  principle  (which  is  grounded 
in  those  presuppositions),  can  help  marxist  feminists  to  connect  the  material  and  moral 
notions  of  the  common  good  in  a  dialectical  way,  taking  account  of  human  development 
242 Marx,  Critique  of  the  Gotha  Program ,  531. 
243 Marx,  Critique  of  the  Gotha  Program ,  529. 
244 Benston,  13;  Vogel,  2.  Even  Heidi  Hartmann,  despite  rejecting  marxism’s  explanation  and  
strategy  for  liberation,  Hartmann  admits  that  “Socialism  is  in  the  interest  of  both  men  and 
women”  (Hartmann,  7). 
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and  the  internal  and  external  conditions  which  enable  or  impede  it.   I  will  argue  that 245
marxist  feminists  should  consider  ‘expropriating’  and  ‘liberating’  Aristotle’s  nuanced  and 
dynamic  theory  of  corruption  and  the  common  good.  246
For  marxist  feminists  as  much  as  for  Aristotle,  material  needs  and  moral 
culpabilities  are  co-constitutive:  external  goods  are  necessary  to  develop  internal  goods,  and 
internal  goods  are  necessary  to  secure  and  distribute  external  goods.  For  instance,  in  both 
theories,  the  internal  good  of  practical  reason  ( phronesis )  is  necessary  for  ruling  in  the 
interests  of  all.  While  Aristotle  restricts  citizenship  to  only  those  elite  who  supposedly 
possess  this  intellectual  virtue  of  harmonizing  means  and  ends,  marxist  feminists 
subversively  insist  that  subalterns  possess  a  more  informed  phronesis  whose  efficacy  is 
limited  by  structural  oppression  and  exploitation.  Through  collective  praxis ,  they  can 
empower  themselves  and  others  to  create  the  possibility  of  a  solidaristic  common  good 
which  serves  the  diverse  needs  and  abilities  of  all  social  positionalities.  
 
3.2   The  Ideological  Function  of  ‘Common  Good’  Rhetoric 
As  sociological  conflict  theories,  marxism  and  feminism  are  inherently  suspicious  of 
“common  good”  discourse.   Any  purported  confluence  of  interests  might  actually  be 247
ideological  cover  for  power  relations  and  privilege  structures.   I  argue  that  this  is  an 248
245 Depew  claims  that  Marx  himself  reads  Aristotle  through  a  historicist  hermeneutic  which  reveals  
true  insights  in  a  dialectical  rather  than  absolute  fashion  (Depew,  70). 
246 In  so  doing,  I  am  not  proposing  an  “Aristotelian  marxist  feminism,”  but  rather  using  Aristotelian  
language  to  explicate  the  tacit  commitments  of  marxist  feminism  concerning  the  conflict  and 
confluence  of  interests  between  men  and  non-men,  the  ruling  class  and  the  working  class,  and 
whites  and  people  of  color.  
247 Marx,  “After  the  Revolution:  Marx  Debates  Bakunin,”  545. 
248 Coole,  34;  Arruzza,  Bhattacharya,  &  Fraser,  45-46;  Marx  and  Engels,  The  German  Ideology ,  
172).  However,  Aristotle  implicitly  supports  this  critique  in  claiming  that  “a  common  interest… 
[which]  rests  merely  on  convention  and  force”  is  unnatural  and  unjust  (Aristotle, Politics  I.vi 
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instance  of  what  Aristotle  describes  as  corruption ,  whereby  a  particular  interest  substitutes 
itself  for  the  interests  of  the  whole.   Class,  patriarchy,  and  racism  divide  groups  which  249
could  otherwise  unite  in  solidarity  to  cooperatively  achieve  common  goals.   In  fact,  ruling 250
class  ideology  (like  patriarchal  and  white  supremacist  ideology)  is  so  insidious  that  it  can 
take  hold  even  among  the  workers,  women,  and/or  people  of  color  who  come  to  identify 
their  oppressor’s  interests  as  their  own.  251
Indeed,  Aristotle  justifies  exploitation  and  oppression  within  the  ancient  oikos  by 
claiming  that  all  household  members  ultimately  have  shared  interests,  despite  the  hierarchy 
of  authority  (i.e.  domination:  patriarch  over  wife,  wife  over  slave,  and  even  slave  over 
child.   Aristotle  paternalistically  insists  that  ‘father  knows  best’  as  to  what  will  truly 252
benefit  the  patriarch’s  subordinates.   Accordingly,  Aristotle  considers  it  to  be  in  these 253
subordinates’  own  best  interests  to  be  ruled  by  ostensibly  virtuous  free  males:  both  directly 
in  private  economic  role  as  patriarchal  master  and  indirectly  in  public  political  role  of 
1255b14-15).  The  problem  is  that  he  refuses  to  acknowledge all  hierarchical  social  relations 
(especially  slavery)  as  products  of  power. 
249 In  its  paradigmatic  political  sense,   Aristotle  defines  ‘corruption’  as  the  condition  of  a  ruling  class  
which  serves  its  own  private  interest  rather  than  the  public  interest  (Aristotle, Politics  III.vii 
1279a28-30).  In  a  relational  sense,  corruption’s  basis  as  brute  force  becomes  more  obvious 
( Politics  I.vi  1255b13-15;  Frank  [2005],  167).  The  concept  of  corruption  can  even  be  extended  to 
other  social  phenomena,  such  as  patriarchy  or  racist  colonialism  (Sankara,  341).  
250 Joseph,  92.  
251 Parsons,  1;  Lenin,  63;  Luxemburg,  79;  Delphy,  76;  Snow,  59.  Historically,  the  suffering  and  
alienation  of  such  social  reproductive  care  workers  are  concealed  and  justified  on  the  grounds 
that  they  are  contributing  to  the  common  good  of  a  family,  a  business,  or  even  a  society.  For  this 
reason,  some  theorists  go  so  far  as  to  say  that  marxist  feminism  is  inherently  corrupt  because  its 
class  struggle  will  always  eclipse  the  anti-racist  struggle  against  white  supremacy  (Hartmann,  2; 
Joseph,  93).  
252 For  example,  the  ‘tyrannical’  rule  of  master  over  slave  is  supposedly  in  the  interest  of  the  latter  as  
well  as  of  the  former  (Aristotle,  Politics  III.vi  1278b32-36). 
253 Aristotle,  Politics  I.v  1254b12-21;  Fortenbaugh,  261;  Cole,  129. 
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citizen.   Otherwise,  he  worries,  their  decisions  will  be  marred  by  irrationality  and 254
therefore  harm  themselves  and  others.   255
One  of  the  capacities  which  the  slave  is  prevented  from  exercising  is  phronesis :  the 
practical  reasoning  which  fuels  participation  in  democratic  deliberation.   For  Aristotle, 256
only  ruling  class  men  are  objective  enough  to  judge  what  is  good  for  each  and  for  all. 
However,  while  this  is  clearly  an  erroneous  assumption,  marxist  feminists  must  also  reckon 
with  their  own  spectre  of  paternalism  which  inevitably  haunts  even  the  most  egalitarian  of 
their  socialist  projects.   Marxist  feminist  theory  cannot  avoid  claiming  that  many 257
oppressed  and/or  exploited  people  are  ignorant  of  their  own  true  interests  (i.e.  liberation), 
an  ideological  position  referred  to  as  false  consciousness .   This  lack  of  liberatory 258
consciousness  can  be  found  even  among  those  various  subalterns  (racial,  gender,  sexual) 
who  standpoint  epistemology  predicts  would  be  most  aware  of  their  own  oppression  and 
whose  particular  interests  are  thought  to  represent  the  ultimate  interests  of  all.   Following 259
Aristotle,  I  argue  that  it  is  not  possible  to  levy  a  critique  of  corruption  against  a  purported 
common  good  without  also  theoretically  presupposing  some  true  common  good  as  a  rubric 
of  critical  comparison.  260
 
254 Aristotle,  Politics  I.xiii  1260a40. 
255 Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics  VII.xiv  1332b33-34. 
256 Aristotle,  Politics  III.iv  1277b3-6,  1277b26-27. 
257 Nussbaum  (1990),  217. 
258 Marx  and  Engels,  The  German  Ideology,  172. 
259 Combahee  River  Collective,  23-24;  Jones,  3;  Sankara,  339. 
260 Marx  argues  that  every  ruling  class  “represent[s]  its  interest  as  the  common  interest  of  all  the  
members  of  society”  (Marx  and  Engels,  The  German  Ideology,  174).  Patricia  Springborg  observes 
that  even  democratic  structures  have  been  criticized  as  actually  being  “the  rule  of  the  most 
powerful  under  the  guise  of  popular  consent”  (Springborg,  537).  
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3.3   The  Good:  Interests,  Needs,  and  Abilities  
In  order  to  determine  what  is  in  the  interest  of  all,  it  is  necessary  (though 
insufficient)  to  determine  what  is  in  the  interest  of  each.   Unlike  modern  liberal  political 261
philosophers,  ancient  theorists  and  marxist  feminists  alike  have  proposed  that  the  good  of 
the  individual  is  congruent  with  or  even  identical  to  the  good  of  society.   Marxist 262
feminism’s  implicit  definition  of  goodness  (or  ‘interest’)  must  minimally  involve  not  being 
oppressed,  dominated,  exploited,  or  alienated—in  a  word,  liberation .   However, 263
“liberation”  is  a  rectificatory  concept,  a  ‘negation  of  a  negation’  lacking  in  determinate 
content.    Even  though  marxist  feminism’s  (largely  implicit)  ethics  schematizes  goodness 264
through  the  purely  formal  concept  of  ‘liberation’,  its  content  must  include  at  least  a  partial 
substantive  good  in  the  form  of  the  socio-material  conditions  necessary  for  sustaining 
freedom.   Therefore,  the  implicit  concept  of  goodness  endorsed  by  marxist  feminists 265
(especially  Simone  de  Beauvoir)  includes  certain  fulfilled  needs  and  certain  enabled 
capabilities.  
Even  though  marxist  feminism’s  normative  project  begins  with  the  structural 
positionality  of  classed,  raced,  gendered,  and  sexualized  subalterns,  it  has  universalizing 
261 A  common  good  is  a  synergic  condition  which  includes  yet  transcends  the  aggregate  interests  of  
all  individual  members  of  a  group.  This  is  because  the  social  system  itself  (whose  condition  can 
be  either  commonly  good  or  corrupt)  is  necessarily  greater  than  the  sum  of  its  parts:  the  whole  and 
the  parts  co-determine  one  another  (McNally,  110;  Springborg,  545). 
262 MacIntyre  (1981),  232;  Cooper  (1975),  290;  Kollontai,  230-31.  
263 Mitchell,  43. 
264 de  Beauvoir,  31.  Marx  typically  avoids  speculation  about  communist  conditions,  insisting  
minimally  that  they  will  involve  “new  social  relations”  (Marx  and  Engels,  The  German  Ideology , 
156;  Marx,  Economic  and  Philosophic  Manuscripts  of  1844 ,  91. 
265 de  Beauvoir,  78.  While  this  definition  of  the  good  necessarily  involves  collective  solidarity  and  
the  dismantling  of  oppressive  social  systems,  it  need  not  rule  out  personal  excellence  as  an 
expression  of  the  good  (à  la  Aristotle).  In  fact,  the  marxist  emphasis  on  humanity’s  creative 
capabilities  might  even  suggest  that  excellence  is  the  ultimate,  albeit  distant,  good. 
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aspirations  and  an  objective  (though  implicit  and  minimalist)  concept  of  the  good.   This 266
view  is  unexpectedly  shared  by  Aristotle,  who  also  approaches  the  universal  form  of 
goodness  only  through  the  hierarchical  differentiation  of  types  of  soul  (albeit  from  the  top 
down  rather  than  up  from  below).   Aristotle  treats  the  good  not  as  an  abstract  form  but  as 267
a  good  for  some  particular  entity  (whose  material  components  are  organized  by  a  specific 
intelligible  structure).   For  Aristotle,  each  entity  has  unique  needs  and  latent  capacities 268
required  to  survive  and  to  thrive.   However,  despite  all  the  physical  and  psychological 269
differences  among  people  which  Aristotle  claims  are  natural  grounds  for  hierarchical 
ranking  (especially  class,  gender,  ethnicity  and  even  age),  he  still  classes  all  human  beings 
as  sharing  in  some  (if  not  all)  of  the  conditions  for  human  flourishing.  Aristotle  regards  the 
specifically  human  function  (which  is  essential  for  eudaimonia )  as  acting  according  to 
reason .   270
This  seemingly  simplistic  formulation  of  the  distinctively  human  telos  actually 
involves  an  integration  of  soul  and  body,  of  reason  and  emotion,  and  of  external  goods 
(which  provide  for  needs)  and  internal  goods  (which  produce  virtuous  action).   Moreover, 271
although  eudaimonia  is  often  treated  as  an  individual  condition,  Aristotle’s  political  theory 
266 For  example,  Claudia  Jones  argues  that  “the  triply-oppressed  status”  of  working  class  Black  
women  is  “a  barometer  of  the  status  of  all  women”  (Jones,  3).  
267 Depew,  67-68. 
268 Aristotle,  Metaphysics ,  VI.ii  1013a24-33,  V.xii  1019a33-1019b3;  Lloyd,  291-292. 
269 Nussbaum,  211.  This  Aristotelian  approach  to  form  and  function  is  adopted  and  adapted  by  Marx  
(DeGolyer,  114). 
270 Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics  I.vii  1098a12-15.  Sherman  notes  that  Aristotle  cannot  consistently  
claim  that  virtuous  action  is  inherently  valuable  if  the  ultimate telos  is  contemplation  ( theoria ) 
(Sherman,  ix). 
271 MacIntyre  (1981),  158.  While  Cooper  and  others  read  Aristotle  as  treating  external   goods  merely  
as  means  to  eudaimonia ,  Nussbaum  and  others  read  him  as  treating  them  as  a  part  of  eudaimonia 
itself  (Sherman,  viii). 
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makes  it  clear  that  it  is  necessarily  a  social  condition:  the  combination  of  the  requisite 
internal  and  external  goods  of  all  members  of  society.   272
Likewise,  Aristotle  considers  the  internal  goods  of  virtue  to  be  insufficient  for 
flourishing  ( eudaimonia) ;  certain  external  goods  are  also  necessary.   Although  goodness 273
does  not  reduce  to  material  conditions,  the  provision  of  basic  necessities  (e.g.  food,  water, 
shelter,  and  healthcare)  are  vital  parts  or  preconditions  for  more  complex  abilities  and 
needs.   Marxist  feminists  claim  that  there  are  many  unmet  needs  (and  inhibited 274
capabilities)  caused  by  class  structures  which  prevent  the  flourishing  of  all  workers,  but 
especially  women  and  people  of  color.   Marx  suggests  that  the  need  which  labor  should 275
fulfill  is  the  ability  to  labor  creatively  as  an  end  in  itself,  and  he  laments  that  alienating 
conditions  deform  labor  into  “merely  a  means  to  satisfy  needs  external  to  it.”   As  Marx 276
puts  it,  capitalism  reduces  human  freedom  to  merely  “animal  functions:  eating,  drinking, 
procreating,  or  at  most  in  his  dwelling  and  in  dressing  up.”   Capabilities  can  be  cultivated 277
272 Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics ,  X.viii  1178b33-1179a12;  Nussbaum  (1986),  xiv;  Ahmed,  44,  47;  
Cooper  (1975),  293. 
273 Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics  I.v  1095b32-1096a2;  Annas,  35,  37.  Aristotle  technically  
distinguishes  between  ‘external  goods’  and  ‘goods  of  the  body,’  but  they  are  functionally 
identical  when  considering  material  use  values  in  contradistinction  to  the  internal  goods  he  calls 
virtues  (MacIntyre  [1981],  190). 
274 Nussbaum,  (1986),  xxii;  Nussbaum  (1990),  241;  Annas,  46.  Because  needs  are  often  distinguished  
from  wants  without  a  universally  acceptable  demarcation,  I  treat  them  as  a  continuum  and  use  the 
term  “need”  to  refer  to  those  desires  which  are  closer  to  material  reality  and  thus  serve  as 
existential  interests.  People  clearly  have  different  material  needs,  due  to  differences  in  ability, 
age,  biosex,  and  even  race.  However,  for  the  most  part,  these  are  simply  specific  versions  of  basic 
material  goods  needed  by  (nearly)  all. 
275 Parsons,  1;  Ferguson  [2017],  120;  Bhattacharya,  18).  Although  the  concept  of  ‘race’  would  not  be  
invented  for  another  two  millenia,  the  ancient  Athenian  slave  population  was  largely  composed 
of  foreign  ethnicities  (Aristotle,  Politics  1285a19-22;  Millett,  194). 
276 Marx,  Economic  and  Philosophic  Manuscripts  of  1844 ,  74. 
277 Marx,  Economic  and  Philosophic  Manuscripts  of  1844 ,  74. 
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and  maintained  only  if  certain  needs  are  met,  but  those  needs  must  be  provided  by—or 
through — certain  capabilities  (those  of  oneself  or  another).   278
Needs  are  fulfilled  by  use  values,  which  in  turn  are  provided  either  directly  by 
nature  or  indirectly  by  labor  (upon  nature).   As  Marx  writes,  “Any  distribution  whatever 279
of  the  means  of  consumption  is  only  a  consequence  of  the  distribution  of  the  conditions  of 
production.”   Workers  control  only  the  means  of  subsistence  (the  necessities  of  life),  not 280
the  means  of  production  (the  ability  to  generate  surplus  value).   This  provides  workers 281
with  their  labor  power,  which  (as  Ferguson  writes)  “is  a  capacity  of  concrete,  potentially 
playful  individuals  whose  needs  and  desires  come  into  conflict  with  the  capitalist  impulse.” 
  For  marxists,  the  maturation  of  needs  varies  directly  with  the  development  of  creative 282
potential.   Conversely,  as  Marx  writes,  alienated  labor  “does  not  develop  freely  [one’s] 283
physical  and  mental  energy  but  mortifies  [one’s]  body  and  ruins  [one’s]  mind.”  284
On  one  marxist  feminist  theory,  even  unique  capabilities  (e.g.  unique  biological 
functions  such  as  pregnancy)  can  serve  as  the  basis  for  oppression  and  exploitation,  if  they 
are  absolutized  to  the  detriment  of  other  possible  capacities.   As  marxist  feminists  have 285
theorized,  social  reproduction  is  the  type  of  labor  which  reproduces  only  the  basic  needs  of 
278 Marxists  also  describes  this  cycle  of  need-emergence  and  need-satisfaction  with  the  economic  
terminology  of  production  and  consumption  (Marx  and  Engels, The  German  Ideology,  156). 
However,  Marx  privileges  production  as  the  human  species-essence,  and  views  “consumption  as  a 
phase  of  production”  rather  than  vice  versa  (Dalla  Costa  and  James,  50).  
279 Marx,  Critique  of  the  Gotha  Program ,  525. 
280 Marx,  Critique  of  the  Gotha  Program ,  531. 
281 Bhattacharya,  77. 
282 Ferguson,  [2017],  129.  
283 In  Herbert  Marcuse’s  reflections  on  “Marxism  and  Feminism,”  he  defines  liberation  as  a  
“subversion  of  the  established  hierarchy  of  needs”  (Marcuse,  285).  
284 Marx,  Economic  and  Philosophic  Manuscripts  of  1844 ,  74;  Sayers,  164. 
285 S.  Smith,  4. 
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life:  those  necessary  to  replenish  the  ability  to  labor.   While  this  certainly  involves 286
relational  capabilities  (“care  and  socialization”),  it  is  rooted  in  fundamental  material  needs 
(“food,  clothing,  and  shelter”).   The  most  illustrative  social  reproducer  is  a  care  worker 287
who  is  exploited  on  the  basis  of  class  and  likely  oppressed  on  the  basis  of  their  gender  or 
race  or  ethnicity.   If  they  are  classed  as  a  (service-providing)  producer,  their  labor 288
provides  for  the  needs  of  a  member  of  the  ruling  class  in  order  to  enable  their  leisure 
activities  (which  may  be  higher-order  in  nature).   By  contrast,  if  they  are  classed  as  a 289
social  reproducer,   their  labor  provides  for  the  needs  of  other  workers,  rejuvenating  their 
labor  power  in  order  to  enable  necessitarian  activities.  Of  course,  a  worker  might 
simultaneously  inhabit  both  positionalities,  such  as  the  slave  in  Aristotle’s  depiction  of  the 
ancient  oikos .   In  the  slave’s  capacity  as  a  care  worker,  they  require  the  ability  to  meet  the 290
needs  of  another  (viz.  the  cared-for  subject  of  their  job).  
One  of  the  important  needs  is  having  the  time  and  resources  to  develop  one’s 
abilities,  such  as  (minimally)  a  worker’s  requisite  job  skills.  Of  course,  their  needs  and 
abilities  are  severely  limited  under  the  exploitative  conditions  of  class  society  (whether 
slavery  or  capitalism).  Because  the  most  basic  needs  are  not  reliably  provided  to  all  and 
286 Federici,  5;  Dalla  Costa  and  James,  50;  Marx  and  Engels,  The  German  Ideology ,  156.  
287 Laslett  and  Brenner,  382-383. 
288 Social  reproduction  is  a  broader  field  than  domestic  labor  and  care  work,  but  these  are  the  most  
concrete  representations  of  the  general  phenomenon,  even  if  at  times  they  conceal  more  than  they 
illuminate   (Arruzza,  21;  Bezanson  and  Luxton,  26). 
289 Cuffel,  338.  de  Beauvoir  writes  that  the  ‘leisure’  of  the  exploited  “is  just  about  sufficient  for  them  
to  regain  their  strength;  the  oppressor  feeds  himself  on  their  transcendence”—that  is,  their  ability 
to  surpass  their  present  internal  conditions  (de  Beauvoir,  83).  Meanwhile,  the  worker’s  needs  and 
abilities  become  a  mere  means  to  one  other,  resulting  in  a  vicious  circle  rather  than  a  spiral 
dynamic  of  personal  and  social  development. 
290 Because  the  gender  of  slaves  in  ancient  Athens  (as  in  the  colonial  U.S.)  was  largely  irrelevant  to  
the  class  structure,  I  will  refer  to  the  individual  slave  with  gender-neutral  “they”  and  “them” 
pronouns  (Cole,  129;  Davis,  5).  This  has  the  additional  benefit  of  grammatically  distinguishing 
the  slave  from  the  male  patriarch  and  the  female  wife.  
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most  workers’  abilities  are  harnessed  to  benefit  only  the  few,  the  social  system  neglects 
their  higher-level  needs  and  arrests  the  growth  of  their  higher-level  abilities.   291
I  suggest  that  this  situation  of  working  class  alienation  can  be  framed  in  Aristotelian 
terms,  because  Aristotle  proposes  that  ‘the  good’  (whether  private  or  common)  must 
involve  both  internal  goods  (i.e.  virtuous  capabilities)  and  external  goods  (i.e. 
socio-material  conditions).   For  Aristotle,  humans  are  conditioned  by  both  their  material 292
context  and  their  transformative  activity  (political,  economic,  or  otherwise).  Accordingly, 
contra  Plato,  certain  external  goods  are  necessary  to  enjoy  the  good  life  ( eudaimonia ).  293
However,  one’s  external  goods  must  often  be  supplied  by  other  people.  
The  oikos  is  the  social  site  responsible  for  mere  survival,  as  opposed  to  the  polis 
which  attends  to  actual  flourishing.   Accordingly,  Aristotle  writes  that  it  is  the  “duty  of  the 294
manager  of  a  household...  to  order  the  things  which  nature  supplies.”   However,  this  is  a 295
truncated  description:  the  responsibility  of  the  household  manager  (officially  the  patriarch, 
but  technically  the  wife)  is  actually  ordering  those  who  provide  order  to  nature’s  raw 
materials  (i.e.  the  slave).  In  Aristotle’s  analysis  of  the  division  of  labor,  in  which 
management  is  a  second-order  capacity  (i.e.  a  form  of  intellectual  labor),  he  refuses  to 
291 This  is  implied  by  Aristotle  himself:  “For  many  necessaries  of  life  have  to  be  supplied  before  we  
can  have  leisure”  (Aristotle,  Politics  VII.xv  1334a18-19).  
292 Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics  I.viii  1098b11-19.  Aristotle  also  indicates  a  third  type,  bodily  
good,  but  he  does  not  distinguish  it  significantly  from  external  good.  He  appears  to  denigrate 
external  goods  by  claiming  that  one’s telos  is  only  internal  to  their  soul,  but  shortly  thereafter  he 
indicates  that  external  goods  are  necessary  means  of  such  teleologically  virtuous  action 
( Nicomachean  Ethics  I.viii  1099a32-1099b1). 
293 Aristotle  suggests  that  external  goods  are  so  morally  significant  that  the  deprivation  of  necessities  
can  exonerate  working  class  crimes  against  the  ruling  class  (Aristotle,  Politics  II.vii  1267a13-16). 
294 Arendt,  24. 
295 Aristotle,  Politics  I.x  1258a25-26. 
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imagine  that  manual  laborers  could  exercise  sufficient  practical  reason  to  order  their  own 
working  conditions.  
 
3.4   Phronesis:  Practical  Reason 
Aristotle  justifies  the  oikonomic  hierarchy  on  the  basis  of  a  supposed  gradation  of 
intellectual  ability  among  the  patriarch,  housewife,  slave,  and  child.   As  I  discussed  in 296
Chapter  2,  there  are  two  moral  virtues  (justice  and  care)  which  are  clearly  social  in  nature. 
But  in  order  to  theorize  the  common  good,  it  is  necessary  to  turn  (perhaps  unexpectedly)  to 
Aristotle’s  examination  of  intellectual  virtue.  Even  though  Aristotle  is  ambiguous  about 
whether  the  nature  of  eudaimonia  consists  of  action  or  of  contemplation,  there  is  one 
character  trait  which  is  valorized  in  both  interpretations  as  both  a  moral  and  an  intellectual 
virtue:  phronesis  (practical  reason  or  prudence).   Whereas  mere  skill  consists  of  knowing 297
how  to  produce  (i.e.  the  means  to  a  material  end),  phronesis  consists  of  knowing  how  to  act 
(i.e.  the  means  to  a  social  end).   Even  though  a  given  deliberation  takes  an  end  for 298
granted,  a  prior  or  subsequent  deliberation  can  put  this  end-goal  up  for  debate:  “it  is  that 
which  has  been  decided  upon  as  a  result  of  deliberation  that  is  the  object  of  choice… 
desired  after  deliberation.”   At  times,  Aristotle  describes  phronesis  as  merely  the 299
296 Aristotle,  Politics ,  I.xiii  1259b47-52.  Aristotle  lays  out  an  is-ought  distinction  between  the  
conventional  slave  and  the  natural  slave—the  former  of  whom  has  the  capacity  for  phronesis ,  and 
the  latter  of  whom  supposedly  does  not  (Ambler,  391). 
297 Ackrill,  57.  The  soul’s  virtues  can  be  divided  between  intellectual  and  moral  excellences  
(Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics  VI.i  1138b36-1139a1).  
298 Whereas  skill  is  amorally  indifferent  about  its  ends,  phronesis  must  align  with  other  virtues  in  
pursuing  morally  good  ends;  otherwise  one  would  have  to  ascribe  wisdom  to  a  vicious  person 
who  deliberately  chooses  effective  means  toward  harmful  ends  (Aristotle, Nicomachean  Ethics 
VI.xii  1144a36-37). 
299 Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics  III.3  1113a3-5.  Aristotle  views  all  moral  decisions  as  deliberate  
choices,  but  in  intuitive  action  (which  is  the  sense  stressed  by  Martin  Heidegger)  one’s  choice 
might  simply  be  what  one might  have  decided  upon  deliberation  (Cooper  [1986],  9-10).  Simone 
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intellectual  process  of  strategically  working  backward  from  a  given  end   to  determine  the 
appropriate  tactics  and  initial  steps.   But  rational  deliberation  and  willful  decision-making 300
about  working  conditions  (i.e.  the  politics  of  labor)  must  involve  considerations  of  ends  as 
well  as  means,  if  only  because  nearly  all  practical  ends  can  also  serve  as  means  to  deeper 
ends.  At  other  times,  Aristotle  acknowledges  that  phronesis  also  involves  being  “able  to 
deliberate  well”  about  the  conditions  of  “the  good  life.”   By  mediating  between  the 301
universal  level  of  theoretical  knowledge  and  the  particular  level  of  lived  experience, 
phronesis  enables  one  to  make  judgments  and  to  determine  courses  of  action.   This 302
condition  of  the  intellect  enables  one  to  make  judgments  in  light  of  wholistic 
knowledge—in  this  case,  knowledge  concerning  the  conditions  and  aims  of  the  entire 
city-state  and  its  constituent  
households.  303
de  Beauvoir  demonstrates  the  reciprocal  nature  of  ends  and  means  in  practical  reasoning,  which 
dialectically  scrutinizes  not  only  means  according  to  given  ends,  but  also  ends  according  to  their 
proposed  means  (de  Beauvoir,  149,  155). 
300 Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics  III.3  1112b15-19.  Aristotle  appears  to  define  phronesis  as  in  part  
the  deliberation  of  means  toward  a  given  desirable  end;  however,  this  seems  overly  technical; 
truly  moral  judgment  would  include  choosing  actions  which,  as  instances  of  a  rule,  have 
intrinsically  value  and  are  inherently  good  (i.e.  virtuous),  not  merely  instrumentally  and 
extrinsically  good  (Cooper  [1986],  1-3). 
301 Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics  VI.v  1140a24-28.  Phronesis  provides  the  virtuous  person  with  the  
moral  perception  and  situational  awareness  to  determine  which  factors  in  a  given  context  are 
ethically  significant  in  relation  to  the  good  life  (Annas,  39;  McDowell,  162).  This  is  
302 Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics  VI.vii  1141b15-16;  Fortenbaugh,  242;  McDowell,  156,  161.  It  is  
clear  from  Aristotle’s  corpus  that  practical  reason  ( phronesis )  is  not  the  most  absolutely  valuable 
form  of  reasoning:  that  accolade  is  reserved  for  purely  theoretical  reasoning.  But  whereas 
Aristotle  understands  such  contemplative  reasoning  as  the  unique  function  of  the  gods,  practical 
reasoning  is  the  most  appropriate  function  for  the  entity  whose  hylomorphic  nature  fuses  mind 
and  matter:  the  human  being  (Aristotle, Nicomachean  Ethics  I.vii  1098a12-15;  Ackrill,  70,  74; 
Nussbaum  [1986],  xxvii).  Therefore,  while  reason  is  not  reducible  to phronesis ,  the  latter  is  the 
exemplary  manifestation  of  the  former  given  the  finitude  which  marks  off  the  human  condition . 
303 Schofield,  318-19;  Heath,  251. 
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By  contrast,  Aristotle  proposes  that  the  slave  and  the  wife  require  only  the  virtue  of 
skill:  practical  reasoning  concerned  with  the  production  of  objects.   He  insists  that  only 304
free  citizens  in  their  function  of  political  rule  require  the  practical  virtue  of  phronesis . 305
According  to  Aristotle,  nature  provides  the  male  child  of  the  wife  and  the  patriarch  with  the 
intellectual  potential  for  phronesis ,  which  will  eventually  be  required  by  him  to  rule  the 
supposedly  ‘irrational’  slave.   By  contrast,  the  slave  is  taken  to  lack  phronesis  not  only  as 306
the  second-order  voluntary  choice  but  even  as  a  first-order  capability.   Aristotle  considers 307
the  ‘natural  slave’  to  be  intellectually  disabled,  deprived  of  the  ability  to  exercise  practical 
reason;  in  fact,  this  is  precisely  his  justification  for  classifying  a  slave  as  a  slave.   308
Aristotle  correctly  recognizes  both  the  necessity  of  a  socio-material  basis  for 
political  freedom  and  citizenship  (i.e.  natural  resources  and  others’  labor)  and  the  moral 
significance  of  knowing  how  to  rationally  control  production  (because  of  its  effect  on 
human  potential).   However,  Aristotle  is  drastically  wrong  to  assume  that  phronesis  is 309
impossible  for  subalterns  to  develop:  what  he  takes  to  be  a  natural  disability  is  actually  a 
social  disabling .   310
 
304 Heath,  247. 
305 Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics  I.i  1094a3-4,  VI.v  1140a31-1140b2,  VI.v  1140b20;  Politics  III.iv  
1277b26-28;  Schofield,  320;  Tabachnik,  1000.  
306 Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics  III.xii  1119b5-8;  Politics,  I.xiii  1260b19-20.  However,  this  
capacity  requires  growth  and  education  in  order  to  truly  become  available  for  use. 
307 Murphy  argues  that  the  recursive  complexity  of  Aristotle’s  “nature,  habit,  and  reason  model”  
renders  it  superior  to  his  simple  “potency-act  model”  (Murphy,  225). 
308 Aristotle,  Politics  I.v,  1254b20-23. 
309 Swanson,  3-4.  
310 Snow,  53. 
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3.5   Regime  Types:  Systemic  Social  Goods 
Just  as  individuals’  character  states  (internal  goods)  are  affected  by  their  external 
conditions,  social  systems  are  conditioned  by  the  characters  of  their  members,  who  are 
typically  not  equal  in  stature  but  differentiated  by  privilege  and  power.   Just  like 311
individuals,  every  social  system  (including  the  entire  society  as  a  whole)  has  both  passive 
needs  and  active  abilities  to  sustain  itself.  The  most  politically  significant  ability  is  political 
legislative  authority.   The  representative  nature  of  authority  is  synecdochal:  there  is  some 312
part  ‘standing  in’  for  the  whole  by  standing  ‘over’  it.   In  order  to  determine  the  nature  of 313
political  representation,  Aristotle  classifies  regimes  according  to  the  quantity  of  rulers  (who 
ostensibly  represent  the  interests  of  the  populace  back  to  them),  which  has  implicit 
qualitative  (i.e.  class)  features.   314
Aristotle  inaugurates  the  discipline  of  political  science  by  canvasing  the 
governments  of  regional  nation-states  and  developing  an  institutional  typology.  There  are 
three  basic  regime  types  (or  constitutions  or  polities),  differentiated  on  a  quantitative  basis 
(rule  by  one,  by  some,  or  by  all)  and  further  subdivided  on  a  qualitative  basis  (rule  for  the 
311 Social  reproduction  theory  explains  these  subclass  oppressions  according  to  the  (gendered  and  
racialized) division  of  labor .  Iris  Marion  Young  argues  that  marxist  feminists  should  wield  this 
concept  (rather  than  ‘class’)  to  account  for  “specific  cleavages  and  contradictions  within  a  class” 
(Young,  51).  However,  Marx  actually  agrees,  claiming  that  “the  division  of  labour  determines  also 
the  relations  of  individuals  to  one  another  with  reference  to  the  material,  instrument,  and  product 
of  labour”   (Marx  and  Engels,  The  German  Ideology,  151).  
312 Marx  writes  that  “the  State  is  the  form  in  which  the  individuals  of  a  ruling  class  assert  their  
common  interests”  (Marx  and  Engels,  The  German  Ideology,  187). 
313 Aristotle  ambiguously  uses  the  same  term  ( polis )  to  refer  both  to  the  entire  society  and  its  
dominant  institution,  the  state  (Mulgan,  17).  In  Book  V  of Politics ,  Aristotle  explicitly  frames 
politics  as  class  struggle  for  such  state  power  (Austin  and  Vidal-Naquet,  22).  Marx  agrees,  using 
this  Aristotelian  model  of  state  power  to  explain  how  the  ruled  revolt:  “The  class  making  a 
revolution  appears...  as  the  representative  of  the  whole  of  society;  it  appears  as  the  whole  mass  of 
society  confronting  the  one  ruling  class”  (Marx  and  Engels,  The  German  Ideology ,  174). 
314 Finley,  5.  de  Ste.  Croix  argues  that  for  Aristotle,  the  difference  between  political  constitutions  is  
not  actually  the  number  of  rulers,  but  rather  their  class.  However,  this  is  simply  a  function  of  class 
society’s  necessarily  pyramidal  sorting  of  a  population.  (de  Ste.  Croix,  72-73).  
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common  good  or  only  for  private  interests).   Aristotle  actually  treats  democracy  as  a 315
corrupt  constitutional  form  of  rule  by  the  many  (i.e.  the  poor  working  class).   He  assumes 316
that  the  masses,  like  all  classes,  are  tempted  to  rule  viciously  according  to  their  own 
interests.  However,  marxist  feminists  might  resonate  with  Aristotle’s  complementary 
concept  of  politeia  (a  social  democracy,  according  to  Martha  Nussbaum)  whereby  the 
governing  many  rule  in  the  interest  of  all  (i.e.  the  common  good).   This  accords  with 317
marxist  feminism’s  mereological  insistence  that  the  interests  of  a  particularly  exploited  and 
oppressed  subclass  can  actually  represent  and  rule  in  the  interests  of  all.  318
Marxist  theory  actually  accords  with  Aristotle’s  model:  a  particular  class  can  only 
gain  power  by  claiming  to  represent  the  will  of  the  whole  society  (the  common  good)  and 
by  scapegoating  another  particular  class  (the  common  enemy).   The  ideologies 319
legitimizing  both  ancient  slavery  and  modern  capitalism  both  purport  to  serve  the  interests 
of  all  (through  paternalism  in  the  former  and  trickle-down  economics  in  the  latter).  Yet  even 
though  Aristotle  errs  in  his  reactionary  grading  of  social  positionalities,  marxists  agree  with 
him  that  the  primary  question  of  the  common  good  is  whether  or  not  the  needs  of  all  are 
315 Aristotle,  Politics  III.vii  1279a26-30;  Ambler,  398;  Mulgan,  60. 
316 Aristotle,  Politics  III.vii  1279b5;  Strauss,  36.  Mulgan  points  out  that  Aristotle’s  quantitative  
approach  to  determining  constitutional  regime  types  is  actually  a  proxy  for  qualitative  class 
analysis,  because   “the  wealthy  are  usually  few  and  the  poor  usually  many”  (Mulgan,  63). 
317 Nussbaum  interprets  Aristotle’s   assignment  of  resource  provision  to  the  government  as  a  form  of  
“welfare  state”  (Nussbaum  [1990],  204). 
318 However,  even  though  Aristotle  assumes  that  practical  judgment  inevitably  tends  to  one’s  own  
affairs,  he  does  not  limit phronetic  decisions  to  self-interest  at  the  expense  of  others’  interests 
(Cherry,  1409).  Intersectional  marxist  feminists  extend  this  belief  even  further:  for  instance,  the 
Combahee  River  Collective  proposes  that  a  political  project  which  liberates  Black  lesbian 
working  class  women  (such  as  themselves)  would  ultimately  involve  the  freedom  of  all  (less 
oppressed)  people  (Combahee  River  Collective,  22-23). 
319 Marx,  “Contribution  to  the  Critique  of  Hegel’s  Philosophy  of  Right, ”  62.  In  surmising  how  the  
state  will  transform  “in  communist  society”,  Marx  warns  that  “one  does  not  get  a  flea-hop  nearer 
to  the  problem  by  a  thousandfold  combination  of  the  word  ‘people’  with  the  word  ‘state’”  (Marx, 
Critique  of  the  Gotha  Program ,  538). 
78 
being  met.  The  question  of  who  has  the  institutional  ability  (i.e.  power)  to  fulfill  those 
needs  is  of  secondary  importance.  It  is  much  less  likely  that  a  subaltern  group’s  needs  will 
be  met  if  they  do  not  personally  have  the  ability  to  meet  them;  however,  it  is  not  impossible. 
Aristotle  considers  ways  in  which  one,  some,  or  many  rulers  can  achieve  the  common  good 
by  meeting  the  needs  of  all.  
 
3.6   Scaling  Down:  From  Polis  Rule  to  Oikos  Rule 
Politics  is  not  merely  rule  within  the  state,  but  rule  within  any  power  structure, 
including  the  workplace.  Just  as  feminism  insists  that  the  personal  is  political,  marxists  insist 
that  the  economic  is  political.   The  oikos  exists  within  all  of  these  dimensions:  ancient 320
Greek  society  did  not  differentiate  between  economics  and  politics  in  the  same  way  as 
liberal  capitalist  society.   Rather  than  treating  them  as  two  different  domains  in  which 321
each  citizen  (of  any  class,  race,  or  gender)  has  power,  Greek  social  life  endowed  patriarchs 
with  political  and  economic  power,  and  women  and  slaves  with  political 
disenfranchisement  and  economic  subjugation.   322
For  Aristotle,  the  political  decision-making  capacity  of  the  property-owning 
patriarch  not  only  applies  at  the  state  level  of  the  polis ,  but  also  at  the  workplace  level  of  the 
oikos .   He  (or  the  manager  who  acts  on  his  behalf)  must  exercise  practical  reason  in 323
deciding  both  why  workers  should  labor  (including  which  goods  and  services  they 
320 Hartmann,  13;  Joseph,  97;  Bhattacharya,  9. 
321 Aristotle,  Politics  I.i  1252b13-18;  Austin  and  Vidal-Naquet,  10. 
322 Clark,  189;  Elshtain,  15-16. 
323 In  Thomas  Smith’s  reading  ofAristotle,  the  degree  of  corruption  in  the  oikos  depends  on  the  
degree  of  corruption  in  the  polis  (T.  Smith,  631). 
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produce)  and  how  they  should  labor  in  producing  them.   These  questions  cannot  be 324
answered  without  reference  to  state-level  political  conditions,  nor  can  these  latter  be 
addressed  in  isolation  from  the  socio-material  conditions  of  production  and  social 
reproduction. 
While  the  rule  of  the  polis  itself  is  restricted  to  all,  some,  or  even  one  citizen  (a  title 
which  is  already  reserved  for  free,  property-owning  males).   However,  as  with  the 325
macrocosmic  polis ,  the  microcosmic  oikos  is  assumed  to  serve  the  interests  (however 
underestimated)  of  all  its  members,  not  merely  the  head  of  the  household.   Aristotle 326
examines  how  the  common  good  (as  a  governing  principle)  functions  in  the  oikos ,  as  the 
key  economic  site  of  production  and  social  reproduction  in  the  ancient  polis .   As  with  the 327
polis ,  the  oikos  is  thought  to  be  a  just  and  legitimate  institution  insofar  as  it  serves  the 
diverse  interests  of  its  members  (whose  unique  and  varying  natures  feature  different 
abilities  and  needs).  By  borrowing  his  own  political  terminology  of  the  city-state,  Aristotle 
analogically  ‘scales  down’  the  evaluative  political  schema  of  the  common  good  and 
corruption  from  the  level  of  the  city-state.   The  six  types  of  relationships  which  constitute 328
the  oikos  (patriarch-wife,  wife-slave,  slave-child,  patriarch-slave,  patriarch  child, 
324 Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics  VI.viii  1141b30-34;  Cherry,  1409.  
325 The  right  of  citizenship  (i.e.  political  participation  in  state  power)  is  rooted  in  property  relations:  
citizens  must  own  property  and  the  propertyless  cannot  be  citizens  (Austin  and  Vidal-Naquet, 
23-24).  Of  course,  as  Marx  writes  the  original  type  of  property  is  “slavery  in  the  family”  (Marx 
and  Engels,  The  German  Ideology,  159). 
326 Aristotle,  Politics  I.xiii  1260b9-14. 
327 Insofar  as  Aristotle  claims  that  “a  state  is  a  body  of  citizens  sufficing  for  the  purposes  of  life”  
(Aristotle,  Politics  III.i  1275b20-21). 
328 Aristotle,  Politics  III.xiv  1285b31-33.  The  obvious  critique  here  is  that  a  microcosmic  example  
commits  the  fallacy  of  composition,  inductively  inferring  that  the  whole  system  shares  the 
structure  of  one  of  its  parts.  However,  several  SRT  theorists  have  emphasized  that  dialectics 
requires  mereological  thinking,  whereby  parts  and  wholes  often  reflect  each  other,  co-constitute 
each  other,  and  even  pass  into  one  another  (McNally,  103;  Ferguson  [2016],  47)  .  
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wife-child)  each  have  their  own  appropriate  type  of  rule  according  to  the  allegedly  inferior 
natures  and  virtues  of  the  subordinates.  329
Patriarchal  rule  involves  policing  both  the  rights  and  the  duties  of  subordinate 
household  members.  The  wife,  slave,  and  child  are  all  graded  according  to  their  supposed 
capacity  to  achieve  a  specific  internal  good:  the  intellectual  virtue  of  practical  reason 
( phronesis ).  Because  (according  to  Aristotle)  the  patriarch  alone  has  the  capacity  for 
authoritative  phronesis ,  he  is  both  free  (i.e.  not  enslaved)  and  empowered  with  citizenship 
rights  (i.e.  enabled  to  rule).   Because  the  wife  lacks  the  social  authority  to  exercise  her 330
potential  phronesis ,  she  is  denied  the  right  of  citizenship  despite  being  free  (i.e.  not 
enslaved).   The  slave  is  doubly  oppressed,  being  denied  both  freedom  and  citizenship 331
rights  (or,  in  marxist  feminist  terms,  liberation  and  power)  on  the  grounds  that  they 
supposedly  lack  even  the  psychological  potential  for  practical  reason.   The  child  is  only 332
temporarily  subjugated  on  the  assumption  that  they  will  eventually  gain  the  practical  reason 
to  govern  not  only  their  own  passions  but  also  other  ‘less  rational’  subjects.  For  Aristotle, 
each  of  these  power  relations  contain  a  common  good  which  serves  the  differing  interest  of 
ruled  as  well  as  ruler.   However,  this  would  be  a  degraded  and  alienating  form  of 333
329 Aristotle,  Politics  I.xii  1259b2-4;  I.xiii  1259b45-48. 
330 Aristotle,  Politics ,  I.xiii  1260b28-31;  III.iv  1277b14-28.  Marx  writes  that  until  now,  only  the  
ruling  class  has  been  truly  free,  meaning  that  their  freedoms  are  really  just  privileges  (Marx  and 
Engels,  The  German  Ideology,  197-8). 
331 Aristotle,  Politics  I.xiii  1260a14;  1260b20;  Wright,  212;  Horowitz,  207.  Of  course,  Aristotle’s  
claim  that  women  lack  sufficiently  recognized  authority  can  imply  that  men  possess  excessive 
and  irrational  authority  (Nichols,  32;  Levy,  405). 
332 Aristotle,  Politics  I.xiii  1260b13-14.  As  Frank  explains,  phronesis  is  “what  Aristotle  calls  a  
second-level  capability...  an  actualization  of  a  first-level  capacity”  through  deliberate  choice 
(Frank  [2004],  96).  Anyone  denied  the  opportunity  to  make  such  a  first-level  decision  cannot 
fully  exercise  the  second-level  of  phronesis  (Schofield,  321). 
333 Aristotle,  Politics  I.v  1254a24-28;  Cuffel,  331;  Swanson,  18. 
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community;  even  on  Aristotle’s  own  account,  the  purpose  of  rule  is  to  instill  not  only 
obedience  but  virtue…  which  would  delegitimize  the  grounds  for  hierarchy. 
 
3.7   Alienation  and  Democratic  Autonomy 
The  classed  and  gendered  division  of  labor  in  the  oikos  is  not  only  oppressive  and 
exploitative  (i.e.  corruptly  serving  only  the  ruling  class  interests  of  the  patriarch).   It  is  also 334
inherently  alienating,  estranging  the  wife  and  the  slave  from  themselves,  other  people,  the 
goods  they  produce,  and  even  their  own  working  conditions  and  productive  processes.  335
This  dynamic  is  most  clearly  illustrated  by  the  fact  that  the  slave  might  be  called  upon  as  a 
tutor  to  educate  the  child  who  will  become  their  future  master.   As  Aristotle  would  have 336
it,  the  slave  has  the  capability  to  train  another  to  eventually  manage  the  slave’s  working 
conditions,  but  the  slave  lacks  this  capability  themself,  requiring  their  own  manager.   A 337
marxist  feminist  would  reject  Aristotle’s  justification  of  ‘natural’  slavery  not  only  as 
reprehensible  but  also  as  obviously  false:  the  extent  to  which  a  slave  (or  any  superexploited 
worker)  lacks  capabilities  is  simply  the  extent  to  which  they  are  being  intellectually  or 
physically  stunted  by  political  decisions  made  by  more  powerful  others.   Thus,  the  slave 338
suffers  from  not  only  exploitation  and  ethnic  oppression,  but  also  alienation.   In  marxism, 339
334 Wright,  207,  214.;  Nichols,  32. 
335 Swanson  is  only  partially  correct  in  describing  this  condition  as  “diversified  excellence”  (19,  23).  
Marx  views  this  condition  of  class-formation  in  a  much  more  insidious  light  (Marx, Economic 
and  Philosophic  Manuscripts  of  1844 ,  74,  77). 
336 Aristotle,  Politics ,  VII.xvii  1336a40-1336b3.  Aristotle  indicates  a  difference  between  the  
enslaved  tutor  and  other  slaves  (who  he  says  have  a  bad  influence  on  the  child)  which  suggests  
that  even  on  his  own  classist  model,  at  least  some  slaves  possess  a  measure  of  virtue. 
337 This  contradiction  is  even  stronger  in  Elshtain’s  reading  of  Aristotle,  in  which  the  family  (and  not  
the  polis )  humanizes  people  via  education  in  reason  and  language  (Elshtain,  49). 
338 Murphy,  5.  In  case  this  sounds  offensive,  one  need  only  consider  the  impact  of  the  privatization  
of  schools  and  hospitals  upon  the  bodies  and  minds  of  the  impoverished. 
339 Marx  insists  that  economic  value  and  moral  virtue  should   affirm  one  another,  but  alienation  
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this  is  the  condition  of  the  estrangement  of  the  laboring  producer  from  their  produced  object 
(or,  more  relevantly,  reproduced  subject).  As  Marx  writes  (both  literally  and  figuratively), 
the  “worker  becomes  a  slave  of  his  object.”   340
All  class-based  modes  of  production  (whether  patriarchal  slavery  or  patriarchal 
capitalism)  alienate  workers  from  themselves  both  in  body  and  in  mind.   Aristotle  leaps 341
from  recognizing  the  psychological  difference  between  intellectual  activity  and  bodily 
productivity  to  positing  a  social  division  of  mental  and  manual  labor.   This  is  made  even 342
worse  by  his  evident  privileging  of  mind  over  matter,  which  entails  a  workplace  hierarchy 
of  management’s  mental  labor  and  workers’  concrete  labor  (producing  either  physical 
goods  or  relational  services).   Not  only  are  these  productive  ends  of  their  labor 343
determined  externally  by  their  employers  and  managers,  but  their  processual  means  of 
accomplishing  these  tasks  are  often  governed  by  rules  and  best  practices  over  which  they 
have  had  no  autonomous  input.  344
By  contrast,  marxist  feminists  suggest  that  if  workers  collectively  took  ownership  of 
their  means  of  production,  they  could  also  thereby  take  ‘ownership’  of  themselves. 345
entails  that  they  oppose  one  another  antagonistically  (DeGolyer,  138). 
340 Marx,  Economic  and  Philosophic  Manuscripts  of  1844 ,  72-73.  Marx  indicates  four  aspects  to  
alienation:  estrangement  from  one’s  self  (“species  being”),  one’s  products,  other  people,  and  
nature  (75-77). 
341 Marx  and  Engels,  The  German  Ideology ,  150.  Social  reproductive  workers  are  especially  
estranged  from  their  psychological  experiences,  because  much  of  care  work  and  service  work 
involves  emotional  labor. 
342 Murphy,  8.  Moreover,  the  slave’s  manual  labor  is  the  material  condition  of  possibility  for  the  
master,  whose  intellectual  ‘labor’  is  the  ordering  principle  for  the  slave  (Aristotle, Politics  I.iv 
1253b24-34;  Swanson,  41).  However,  Sharkey  points  out  that  on  Aristotle’s  account,  all  human 
beings  are  constituted  by  both  form  and  by  matter,  so  it  is  erroneous  of  him  to  posit  hierarchical 
binaries  between  different  types  of  human  being  on  such  a  basis  (Sharkey,  120).  
343 Aristotle,  Politics  I.vii  1255b34-35;  Fortenbaugh,  243. 
344 Marx  and  Engels,  The  German  Ideology,  160,  191;  Murphy,  226.  Following  Marx,  Arruzza  shows  
that  the  conditions  of  production  and  social  reproduction  (re)produce  the  worker  as  a  particular  
type  of  subject,  for  better  or  for  worse  (Arruzza,  18). 
345 Weeks  stresses  the  importance  of  considering  workplaces  as  political  “sites  of  decision-making”  
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Historically,  the  working  class  has  organized  in  two  types  of  democratic  institutions— labor 
unions  and  worker  cooperatives —to  mitigate  the  exploitation  of  labor  and  the  alienation 
from  workplace  control.   In  labor  unions,  workers  collectively  unite  against  the  owners 346
and  managers,  while  in  worker  cooperatives  workers  collectively  unite  to  become  owners 
and  self-managers.   Both  labor  unions  and  worker-owned  co-ops  call  for  prudence  not 347
only  synchronically  (at  the  micro-level  of  short-term  self-interest)  but  also  diachronically  (at 
the  macro-level  of  long-term  altruism).  348
While  the  short-term  goal  of  radicals  in  both  institutions  is  to  meet  the  needs  of 
themselves  and  their  comrades,  the  long-term  goal  is  to  transition  into  a  post-capitalist, 
post-racist,  post-patriarchal  society  that  serves  the  full  spectrum  of  needs  (varying  according 
to  positionality).   These  would  include  not  only  the  lower-level  needs  of  subsistent 349
survival  (i.e.  labor  power  replenished  by  social  reproduction),  but  also  those  higher  level 
needs  of  the  development  of  human  capabilities.  These  can  and  should  be  enabled  by  the 
state,  provided  that  it  has  been  structured  according  to  socialist  principles  (often  through  the 
pressure  of  liberation  movements).  Yet  marxists  hope  that  even  the  state  will  eventually 
wither  away.  This  presupposes  development  of  a  social  order  in  which  the  needs  and 
capabilities  of  all  are  both  socially  supported  yet  not  socially  determined.  350
(Weeks,  2).  However,  while  Marxists  call  for  the  workers  to  own  the  means  of  production,  it  is  
unclear  whether  there  should  be  direct  ownership  of  these  instruments,  or  rather  representative 
ownership  as  a  class. 
346 Wolff,  174.  These  function  as  prefiguratively  communistic   social  relations  within  the  dominant  
class  system,  demonstrating  that  a  common  good  is  possible  to  cultivate,  at  least  at  the  small  scale 
(Sayers,  169). 
347 Wolff,  3,  12. 
348 However,  Rosa  Luxemberg  warns  that  without  more  explicit  political  organizations: 
“Cooperatives  and  trade  unions  are  totally  incapable  of  transforming  the  capitalist  mode  of  
production”  (Luxemburg,  50). 
349 Marx,  Critique  of  the  Gotha  Program,  537.  
350 Marx  and  Engels,  The  German  Ideology,  160. 
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However,  there  is  one  capability  which  would  be  normative  for  all  citizens  to 
develop:  the  intellectual  virtue  of  phronesis .  For  economic  institutions  such  as  labor  unions 
and  worker  co-ops,  the  condition  of  democracy  at  work  is  both  the  (partial)  means  and  the 
(partial)  end  of  the  socialist  movement  in  which  they  often  participate.  Democracy  calls 
forth  the  practical  reasoning  of  all  participants.  The  collective  habit  of  democratic 
participation  can  and  should  be  practiced  prefiguratively  at  the  small  scale  as  preparation 
for  large  scale  socialist  transformation.   Practical  reason,  therefore,  is  not  only 351
instrumentally  valuable  as  a  means  of  providing  for  the  material  needs  of  oneself  or  another. 
Phronesis  is  also  an  inherently  valuable  end  in  itself,  a  part  of  the  set  of  virtues  which 
constitute  the  good  life.   Accordingly,  marxist  feminists  cannot  actually  disagree  with 352
Aristotle’s  framing  of  the  active  citizen’s  phronesis  as  the  necessary  connection  point 
between  ethics  and  politics.   Rather,  they  merely  expand  the  pool  of  agents  who  are 353
encouraged  to  develop  the  virtue  of  practical  reason  through  experience  in  collective 
decision-making.   354
For  care  workers  performing  social  reproductive  labor,  a  major  impediment  to 
democratizing  their  workplaces  is  their  suppression  of  phronesis  by  their  management  (as 
local  agents  of  the  capitalist  superstructure,  or  “ideological  state  apparatus”).  It  is  no  insult 
to  the  workers’  technical  intelligence  to  point  out  that  their  work  life  has  been  designed  to 
351 Wolff,  148.  However,  small-scale  prefiguration  is  limited:  Aristotle  claims  that  the  microstructural  
oikos  cannot  flourish  without  the  support  of  the  macrostructural  polis  (Dobbs,  35). 
352 Ahmed,  47.  The  internal  goods  are  virtues,  which  may  possibly  serve  as  partial  means  to  causally  
achieve eudaimonia,  but  which  must  necessarily  serve  as  the  component  parts  of  the  whole 
eudaimonistic  state  (Ackrill,  61-2).  
353 Nichols,  3,  5.  This  is  not  to  simply  identify  marxist  feminist  communism  with  Aristotelian  
eudaimonia;  rather,  it  is  to  treat  them  as  necessary  conditions  for  the  emergence  of  one  another 
(Ahmed,  32). 
354 Nichols,  5-6. 
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prevent  the  development  of  class  consciousness:  the  awareness  of  how  their  working 
conditions  are  connected  to  national  and  international  political  decisions,  and  how  their 
interests  and  those  of  their  bosses  align  with  their  counterparts  elsewhere.  Because 
alienated  workers  are  not  allowed  to  make  deliberative  decisions  even  about  their  own 
work  life,  they  do  not  develop  the  particular  kind  of  strategic  judgment  required  for  civic 
participation  in  state  rule  over  the  rest  of  their  lives.  355
 
3.8   Confluences  and  Conflicts  of  Interests 
Even  though  there  were  no  slave  revolts  or  abolitionists  in  ancient  Greece,  Aristotle 
takes  the  possibility  of  revolution  very  seriously.   He  emphasizes  the  necessity  of  social 356
stability  for  avoiding  revolution  by  other  strata  of  the  working  class.  To  theorize  optimal 
social  stability,  Aristotle  examines  the  material  and  moral  interests  of  each  major  social 
positionality,  including  each  member  of  the  oikos .   Because  the  wife  appears  to  belong  to 357
her  husband’s  class,  she  is  a  common  enemy  of  all  her  slaves  (who  have  a  shared  interest  in 
her  removal).   As  a  labor-aristocratic  manager,  the  wife  would  have  no  immediate  interest 358
in  joining  any  slave  rebellion  against  her  ruling  class  husband.   This  is  the  case  even  if  her 359
355 However,  this  by  no  means  implies  that  the  exploitative  private  realm  of  production  impedes  the  
development  of  any  virtues;  in  fact,  Swanson  reads  Aristotle  as  treating  the  private  worksite  as  an 
“opportunity  to  actualize  virtue”  albeit  at  a  degraded  level  (Swanson,  2). 
356 Finley,  109;  Mulgan,  43;  de  Ste.  Croix,  73,  75  .  A  marxist  explanation  for  the  lack  of  slave  revolts  
in  ancient  Greece  would  not  likely  point  to  any  failures  of  the  slaves  themselves,  but  rather  the 
historical  conditions  for  overthrowing  the  ancient  mode  of  production  (slavery)  which  were  not 
yet  sufficiently  developed  to  facilitate  a  wave  of  revolts.  
357 Although  revolution  paradigmatically  refers  to  an  upheaval  of  a  state’s  constitution,  it  also  
applies  to  the  nature  of  the  family,  which  has  also  changed  from  form  to  form  throughout  history, 
to  the  point  where  marxist  feminists  imagine  its  eventual  obsolescence  (Kollontai,  1-2).  
358 In  order  to  build  a  positive  common  good,  the  working  class  (along  with  the  Black  community,  
women,  and  other  subalterns)  first  identify,  rally  against,  and  defeat  the  ruling  class,  who  
constitute  a  common  enemy:  the  negative  inverse  of  the  common  good  (Davis,  142;  Marx  and 
Engels,  The  German  Ideology ,  199). 
359 In  fact,  as  Finley  shows,  there  is  not  even  historical  evidence  of  another  segment  of  the  working  
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slave  is  also  female,  and  they  might  be  expected  (by  non-marxist  feminists)  to  share 
gender-based  solidarity. 
However,  as  previously  discussed,  the  wife’s  managerial  function  is  a  type  of  labor 
(albeit  privileged).  Her  physical  well-being  (a  fundamental  set  of  needs)  is  dependent  upon 
her  ability  and  willingness  to  perform  her  assigned  duties.  This  implies  that,  strictly 
speaking,  she  is  actually  a  member  of  the  working  class,  who  are  not  only  economically 
exploited  but  who  are  also  politically  alienated  as  non-citizens.  The  wife  is  technically  free 
(not  enslaved)  but,  like  the  slave,  she  is  also  deprived  of  the  right  to  governance  (including 
political  decisions  affecting  her  workplace).   Thus,  it  is  not  clear  why  the  wife  (despite 360
her  rational  fear  of  retribution)  does  not  also  have  an  interest  in  becoming  empowered  to 
fully  realize  her  potential  (as  a  worker  as  well  as  a  citizen). 
While  the  wife’s  compromised  positionality  (as  a  class  traitor  to  her  enslaved 
co-workers)  provides  for  her  needs,  it  stultifies  her  abilities.  Her  husband  strips  her  of  the 
capacity  to  live  a  public  life.  Thus,  the  wife  shares  with  the  slave  a  common  good  (however 
negative)  in  the  form  of  the  possibility  of  overthrowing  the  rule  of  patriarch.  In  a  vacuum,  it 
is  not  inconceivable  that  the  slave—or  rather,  slaves—could  persuade  her  to  join  them  in 
overthrowing  the  master’s  rule.   361
class,  the  “free  poor…  joining  with  the  slaves  in  a  common  struggle”  (Finley,  107). 
360 On  Levy’s  reading,  Aristotle’s  only  problem  with  including  women  in  state  rule  is  a  lack  of  
political  education,  which  can  and  should  be  rectified  (Aristotle,  Politics  II.vi  1264b37-1276a12; 
Levy,  407). 
361 Of  course,  this  is  possibility  is  highly  speculative:  the  only  record  of  a  coordinated  women’s  
movement  is  the  fictional  sex  strike  in  Aristophanes’  5th-century  comedy Lysistrata  (Austin  and 
Vidal-Naquet,  26).  However,  for  present  purposes,  I  am  not  interested  in  the  implausibility  of  such 
a  common  struggle;  instead,  I  am  simply  performing  is  a  conceptual  analysis  of  the  lode-bearing 
notion  of  ‘interests’  within  marxist  feminist  theory.  
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Not  only  is  Aristotle’s  refusal  to  acknowledge  the  personal  and  social  benefits  of 
empowering  the  slave  and  wife  appalling—it  is  also  tragically  unnecessary.   Although 362
Aristotle  assumes  that  necessitarian  labor  and  freedom  are  mutually  exclusive,  this  is 
directly  at  odds  with  his  theory  of  human  nature  as  bodies  ensouled  with  the  psychological 
potentiality  for  reason.   Thus,  as  rational  animals,  all  human  beings  should  be  able  to  both 363
labor  and  to  deliberate—and  to  deliberate  about  how  to  labor.  If  the  wife  and  the  slave  were 
granted  the  ability  to  control  their  own  working  conditions,  they  would  quickly  develop  (or, 
more  precisely,  expand)  their  phronesis  through  managing  the  means  and  ends  of  their  own 
labor.  And  since  Aristotle  claims  that  women  and  ‘natural’  slaves  are  structurally  unable  to 
develop  this  virtue,  any  empirical  demonstration  of  phronesis  by  these  subalterns  would 
undermine  the  normative  force  ensuring  their  paternalistic  subordination.   He  is,  to  say  the 364
least,  unwarranted  in  inferring  a  lack  of  ability  based  on  continued  coercion  into  degrading 
socio-economic  roles.  365
Such  pseudo-meritocracy  is  not  merely  a  relic  of  ancient  patriarchal  slavery;   it 
persists  even  into  late-stage  patriarchal  racialized  capitalism.   The  problem  is  not  merely 366
that  the  class  system  ignores  the  intellectual  needs  of  the  super-exploited  workers,  nor  even 
that  it  seeks  to  keep  them  from  gaining  the  critical  thinking  skills  required  to  overthrow  the 
ruling  class  (e.g.  by  preventing  slaves  from  learning  to  read).   The  ultimate  problem  is  that 367
when  the  most  abject  members  of  the  working  class  do  in  fact  exhibit  the  ability  to 
362 Elshtain,  53. 
363 Aristotle,  Nicomachean  Ethics  I.xiii  1102b29-31;  Arendt,  72-73. 
364 This  has,  unsurprisingly,  been  demonstrated  historically,  from  Black  Reconstruction  to  the  
Petrograd  Soviet. 
365 Elshtain,  43;  Wright,  212. 
366 Arruzza,  Bhattacharya,  &  Fraser,  11. 
367 Davis,  22. 
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autonomously  control  their  own  environment,  it  reveals  them  to  have  the  same  rational 
faculties  as  their  would-be  superiors.   Such  democratic  participation  in  ruling  their  social 368
institutions  (including  their  jobs)  would  allow  the  working  class—whether  ancient  or  late 
modern—to  expand  their  capabilities  and  to  provide  for  the  needs  of  all.  
 
3.9   Virtuous  Circles 
In  the  long  term,  both  the  privileged  productive  laborers  and  the  marginalized  social 
reproductive  laborers  who  constitute  the  working  class  share  an  objective  interest  in 
abolishing  class  society  and  pursuing  a  common  good.   But  in  the  short-  to  mid-term,  the 369
exploitative  status  quo  induces  conflicts  of  interest  between  these  sub-classes.   Thus, 370
solidarity  between  them  is  not  a  given—instead,  such  a  common  good  must  be  constructed. 
The  common  good  depends  upon  contingent  conditions  at  the  personal  level  of  a  moral 
agent  whose  character  manifests  virtues  (e.g.  care,  justice,  and  practical  reason)  and/or 
vices  (e.g.  active  injustice  or  passive  complicity,  whether  out  of  ignorance  or  willful 
malice).  The  common  good  also  depends  on  the  social  conditions  determined  in  large  part 
by  property  distribution  according  to  political  decisions  (made  by  ruling  bodies  which  can 
be  more  or  less  democratic  in  nature).   Because  the  populace  contains  fluctuating  and 371
368 On  Aristotle’s  own  theory,  they  should  be  recognized  as  fellow  citizens  in  a  social  democracy  
(Bradshaw,  557;  Nussbaum  (1990),  203,  208,  233.  This  is  simply  a  positive  reading  of  Aristotle’s  
warning  that  changing  the  social  functions  of  the  alienated  and  exploitative  oikos  will  negatively 
impact  the  whole  social  order  (Coole,  29). 
369 Arruzza  notes  that  men,  unlike  capitalists,  have  nothing  to  lose  if  women’s  domestic  labor  is  
socialized  (Arruzza,  8).  In  the  abstract,  this  even  extends  to  the  uppermost  tiers  of  the 
bourgeoisie—ultimately,  a  common  good  should  be  available  to  all.  But  revolutionary  history 
shows  that  the  ruling  classes  are  extremely  reticent  to  recognize  this  possibility. 
370 Laslett  and  Brenner,  391;  McAlevey,  158.  Similarly,  Hartmann  writes  that  even  though  men’s  and  
women’s  interests  may  coincide  “in  the  long  run,”  they  are  opposed  in  the  short  term  
(Hartmann,  9).  
371 Yack,  3-4.  Aristotle  doubts  that  citizen-legislators  can  incentivize  the  common  use  of  common  
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uneven  levels  of  need-fulfillment  and  capability-development,  the  common  good  is 
inescapably  a  provisional  confluence  of  interests.   For  this  reason,  the  citizen-rulers 372
require  context-specific  phronesis  to  leverage  existing  goods  (both  internal  and  external)  as 
means  toward  the  end  of  achieving  further  ends  and  greater  goods. 
There  is  a  cyclical  relationship  between  the  internal  goods  consisting  of 
virtue-honed  capabilities  (such  as  phronesis )  and  external  goods  which  provide  for 
socio-material  needs.  Certain  external  goods  are  existentially  necessary  for  an  agent  to  even 
live  long  enough  to  develop  virtues,  while  some  internal  goods  (such  as  the  virtue  of 
phronesis )  are  necessary  for  them  to  even  secure  those  goods  at  all.   Analogously,  each 373
socio-economic  system  is  reproduced  by  the  dialectical  connection  between  material  base 
needs  (the  ‘lowest  common  denominator’  of  shared  interests)  and  the  intentional  strategic 
choices  made  by  the  ruling  class  of  citizen-legislators  (whose  practical  reasoning  may  be 
more  or  less  virtuous  in  nature).   374
Marxist  feminists  proclaim  as  a  key  article  of  faith  that  the  privileged  have  a  moral 
obligation  to  struggle  on  behalf  of  the  oppressed—perhaps  to  the  point  of  opposing  their 
own  interests.  However,  they  also  recognize  that  advocating  such  altruism  among  their 
(state)  property,  so  he  counsels  them  to  incentivize  the  virtue  of  benevolence  among  private 
property  owners  and  indirectly  enable  its  common  use  (Aristotle, Politics  II.v  1263a16-39; 
Dobbs,  39-40).  Yet  even  though  this  account  may  seem  quite  idealist  by  marxist  standards,  it  is 
based  on  Aristotle’s  empirical  analysis  of  human  behavior...  within  a  distributive  matrix  that  has 
already  been  concretely  determined  by  the  contingent  decisions  of  citizen-legislators. 
372 This  is  merely  the  inverse  of  how  oppressive  modes  of  production  (especially  capitalism)  may  
repeatedly  reconfigure  social  positionalities  to  perpetuate  ruling  class  corruption  (Arruzza,  14). 
373 Annas,  43.  Aristotle  writes  that  virtuous  activity  “needs  the  external  goods  as  well;  for  it  is  
impossible,  or  at  least  difficult,  to  do  noble  acts  without  the  proper  equipment.  In  many  actions 
we  use  friends  and  riches  and  political  power  as  instruments  ( Nicomachean  Ethics  I.viii 
1099a32-33).  
374 Nussbaum  (1990),  204. 
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privileged  allies  is  clearly  inadequate  as  their  primary  political  strategy.   After  all, 375
capitalist  patriarchy  is  partially  constituted  by  economic  conditions,  and  Marx  writes  that 
every  “radical  revolution”  is  driven  by  “a  material  basis…  the  needs  of  the  people.”   But 376
on  the  Aristotelian  model  of  moral  development,  it  is  actually  possible  for  prudent 
( ‘phronetic’ )  organizers  to  leverage  economic  self-interest  into  some  degree  of  altruistic 
solidarity.  377
The  marxist  feminist  tradition  has  always  had  one  foot  in  history  and  theory  and  the 
other  in  political  praxis ;  training  in  both  (via  the  experience  of  liberatory  struggle)  is 
required  to  make  strategic  judgments  reconciling  means  with  ends  and  particulars  and 
universals.   Through  such  practical  reasoning  (i.e.  Aristotelian  phronesis ),  marxist 378
feminists  can  determine  which  people  might  share  converging  interests  with  them,  even  if 
those  interests  are  purely  egoistic  material  needs.   Unlike  bourgeois  liberalism,  marxist 379
feminism  leverages  feelings  of  solidarity,  whereby  “an  injury  to  [one]  is  actually  an  injury 
to  all.”   By  appealing  to  such  enlightened  self-interest,  marxist  feminists  can  construct  a 380
common  good  within  and  across  (sub)class  divisions,  building  a  culture  of  solidarity  in 
which  relational  experiences  can  cultivate  more  altruistic  motives  and  virtues.   The 381
375 Bhattacharya,  15,  17.  This  is  the  case  even  with  perhaps  the  most  famous  articulation  of  
intersectionality,  the  Combahee  River  Collective  Statement.  Even  as  they  cite  the  need  to  center  
the  multiply  oppressed,  they  recognize  the  limits  of  altruism:  “We  believe  that  the  most  profound 
and  potentially  most  radical  politics  come  directly  out  of  our  own  identity,  as  opposed  to  working 
to  end  somebody  else's  oppression”  (Combahee  River  Collective,  19). 
376 Marx,  “Contribution  to  the  Critique  of  Hegel’s  Philosophy  of  Right ,”  61.  As  Silvia  Federici  
writes,  “welfare  buys  women  more  autonomy  from  men”  (Federici,  48). 
377 Frank  (2005),  153;  McAlevey,  56. 
378 McAlevey,  201,  11. 
379 As  Ruth  Groff  proposes,  “Aristotle’s  concept  of  phronesis  is  a  natural  one  for  Marxists  to  endorse  
when  it  comes  to  theorizing  the  nature  of  ethical  judgment”  (Groff,  313). 
380 Bhattacharya,  89-90. 
381 Luxemburg,  216,  McAlevey,  29;  T.  Smith,  628.  Simone  de  Beauvoir  emphasizes  the  inherently  
intersubjective  dimension  of  liberation:  to  “will  oneself  free  is  also  to  will  others  free”  (de 
Beauvoir,  73). 
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political  decisions  involved  in  building  such  coalitional  common  goods  requires  precisely 
the  Aristotelian  intellectual  and  moral  virtue  of  phronesis .  
Consider  the  example  of  a  care  worker  who  (along  with  her  comrades  in  her  labor 
union)  has  decided  to  go  on  strike  from  her  (waged)  social  reproductive  labor.   In 382
self-interestedly  pursuing  her  own  individual  good  (higher  wages,  better  working 
conditions,  and  greater  job  autonomy),  each  striking  care  worker  pursues  the  good  of  her 
union.  In  pursuing  the  good  of  her  union,  she  also  pursues  the  interest  of  her  class,  race, 
and  gender.   And  in  pursuing  the  interest  of  her  subordinate  class,  she  pursues  the  true 383
interest  of  her  entire  society.   True  political  struggle—even  for  self-interested 384
motives—does  not  leave  its  subjects  untouched.   In  the  process,  it  transforms  them  and 385
elevates  their  interests  and  ends—not  only  the  fulfillment  of  their  individual  needs,  but  their 
development  of  more  sophisticated  capabilities  by  which  to  serve  (and  expand)  the  interests 
of  others.   The  common  good—the  communist  good—is  one  in  which  abilities  and  needs 386
cohere  in  a  mutually  reinforcing  virtuous  circle.  Marx  and  Engels  famously  describe  such  a 
society  as  one  in  which  “the  free  development  of  each  is  the  condition  for  the  free 
development  of  all.”   387
I  conclude  that  within  any  class  society,  the  common  good  which  is  actually  shared 
by  different  classes,  genders,  and  races  (or  ethnicities)  is  an  interest  in  constructing 
382 These  industries—highly  feminized,   highly  racialized,  highly  social  reproductive—such  as  
healthcare,  education,  and  food  services—are  the  new  sites  of  labor  struggle  in  the  21st  century  
(McAlevey,  20).  
383 McAlevey,  158-9. 
384 McAlevey,  204.  
385 de  Beauvoir,  128. 
386 Frank  (2005),  175-76. 
387 Marx  and  Engels,  “Manifesto  of  the  Communist  Party,  491. 
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solidarity.   The  harmonization  of  conflicting  interests  is,  simply  put,  neither  possible  or 388
impossible.  Rather,  the  very  possibility  of  a  common  good  is  contingent  upon  the  internal 
and  external  conditions  of  multiple  individuals  in  different  social  and  economic 
positionalities.  A  solidaristic  common  good  between  different  classes,  genders,  and  races 
may  well  not  actually  exist,  but  it  can  become  possible .  Such  an  achievement  will  require 
the  exercise  of  phronesis,  the  most  essential  capability  for  democratic  deliberation  about  the 
just  distribution  of  necessities  and  the  means  of  accomplishing  it.   I  suggest  that  Aristotle’s 389
theory  of  moral  character,  especially  the  virtue  of  phronesis ,  can  serve  as  a  surprisingly 
effective  model  for  marxist  feminists  to  address  power  differentials  in  a  strategic  way  which 
builds  toward  liberation. 
 
3.10   Conclusion 
In  this  chapter,  I  analyze  the  conditions  under  which  a  common  good  (a  confluence 
of  interests)  would  be  possible  between  different  strata  of  the  working  class,  particularly 
across  the  gendered  and  racialized  division  of  labor  between  productive  and  social 
reproductive  workers.  I  consider  critiques  by  marxists  and  feminists  that  ‘common  good’ 
discourse  (such  as  Aristotle’s  foundational  conception),  when  deployed  under  present 
conditions  of  domination,  both  ignores  differences  in  need  and  ability  (due  largely  to 
388 As  Maria  Mies  recounts  her  students’  slogan  in  the  women’s  movement,  “Struggle  unites  us!”  
(Mies,  viii).  
389 Phronesis  is  an  instrumentally  valuable  means,  which  is  by  no  means  exhausted  in  either  
liberation  struggles  or  in  statecraft.  Yet  it  is  also  an  inherently  valuable  end  (Yack,  11-12).  In  both 
of  these  aspects, phronesis  is  a  necessary—though  not  sufficient—condition  for  the  good  life, 
individually  and  collectively. 
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classed  gendered  and  raced  conditioning)  and  ideologically  conceals  domination  by 
coercing  the  oppressed  and  exploited  to  substitute  their  oppressors’  interests  for  their  own.  
I  have  responded  that  marxist  feminism’s  socialist  principle  (‘From  each  according 
to  their  ability,  to  each  according  to  their  need’)  is  actually  a  specific  version  of  the 
Aristotelian  common  good.  Aristotle’s  hylomorphic  theory  conceptualizes  the  good  in 
terms  of  both  external  goods  (material  use  values  for  physical  needs)  as  well  as  internal 
goods  (the  virtuous  condition  of  rationally  habituated  affects).  Similarly,  marxist  feminist 
analysis  is  primarily  interested  in  certain  basic  needs  (viz.  food,  water,  shelter,  security, 
healthcare,  transportation,  and  education)  which  in  turn  empower  and  condition  human 
capabilities.  Thus,  human  life  is  not  only  reproduced  through  this  cycle  of  needs  and 
abilities,  but  is  naturally  self- transcending .  By  reducing  such  transcendence  to  subsistence, 
class  systems  alienate  workers  by  debasing  their  needs  and  incapacitating  their  abilities, 
thereby  all  but  precluding  a  common  good. 
I  have  shown  that  what  marxists  and  feminists  view  as  ideological 
pseudo-universality  is  precisely  what  Aristotle  calls  corruption ,  whereby  a  particular 
interest  falsely  asserts  itself  as  representing  the  interest  of  the  whole.  Using  these 
definitions,  Aristotle  develops  a  normative  theory  of  regime  types  in  which  institutional 
legitimacy  requires  that  each  ruler  serve  the  interests  of  all  (i.e.  the  common  good)  rather 
than  only  their  own  interests  (i.e.  corruption).  On  this  definition,  patriarchal  racialized 
capitalism  does  not  merely  permit,  reward,  or  even  cause  corruption;  instead,  by  definition, 
it  is  an  inherently  corrupt  system. 
94 
I  have  recounted  how  Aristotle’s  common  good  schema,  originally  developed  to 
evaluate  the  legitimacy  of  a  political  state,  is  also  applied  microcosmically  to  the  economic 
worksite  of  the  household  ( oikos ).  Within  the  ancient  familial  slave  economy,  Aristotle 
prescribes  a  specific  hierarchical  rule  to  each  relationship:  husband  over  wife,  master  over 
slave,  wife  over  slave,  father  over  child,  and  slave  over  child.  These  forms  of  rule  are 
drawn  from  political  regime  types,  which  either  function  justly  for  the  common  good  or 
function  unjustly  for  corrupt  private  interests.  Aristotle  ranks  the  socio-economic 
positionalities  of  the  patriarch,  the  wife,  the  slave  and  the  child  according  to  their 
(in)abilities  to  politically  exercise  phronesis :  practical  reason  or  prudence.  Aristotle  insists 
that  this  capacity  (for  rationally  acting  to  benefit  others  and  self)  gives  the  patriarchal  master 
the  right  to  not  only  control  the  workplace  but  also  participate  as  a  free  citizen  in  the 
autonomous  rule  of  the  state.  While  marxist  feminists  would  reject  as  absurd  the  claim  that 
women  and  the  enslaved  cannot  exercise  practical  wisdom,  they  would  acknowledge  that 
the  oppressed  have  (by  definition)  been  prevented  from  developing  phronesis  (which  is 
necessary  for  democratic  collective  autonomy)  by  being  systematically  denied  the 
experience  of  ruling  at  any  level  beyond  one’s  own  workplace  (e.g.  the  oikos ). 
I  have  argued  that,  as  with  his  notion  of  the  common  good,  Aristotelian  phronesis  is 
not  merely  a  ruling  class  characteristic;  it  is  also  indispensable  for  working  class  liberatory 
struggles  which  must  navigate  socio-political  contingencies  with  principled  stances.  The 
utopian  goal  of  communism,  in  which  democratic  structures  rationally  coordinate  the  needs 
and  abilities  of  all,  would  entail  that  all  citizens  cultivate  this  deliberative  virtue  of  phronesis 
through  participation  in  the  governance  structures  responsible  for  fulfilling  basic  needs. 
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I  have  demonstrated  that  marxist  feminists  would  agree  with  Aristotle’s  claim  that 
only  the  practically  wise  should  rule,  because  otherwise  the  common  good—the  needs  and 
abilities  of  all—will  not  be  served.  Yet  because  marxist  feminists  are  committed  to  actual 
democracy  (at  least  in  the  long  term),  they  must  insist  that  everyone  should  develop 
phronesis.  (Contra  Aristotle’s  ideological  circular  logic,  everyone  must  be  said  to  have  this 
potential).  By  building  autonomous  workplace  institutions  such  as  labor  unions  and 
worker-owned  co-ops,  workers  (especially  multiply  oppressed  care  workers)  can  exercise 
practical  reason  in  democratic  deliberation  over  their  own  means  of  production.   In  the 
meantime,  as  the  exploited  and  the  oppressed  struggle  against  their  common  enemy,  their 
shared  experience  trains  them  in  the  virtue  of  practical  reason  and  expands  their  capacity 
for  collective  autonomous  decision-making.  This  shared  capability  increases  the  likelihood 
of  providing  for  not  only  their  own  needs  but  also  for  those  of  others.  The  collectively 
deployed  virtue  of  phronesis  is  both  a  strategic  means  toward—and  an  end  prefiguratively 
manifesting—the  good  life  which  Aristotle  calls  eudaimonia  and  which  marxist  feminists 
call  liberation  or  even  communism.  The  more  that  citizens—comrades—exercise  internal 
goods  (such  as  the  virtuous  capability  of  phronesis ),  the  more  capable  they  will  be  in 
making  strategic  decisions  as  history  unfolds  dialectically.  And  the  prudent  decisions  they 
will  make  will  strategically  connect  the  diverse  needs  and  abilities  among  different  social 
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